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ARE LITIGATION OUTCOME DISPARITIES 
INEVITABLE? COURTS, TECHNOLOGY,  
AND THE FUTURE OF IMPARTIALITY 
Avital Mentovich, J.J. Prescott, & Orna Rabinovich-Einy* 
This Article explores the ability of technology—specifically, online judicial procedures—to eliminate 
systematic group-based litigation outcome disparities (i.e., disparities correlated with the visible identity 
markers of litigants). Our judicial system has long operated under the assumption that it can only be 
“impartial enough.” After all, judges, like all human beings, harbor implicit biases that often are sizable, 
unconscious, and triggered automatically, and research indicates that strategies to curb implicit biases in 
human decision-making may be ineffective, especially in the face of the resource and caseload constraints 
of modern-day adjudication. The recent emergence of online court proceedings, however, offers new hope 
for curtailing disparities. By allowing hearings to occur without face-to-face interactions, online legal pro-
ceedings may lessen the salience of group-identity traits, thereby mitigating unwarranted disparities and 
enhancing the impartiality of the justice system. Yet online proceedings differ from in-person hearings in 
ways beyond merely reducing the salience of age, gender, and race—and these differences may also influence 
group-based outcome disparities. Using state-court data, we study group-based disparities in online and 
offline civil-infraction cases. We present evidence that is consistent with the existence of implicit or other 
structural biases in face-to-face proceedings; all else equal, legal outcomes appear to vary by litigant age 
and race but not by gender. These disparities fade with the change in medium, possibly by circumventing 
implicit biases. We explore the implications of our findings for system impartiality and weigh the chal-
lenges confronting efforts to realize substantive, procedural, and digital justice in online courts.  
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   INTRODUCTION  
Impartiality stands as a long-established and central pillar of a just legal 
system,1 and an impartial decision maker2—someone who is independent, neu-
tral, disinterested, unbiased, and guided solely by law—has long been seen as 
an indispensable feature of fair and legitimate judicial proceedings.3 Recently, 
however, research has cast significant doubt on the ability of human decision 
makers to achieve complete or full impartiality by uncovering persistent dispar-
ities in judicial decisions, many of which correlate with the visible group-identity 
markers of parties.4 One plausible explanation for these disparities is grounded 
in social-science research, which has exposed widespread and inevitable biases, 
heuristics, and stereotypes in human thought processes that operate on behav-
ior automatically and, at times, unconsciously.5 These findings, when applied to 
the legal realm, illuminate the many ways in which “implicit bias” may shape 
judicial decision-making, resulting in disparities in legal outcomes that are a di-
rect function of a litigant’s group identity.6  
Judicial biases of any sort in decision-making are not the only plausible ex-
planation of identity group-based outcome disparities, however.7 Legal systems 
 
1. See Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 498–506 (2014) 
(tracking judicial impartiality as a value in Western history, philosophy, and literature); Martin Jay, Must Justice 
Be Blind? The Challenge of Images to the Law, in LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE 
AESTHETICS OF LAW 65, 68–69 (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999) (tracing the history of the 
blindfolded Lady Justice and stating that, although initially satirical, “[b]y 1530 . . . the blindfold was trans-
formed instead into a positive emblem of impartiality and equality before the law” and that “this impartiality 
was required by the new urban, secular, bourgeois culture of the early modern period, which left behind the 
personalism of private, feudal justice”). 
2. Leviticus 19:15 (“Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not respect the person of 
the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour.”); see 
also Geyh, supra note 1, at 512 (“For over two thousand years, being a good judge has meant being an impartial 
judge.”). 
3. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1–8 (1981). 
4. See, e.g., Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 
1207–40 (2018) (demonstrating racial disparities in sentencing and plea bargaining, where black defendants 
are more likely than white defendants to be convicted for crimes carrying the possibility of imprisonment and 
less likely to receive sentence reductions); Brian D. Johnson, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Sentencing Departures 
Across Modes of Conviction, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 464–78, 482 (2003) (analyzing “departures”—where defend-
ants receive sentences that depart from the recommended range of punishment for a certain crime—and 
finding that black and Hispanic defendants are more likely than white defendants to receive upward depar-
tures and less likely to receive downward departures). 
5. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra Part I.B. Importantly, attempts to reduce outcome disparities through measures like requir-
ing more deliberate decision-making and reducing judicial discretion have proved to be at least somewhat 
unsuccessful. See infra Part I.D (examining the nature of implicit biases and the practical constraints to resolv-
ing them in the modern court system). 
7. Litigation procedure may cause disparate outcomes if it systematically influences substantive trial 
outcomes—and this seems to be the case even in relatively minor disputes. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler, Medi-
ation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
323, 335–37 & tbl.1 (1995). Wissler’s empirical analysis of small-claims disputes finds that “the successful 
mediation and adjudication groups could be distinguished with 85% accuracy on the basis of . . . 10 process 
characteristics,” including session length, whether the presiding official is hurried, whether few solutions were 
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must rely on innumerable procedures for courts to arrive at outcomes with 
some measure of consistency,8 and even facially neutral procedures can result 
in disparate playing fields vis-à-vis social groups—echoing socioeconomic and 
cultural differences and ending in identity-group-based disparities in the sub-
stantive outcomes of litigated disputes.9 Difficult to detect or isolate empirically, 
or even to predict ex ante, these structural biases detract from our justice sys-
tem’s impartiality even though they do not stem from explicit or implicit judicial 
bias. Instead, by definition, they are rooted in and emanate from fixed and uni-
formly applied litigation procedures.10 An illustration of this dynamic can be 
found in the now-standard methods by which U.S. tribunals assemble evidence 
(e.g., defaulting to requiring parties to testify in person in open court), which 
might in fact impede the ability of particular social groups to effectively convey 
their observations or preferences.11  
 
discussed, whether parties were given control over the presentation or opportunity to tell their story, whether 
the discussion was thorough, whether parties had control over the outcome, whether the procedure was 
formal and/or open, whether the procedure was understandable, and whether there was discussion or argu-
ment. Id. at 335. Although not a consideration in this analysis, representation—and its quality—factors heavily 
into disparate court outcomes. See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public De-
fender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2635–41 (2013); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Defense Attorney Bias and the Rush to 
the Plea, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 271, 283 (2016) (“Differences in socio-economic background, education, and 
race can influence even diligent defense attorneys powerfully, and without the attorneys being conscious of 
them.”). Cf. Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of 
Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2006) (contending that 
lawyers have “more accurate information than pro se litigants do about likely outcomes at trial” and that legal 
representation leads to statistical improvements for client outcomes in Tax Court litigation). 
8. See, e.g., BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ASSESSING CONSISTENCY AND 
FAIRNESS IN SENTENCING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN THREE STATES 1 (2008), https://www.ncsc.org/~/ 
media/Microsites/Files/CSI/Assessing%20Consistency.ashx (positing that sentencing guidelines are proce-
dures designed, in part, to ensure consistent sentencing outcomes). 
9. For example, assume that groups with different identity markers vary in their preferred mode of 
argument in a face-to-face setting. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of 
Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 271–92 (1993) (explaining that vocal registers and linguis-
tic patterns are linked to gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and the power dynamics in the particular 
interaction). If these different argument modes are differentially effective in a courtroom setting, we might 
find outcome disparities that have nothing to do with implicit biases. In principle, any observable, group-
level, procedurally relevant differences could be measured and accounted for in empirical work, but data 
challenges abound in studying litigation procedures, dynamics, and outcomes. But see Brian D. 
Johnson, Contextual Disparities in Guidelines Departures: Courtroom Social Contexts, Guidelines Compliance, and 
Extralegal Disparities in Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 761, 786–89 (2005) (finding that seemingly neu-
tral factors such as courtroom size affect rates of sentencing departures). 
10. As an illustration, scholars have suggested that the Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009), which heightened the standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) motions, embeds bias within the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1159–
63 (2012) (arguing that the facially neutral plausibility standard suffers from the fact that plausibility is ulti-
mately subjective); Ramzi Kassem, Implausible Realities: Iqbal’s Entrenchment of Majority Group Skepticism Towards 
Discrimination Claims, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1443, 1458–64 (2010) (same). 
11. For instance, the requirement that a litigant be physically present in court can hurt low-income 
individuals and their families. See Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems: Enhanc-
ing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 224–25 (2016) (explaining how spending 
half a day at court may be prohibitively expensive for low-income workers, who are disproportionately from 
minority groups). 
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As it became too much to expect modern judicial systems to achieve abso-
lute impartiality in legal outcomes, debate simmered over how best to address 
the myth or paradox of judicial impartiality.12 An equilibrium of sorts eventually 
emerged: on the one hand, impartiality continues to serve as an abstract and 
aspirational ideal for our courts, and on the other hand, full or true impartiality 
is taken to be impossible given human and structural constraints associated with 
conventional legal process, which can produce at best “impartial enough” legal 
outcomes.13 This equilibrium status quo has long seemed fixed and inevitable, 
given the architecture of judicial proceedings in which the decision-making pro-
cess revolves around face-to-face oral interaction.14  
And yet the recent rise of online hearings and other court proceedings,15 
which transport evidentiary and decision-making processes to the online sphere 
(accessed through computers and mobile devices), holds promise as a catalyst 
for disrupting this “impartial enough” status quo, hopefully mitigating many of 
the remaining—and stubborn—group-based outcome disparities in our sys-
tem.16 These technological innovations not only have the ability to make phys-
ical identity attributes of litigating parties (such as age, gender, and race) less 
salient during proceedings but also may change the nature of communication 
in litigation and rearrange the structure of the process, and any such disruption 
has the potential to reveal any long-hidden structural tendencies toward dispar-
ity, if not implicit bias in judicial decision-making. Thus, the arrival of online 
procedures presents an opportunity to better understand “impartiality” and the 
 
12. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial 
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1156–58 (2009) (finding that, in federal workplace racial-har-
assment suits, a judge’s race and political affiliation affects their adjudication); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the 
Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95, 119–28 (1997) 
(contending that impartiality is more likely with a racially representative judiciary); Kathleen Mahoney, Judicial 
Bias: The Ongoing Challenge, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 43, 66 (advocating that judges be educated about the social 
factors that threaten their impartiality); Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 417, 431–34 (2011) (reasoning that extraordinarily high caseloads, among other factors, leave little time 
for immigration judges to engage in deliberate thinking, which threatens their impartiality). Various scholars 
have referred to impartiality in the court setting as a “myth,” a “fiction,” or an “elusive ideal.” E.g., Geyh, 
supra note 1, at 495, 510; Kathleen E. Mahoney, Essay, The Myth of Judicial Neutrality: The Role of Judicial Education 
in the Fair Administration of Justice, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 785 (1996) [hereinafter Mahoney, The Myth of 
Judicial Neutrality]. Even the goal of being “impartial enough” is elusive. See Geyh, supra note 1, at 510. 
13. See Geyh, supra note 1, at 493, 510. 
14. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (Confrontation Clause); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020–22 
(1988) (holding that a defendant’s confrontation right was violated when the state used a screen at trial to 
prevent his alleged child victims from seeing him while they testified); In re Gust, 345 N.W.2d 42, 45 (N.D. 
1984) (reasoning that telephonic depositions are strongly disfavored because they inhibit insight into the 
witness’s credibility). But see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1989) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause permits testimony by one-way closed-circuit television “where necessary to protect a child witness 
from trauma that would . . . impair the child’s ability to communicate”). 
15. See J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform Technology, 70 VAND. L. REV. 
1993, 1999–2000 (2017) (surveying court adoption of ODR); Zack Quaintance, Judges, Private Sector Spread 
Online Dispute Resolution in Courts, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/public-
safety/Judges-Private-Sector-Spread-Online-Dispute-Resolution-in-Courts.html (discussing the growth of 
online dispute resolution). 
16. See infra Part II. 
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varied sources of group-based outcome disparities in our courts and, on a 
broader level, to underscore the connection between the design of legal pro-
cesses and courts and the fairness of the outcomes they produce. 
In this Article, we explore the consequences of introducing online proce-
dures on social-group-identity outcome disparities. We posit that the obscuring 
of identity attributes—coupled with the enhanced structure (i.e., less procedural 
discretion) that comes with software design and the ability to testify or com-
municate over the Internet from afar—will engender fewer disparities in out-
comes across social groups and more consistency (and hence impartiality) in 
legal decision-making.17 We test our hypothesis empirically with case-level data 
using a quasi-experiment: the plausibly exogenous adoption and implementa-
tion of online dispute-resolution (ODR) procedures in two state district courts 
in the United States. Our data allow us to compare differences in litigation out-
comes reached in face-to-face procedures relative to ODR-style hearings for 
civil infractions by party age, gender, and race. 
We find that the shift from traditional in-person judicial proceedings to 
online (or at least differently organized) proceedings reduces measured age- and 
race-based disparities in litigation outcomes.18 On the basis of these results, we 
contend that online proceedings (when otherwise legally and ethically appropri-
ate) may succeed at diminishing group-based disparities that arise from face-to-
face traditional hearings as they are currently structured.19 At the same time, we 
recognize that any gains in impartiality may, at times, come with accuracy and 
legitimacy costs when interpersonal interaction and attention to the particulars 
of the case and party identity are important.20 In addition, we acknowledge that 
our empirical results emerge from a particular court system, a narrow range of 
case types, and a specific ODR platform technology.21 Nevertheless, our work 
confirms the practical significance of process design to legal-system impartiality 
and fairness, and it does so contemporaneously with the nascent exponential 
growth—both nationally and globally—in the use of digital technology in dis-
pute resolution and the availability of online proceedings.22 
 
17. Precedent for this idea can be found within the medical profession, which has been exploring iden-
tity obfuscation as a way to reduce healthcare disparities. See, e.g., Sande Okelo et al., Race and the Decision to 
Refer for Coronary Revascularization: The Effect of Physician Awareness of Patient Ethnicity, 38 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 
698, 701–02 (2001) (finding that examining only clinical factors leads to similar treatment of white and black 
patients but that disparities arise when race is introduced into files). 
18. See infra Part II.D. 
19. See infra Part III.A. 
20. And as courts shift from physical to textual or virtual interaction, different biases may shape judicial 
decisions reached online. For a short discussion of the challenges and trade-offs associated with the shift to 
online courts, see infra Part III.B. 
21. See infra Part II.D.5. 
22. See, e.g., Quaintance, supra note 15 (describing the expansion of online dispute resolution and how 
the technology fosters efficiency and “genial solutions to disputes”). 
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Our Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the gap between the 
quest for impartiality and the reality of disparate judicial outcomes across iden-
tifiable groups. We elaborate on two possible sources for this reality: the influ-
ence of implicit biases in decision-making and the existence of structural biases 
stemming from the specifics of legal-process design.23 We note particularly that 
the salience of identity features in the face-to-face court setting, combined with 
the spread of managerial judging practices and informal hearings that broaden 
the scope of judicial discretion, can exacerbate implicit biases,24 perhaps adding 
to any existing structural biases. Part II presents empirical analysis from real-
world adoption and use of online court proceedings. We demonstrate that the 
shift from typical face-to-face court proceedings to online hearings appears to 
reduce measured litigant age- and race-based disparities in legal outcomes, with 
little evidence of it affecting gender dynamics. Part III situates our case study 
and its results within the broader context of fair, just, and effective court pro-
ceedings in the digital age, exploring both the benefits and the costs associated 
with the vision of realizing impartiality in the online setting. 
I. IMPARTIALITY AND DISPARITIES IN LEGAL OUTCOMES 
A. The Equilibrium 
Impartiality is perhaps the basic principle of a just legal system.25 It is seen 
as a normative prerequisite for legal judgment,26 and it is essential for ensuring 
the legitimacy of the legal system and the judicial branch of government in par-
ticular.27 Although it is likely that virtually all agree on the centrality of impar-
tiality as a fundamental legal principle, its formal definition is more elusive, with 
many referring alternatively to various facets of this complex notion. Typically, 
discussions of impartiality focus on the necessity of evenhanded decision mak-
ers (in the legal setting, of judges and their staffs),28 although the impartiality of 
 
23. See infra Parts I.A–C. 
24. See infra Part I.C. 
25. See supra note 1. 
26. The centrality of impartiality in the rule of law has roots in moral philosophy, both in the sense of 
identity blindness and in the requirement for a consistent application of any moral principle. The supremacy 
of principle over the characteristics and interests of the parties or the decision maker is echoed in the Kantian 
notion of “moral maxims” and in the Rawlsian notion of the “veil of ignorance.” The moral maxims were 
portrayed as a priori moral principles that must be applied in all contexts by all humans to all humans. See, e.g., 
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40 (Allen W. Wood ed. & trans., 
Yale Univ. Press 2002) (1785); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 114 (rev. ed. 1999). The identity and 
contextual blindness for which the philosophical traditions of Kant and Rawls advocate, however, have been 
the subject of critique regarding both the desirability and feasibility of this abstraction in realizing substantive 
justice. See infra note 389; infra Part III.B.1. 
27. See Anne Richardson Oakes & Haydn Davies, Process, Outcomes and the Invention of Tradition: The Grow-
ing Importance of the Appearance of Judicial Neutrality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 573, 573 (2011). 
28. See Henry T. Lummus, Our Heritage of Impartial Justice, 22 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 243, 243–44 
(1939) (reasoning that impartial justice demands decisions based solely on law and evidence, without regard 
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legal proceedings or of the justice system as a whole of course remains in jeop-
ardy even without decision-maker biases of any sort. We consider these latter, 
facially neutral phenomena below when we address structural-design disparities 
in adjudication. We begin here with judicial impartiality, the more common arena 
in which scholars examine and defend impartiality. 
The first sense in which we expect impartiality from judges can be labeled 
a negative view of impartiality. This notion captures the need for judges to with-
draw from judicial decision-making when they would not be neutral, objective, 
disinterested, or “unswayed by personal interest.”29 This negative take on a 
judge’s duty is perhaps the most intuitive understanding of impartiality. At the 
same time, it is a rather narrow understanding of the term, which simply an-
nounces when judges should be disqualified from deciding entire cases or dis-
putes but provides little positive instruction on how to maintain, actively 
develop, or foster impartiality in the real-world situations in which judges 
must—in order to avoid an unfair status quo—make decisions. 
The more affirmative or substantive component of judicial impartiality is 
defined positively; it relates to the necessary environmental conditions or steps 
judges or a justice system must take to ensure impartial decision-making when 
judges are qualified in the negative sense we describe above or are otherwise 
required to adjudicate a dispute. If the negative understanding of impartiality 
instructs judges about what they should avoid (such as adjudicating cases that 
affect their interests or ruling on issues using their personal preferences and 
prejudices as touchstones), the positive element guides judges in how and what 
they ought to consider in arriving at their decisions (that is, the law—both pro-
cedural and substantive—and facts that are germane to the law).30 When both 
aspects of impartiality are firmly in place, we assume that judges should “[b]e 
able to think dispassionately and submerge private feelings on every aspect of 
 
to external pressures); see also Melissa E. Loewenstern, The Impartiality Paradox, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 501, 
503–05 (2003) (characterizing the neutral judge as the central precept of the adversary system). 
29. Impartial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2018) (“Any 
justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). 
30. For an analysis of the ways various procedural arrangements subtly enhance judicial impartiality by 
preventing prejudgment and allowing for appellate review, see Geyh, supra note 1, at 520–29. 
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the case,”31 conduct fair proceedings that are likely to produce accurate results, 
and announce principled and reasoned decisions.32 
If the arrangements guaranteeing both positive and negative aspects of im-
partiality are successful in producing unbiased decision-making by judges, then 
we would expect similar cases to be handled with similar (i.e., consistent) legal 
proceedings and to result in similar outcomes.33 In this sense, consistency can 
serve as an important signal of judicial commitment to impartiality, and likewise, 
the lack thereof may indicate that a judge’s decision may have been based on 
irrelevant or inappropriate considerations.34 In this framework, the impartial 
application of judicial discretion does tolerate certain variations in outcomes 
across similar cases (for example, legitimate differences across judges in pun-
ishment philosophies), but for outcomes to be “impartial,” such variation—so 
long as it is not grounded in bias—should not correlate with whether litigants 
are members of a particular identity group (e.g., age, gender, or race) or any 
other characteristic or consideration irrelevant to the dispute or task.35 
Reality, however, is at odds with this aspiration. Over the years, it has be-
come increasingly clear that a system’s or judge’s explicit commitment (and 
even strong devotion) to impartiality in both the negative and positive senses 
 
31. Peter M. Friedman, Comment, Don’t I Know You from Somewhere?: Why Due Process Should Bar Judges 
from Presiding over Cases When They Have Previously Prosecuted the Defendant, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 683, 
703 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952)). But see 
Kathy Mack & Sharyn Roach Anleu, Performing Impartiality: Judicial Demeanor and Legitimacy, 35 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 137, 138 (2010) (“[A] legitimate exercise of judicial authority . . . requires a judicial demeanor that 
displays detachment as well as engagement.”); Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial 
Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, 
and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 431 (2004) (offering a different understanding of neutrality as 
nonpassive, at least in certain contexts and settings). This concept is premised on the distinction between 
impartiality toward the parties and neutrality toward the issues in the case. See Joe Cutler, Oops! I Said It 
Again: Judicial Codes of Conduct, the First Amendment, and the Definition of Impartiality, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
733, 740 (2004); Ralph Slovenko, “Je Recuse!”: The Disqualification of a Judge, 19 LA. L. REV. 644, 648 (1959). But 
one might question the ability to separate the two because identity may influence how someone thinks about 
an issue. See infra Part I.D (discussing the justifications for judicial diversification). 
32. The most immediate and obvious arrangements that encourage judges to be impartial are court 
procedures such as recusal rules (part of the due process requirement), see Geyh, supra note 1, at 515–18,  and 
judicial ethical rules (and related disciplinary proceedings), see id. at 515–18, 523–29. 
33. William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1265 
(1986). 
34. Of course, tying impartiality or neutrality to consistency in outcomes depends on one’s approach 
toward the meaning of neutrality. In recent years, in the dispute-resolution literature, an alternative view of 
neutrality has been advanced in which decision makers do not distance themselves from the parties but are 
instead equally close to each. See, e.g., Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in 
Mediation, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 35, 41–46 (1991) (describing the discontinuity between two different 
notions of neutrality in mediation: “neutrality-as-impartiality,” which requires detachment, and “neutrality-
as-equidistance,” which requires proactive involvement); Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution 
and Systemic Change, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (advocating for “multi-partiality,” a form of neutrality involving 
“critically analyzing a conflict from multiple vantage points . . . as a way to check the inevitable biases in 
decision making that must be continually surfaced and corrected”). 
35. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 156–57 (1961) (equating impartiality in the law with 
objectivity and reasoning that both demand the “law [be] applied to all those and only to those who are alike 
in the relevant respect marked out by the law itself”). 
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can neither eliminate outcome disparities nor fully inoculate judges against po-
tential biases, chiefly unconscious ones. This realization emerged from devel-
opments on at least two fronts. The first is the large and growing body of work 
in the social sciences exposing the existence and indeed pervasiveness of un-
conscious human biases, stereotypes, and heuristics.36 These systematic distor-
tions affect both decision-making and behavior and therefore have important 
consequences for all human institutions.37 The second significant development 
is the evolving and now-extensive volume of research uncovering and docu-
menting systematic disparities in legal outcomes in what are similar cases—dif-
ferences that align with a party’s group-identity markers (mainly race) even after 
controlling for other individual dissimilarities.38 
These disparities cannot easily be attributed to explicit violations of either 
the negative notion of impartiality (i.e., that judges refrain from deciding cases 
in which they have a personal interest in or a connection to the parties or issues 
at stake) or the positive concept of impartiality (i.e., that judicial decision-mak-
ing should be expressly reasoned in a way that places any outcome in question 
within the boundaries of the law). Thus, one explanation for the prevalence of 
disparities in litigation outcomes is that they derive 1) from the structure of legal 
process itself and/or 2) from systematic cognitive and behavioral biases that 
 
36. E.g., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF 
GOOD PEOPLE 47–49 (2013) (“[A]lmost 75 percent of [Americans] who take the Race IAT [Implicit Asso-
ciation Test] . . . reveal automatic White preference. . . . The meta-analysis . . . clearly showed that the Race 
IAT predicted racially discriminatory behavior.”); see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 955–57 & tbl.1 (2006) (“[O]nly 18% of respondents 
demonstrated sufficiently small implicit bias to be judged implicitly neutral.”). 
37. E.g., BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 36, at 47 (“[A]utomatic White preference expressed on 
the Race IAT is now established as signaling discriminatory behavior.”). Such preferences manifest, for ex-
ample, as preferring white over black job applicants or more readily perceiving anger in black faces than in 
white faces. Id. at 49. 
38. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System: A Summary, 31 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 15, 20–21 & tbl.2 (1985) (finding that, starting with similar charges, black and Hispanic suspects are 
less likely than white suspects to receive felony-misdemeanor charge reductions and more likely to receive 
prison sentences); Katherine B. Spencer et al., Implicit Bias and Policing, 10 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. 
COMPASS 50, 53 (2016) (citing Jack Glaser, The Efficacy and Effect of Racial Profiling: A Mathematical Simulation 
Approach, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 395 (2006)) (“[F]ocusing law enforcement on members of a 
minority group can create and exaggerate disparities in criminal justice outcomes . . . .”); Michael Tonry, The 
Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & 
JUST. 273, 274 (2010) (“[A] combination of police practices and legislative and executive policy 
decisions . . . systematically treat black offenders differently, and more severely, than whites.”); Patricia 
Warren et al., Driving While Black: Bias Processes and Racial Disparity in Police Stops, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 709, 731 
(2006) (“In general, we find a fairly large race disparity in local police officer stops and a very small one in 
highway patrol stops.”). These studies investigate the criminal justice system, but the same phenomenon 
appears to exist elsewhere in our justice system. See, e.g., Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1164 (speculating that 
implicit biases affect juror decision-making in the context of civil trials); Loren D. Goodman, Note, For What 
It’s Worth: The Role of Race- and Gender-Based Data in Civil Damages Awards, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1356 (2017) 
(discussing the continued use of race- and gender-based data in the calculation of civil damages); cf. Gary 
LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and 
Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 767, 788–89 (1996) (reporting that “bivariate results offer con-
siderable support for a disparity hypothesis” but conceding that multivariate analysis indicates the disparities 
may be explained by case-specific and repeat-player variables rather than by race and gender). 
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can impact judicial decision-making.39 Judges are likely unaware of either dy-
namic, but implicit biases,40 in particular, operate in subtle, untraceable ways, 
tied inextricably to the identities of the judges and the parties.41  
B. Implicit Judicial Biases 
What constitutes a judicial “bias”? As we use the term, judicial biases exist 
when judges make legal decisions that are based in part on parties’ social identity 
traits. Outcomes are thus systematically influenced by information that is irrel-
evant from a legal perspective.42 In this Article, we examine group-based biases 
that may be traceable to a party’s age, gender, or race. Scholars have defined 
and studied group-based biases in judicial decision-making by drawing on so-
cial-scientific insights where the term group-based biases refers to systematic dif-
ferences in how someone perceives specific individuals as a function of their 
group affiliations or social identities.43 When apparent differential treatment 
 
39. See Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1126; see also infra Part I.B. 
40. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1195, 1209–11 (2009) (presenting results from an Implicit Association Test (IAT) demonstrating 
unconscious racial biases among judges). 
41. See, e.g., Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1146–48; Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1210 (observing in 
their data that white judges displayed a strong white preference on the IAT while black judges “demonstrated 
no clear preference overall”). 
42. This definition includes a wide array of possible biases, some stemming from judges’ predisposition 
toward or against specific people or groups or their preexisting views on specific issues. Other biases can 
arise from influences that the law deems irrelevant or inappropriate, such as evidence obtained in violation 
of due process or the characteristics of a defendant, like a prior criminal record. See generally A. N. Doob & 
H. M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 
CRIM. L.Q. 88 (1972) (prior criminal record); Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence 
on Juror Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67 (1995) (prior convictions and prior acquittals); Kerri L. 
Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 407 (1995) (inadmissible hearsay and prior criminal record). 
43. The term social identity refers to one’s group identity. For the formulation of social identity theory, 
see generally Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in PSYCHOL. 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 276 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986). Group-based biases are 
typically assessed by examining how people perceive target individuals belonging to different social groups 
(for example, women versus men, black versus white). This is done by either providing perceivers with no 
information on the targets they judge apart from their group identities, which is the zero-information para-
digm of the IAT, see Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1209 & n.72, and infra notes 72–73 and accompanying 
text, or by providing perceivers with the exact same information about the targets they judge, see, e.g., Corrine 
A. Moss-Racusin et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 
16,474, 16,474–75 (2012). The Moss-Racusin et al. study provided participants with identical job application 
materials—other than the gender of the job candidate. Id. at 16,475. Given the study’s design, any outcome 
discrepancies between groups could not be attributed to relevant considerations because such considerations 
were either not provided or were held constant. Id. at 16,478. Rather, discrepancies must have been due to 
implicit or explicit prejudices about different social groups. The study of courtroom biases relies on similar 
logic: examining whether systematic discrepancies in judicial decisions exist as a function of the parties’ or 
the adjudicators’ group identities, where all legally relevant information is held constant. See, e.g., Jennifer L. 
Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 
17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006); Guy Grossman et al., Descriptive Representation and Judicial Outcomes in Multi-
ethnic Societies, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 44, 45 (2016). 
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across these groups cannot be linked to legally valid considerations, researchers 
often ascribe the outcome disparities to explicit or implicit judicial bias.44  
One important line of research examines how judicial characteristics, such 
as race and gender, affect a judge’s decision-making.45 The initial goal of this 
area of research was not to detect biases per se but rather to examine the impact 
of policymaker efforts to diversify the judiciary.46 Perhaps surprisingly, the find-
ings of these studies tend to indicate that, apart from a few exceptions, judges’ 
group identities—their gender, race, and even political ideology—do not have 
sweeping consequences for their judicial approach, reasoning, or decision-mak-
ing.47 Before researchers arrived at this general conclusion, more than a few 
commentators proposed that female judges might “adjudicate in a ‘different 
voice’ . . . to favor community concerns and family preservation.”48 Some pre-
dicted that female judges, for example, would be more lenient in sentencing 
because “women are slightly more liberal than men on a variety of issues, in-
cluding those related to crime control.”49 Research does not support this hy-
pothesis.50 Indeed, contrary to stereotypes, at least some research demonstrates 
that women may be harsher than men when they sentence individuals.51 That 
said, much of this evidence is anecdotal; more rigorous research concludes that 
“while feminist . . . theories of judging abound, female judges do not appear to 
adopt significantly different approaches to judging from those taken by their 
 
44. Looking to individual characteristics to explain disparities forms the methodological basis for much 
of the judicial-bias-in-sentencing literature. See, e.g., David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in 
Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 296–98 & tbl.6 (2001) (using race and 
gender as explanatory variables for sentence length). 
45. Although this literature does examine whether a judge’s group-based identity affects judicial out-
comes, it is usually framed as exploring whether “extralegal considerations”—rather than “biases”—influence 
judicial decision-making. These findings tend not to be classified under the rubric of “biases” because it is 
difficult to determine what constitutes the benchmark for a nonbiased decision. For example, with gender-
based disparities in judicial decisions pertaining to sexual crimes, it is unclear who would represent the stand-
ard of unbiased, neutral judgments: female judges and their harsher standards (perhaps better informed) or 
male judges who may be more lenient (perhaps more objective)? Even if not framed as “biases,” these find-
ings nevertheless show that extralegal considerations affect judicial decision-making, so we see them as chal-
lenges to the goal of judicial neutrality. Ostensibly attempting to restore impartiality, advocates have used 
these findings to make claims about the importance of judicial diversity. See infra Part I.D. 
46. This research was catalyzed by the Carter Administration’s push to diversify the judiciary. See Tracey 
E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 19 (2001) (“Jimmy Carter’s efforts to diversify the federal bench 
resulted in the appointment of two Hispanics, one Asian American, and nine African Americans to the courts 
of appeals (representing twenty-one percent of his circuit appointments).”). 
47. Id. at 23–25. 
48. Id. at 20. 
49. John Gruhl et al., Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J. POL. SCI. 308, 311 (1981). 
50. In a study of more than 30,000 cases, the researchers tested for evidence of disparities as a function 
of judges’ gender. See id. at 314. 
51. See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the Judge’s Gender 
Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163, 1174–77 (1999) (showing that women judges 
tend to be harsher in sentencing decisions and slightly harsher against young and black defendants). Despite 
these findings, the researchers conclude that similarities in both reasoning and decisions between female and 
male judges outweigh the differences between them. Id. at 1179, 1181–82. 
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male colleagues.”52 Scholars have drawn a similar conclusion with respect to 
whether a judge’s race or ethnicity affects their legal decision-making.53 Even 
when research does document effects of a judge’s race in particular contexts, 
such effects are typically small and inconsistent, and they pale in importance 
when compared to individual differences between judges.54 
Other lines of research speculate that a judge’s group identity may not com-
prehensively influence all aspects of decision-making but instead may operate 
on a narrower scope, perhaps just in those domains specifically “linked” to the 
group’s distinguishing trait. For instance, scholars have hypothesized that fe-
male judges might sentence individuals convicted of sexual crimes with greater 
punitiveness because women are the primary victims of such crime and because 
of their unique experience with, and perspective regarding, sexual violence.55 
And research has shown that female judges are harsher than their male coun-
terparts in sex offense and sex discrimination cases, displaying a tendency both 
to find liability more often and to impose more severe punishments.56 Similarly, 
research also suggests that black judges are more likely to rule in favor of af-
firmative-action plans and for plaintiffs in race-based discrimination cases when 
compared to their nonblack counterparts, intimating the possibility of a distinct 
approach to cases involving race-related issues.57 Interestingly, in a study of asy-
lum decisions, scholars found that a judge’s gender had a significant impact on 
a case’s expected outcome, with asylum applicants having a 44% higher chance 
 
52. George, supra note 46, at 21–22 (footnote omitted). 
53. See, e.g., Thomas M. Uhlman, Black Elite Decision Making: The Case of Trial Judges, 22 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
884, 891–92 (1978). But see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group 
Bias in Judicial Decisions—Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 403, 
420–23 (2010); Moses Shayo & Asaf Zussman, Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism, 126 Q.J. 
ECON. 1447, 1448–49 (2011) (demonstrating the existence of judicial biases in Israel based on judges’ ethnic 
affiliations). 
54. George, supra note 46, at 23–25. Despite no general differences among judges, some race-based 
differences in outcomes emerge with respect to a defendant’s race within specific contexts. See infra notes 79–
91 and accompanying text. 
55. Cassia Spohn, Decision Making in Sexual Assault Cases: Do Black and Female Judges Make a Difference?, 
in 2 WOMEN & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83, 87–88 (1990). 
56.  On finding liability, see, for example, Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and 
Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1778 (2005) (finding that the presence 
of a female judge on a panel increases the likelihood of ruling in favor of plaintiffs in cases involving sexual 
harassment or sex-related discrimination). See also Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on 
Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 402–06 (2010) (reporting similar results). On sentencing severity, see Spohn, 
supra note 55, at 91 (concluding that although female judges do not appear to convict defendants in sexual 
assault cases more frequently than do their male counterparts, when sexual assault defendants are found 
guilty, female judges give these defendants harsher sentences—four years longer on average). 
57. Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 
177 (2013) (finding that black judges are significantly more likely to support affirmative-action programs than 
white judges and that the presence of a single black judge on a panel increases the panel’s likelihood of ruling 
in favor of affirmative action). 
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of succeeding when assigned to a female judge.58 Some have viewed these find-
ings as part of a larger trend in decision-making research toward identifying new 
instances in which a judge’s gender influences litigation outcomes, at least when 
mixed judicial panels are involved.59 But, at present, the full significance and 
contours of any effect of a judge’s group identity on judicial decision-making 
and outcomes remains, for the most part, unclear.  
By contrast, the group identities and roles of parties have proven to be a 
significant factor in shaping judicial decisions, casting a deep shadow on our 
aspiration for judicial impartiality. The social psychology literature that docu-
ments the origin, meaning, manifestation, and measurement of implicit group-
based biases gives a convincing account for these patterns. Broadly speaking, 
implicit biases are rooted in “social categorization processes.”60 Psychologists 
consider these processes a cognitive necessity because they impose order on an 
otherwise overly complex social environment and conserve limited cognitive 
resources.61 In the past, due to the social acceptability of certain beliefs, people 
could express their biases knowingly and willfully, either by consciously harbor-
ing stereotypes of certain social groups or by explicitly preferring people from 
their own group (“in-group”) over outsiders (“out-group”).62 But in recent dec-
ades, changing social norms have made it socially unacceptable (and, for many, 
 
58. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 
342 (2007). 
59. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Asylum in a Different Voice: Judging Immigration Claims and Gender, 
in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 202 (Jaya 
Ramji-Nogales et al. eds., 2009). 
60.  Henri Tajfel et al., Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 153 
(1971); see also Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and 
Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995). For reviews, see generally Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, 
Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297 (2003), and 
Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive 
Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009). For an overview of “social categorization,” see 
Richard J. Crisp & Miles Hewstone, Multiple Social Categorization, 39 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 163, 218–19 (2007). 
61. Tajfel et al., supra note 60, at 153. The human need for social categorization has been linked to 
stereotypes—the attribution of qualities to individuals based solely on their group memberships—as well as 
to conflicting intergroup relations, because it facilitates an “us-versus-them” division. See generally Crisp & 
Hewstone, supra note 60 (analyzing the complex links between social categorization and stereotypes). In the 
past, these manifestations of social categorization were largely explicit; that is, people knowingly harbored 
stereotypes for or against different social groups and willfully preferred those from their own group to out-
siders. Katherine Cramer, Understanding the Role of Racism in Contemporary US Public Opinion, 23 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 9.1, 9.2–9.5 (2019). In recent decades, as the explicit manifestation of stereotypes and biases has become 
socially unacceptable, people have embraced more egalitarian norms. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, 
Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3–6 (2004); Simo V. Virtanen & Leonie 
Huddy, Old-Fashioned Racism and New Forms of Racial Prejudice, 60 J. Pol. 311 (1998). This change, however, did 
not erase (and in some cases did not even much reduce) age-old gaps between individuals in dominant and 
marginalized groups in various areas, including health, education, and wealth. Cramer, supra, at 9.3–9.4. This 
paradox gave rise to theories highlighting the implicit and nuanced manifestations of contemporary prejudice. 
See, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, supra, at 1. 
62. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 61, at 5. 
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undesirable) to harbor or express such stereotypes and biases explicitly.63 This 
normative pressure toward egalitarianism has not eliminated the existence of 
these biases but has instead pushed at least some of them into the implicit, 
unconscious realm.64 
The growing recognition of the prevalence and potential impact of implicit 
biases in decision-making and behavior is a consequence of two interrelated 
realizations. First, despite a significant normative commitment to egalitarian 
values and the rejection of explicit manifestations of stereotypes or biases, 
group-based disparities persist.65 Historically disadvantaged groups continue to 
lag on many dimensions, including health, education, income, and wealth.66 Sec-
ond, many social psychologists concluded that implicit attitudes and biases can 
be objectively and usefully measured. After devising several tools to assess the 
existence and strength of implicit bias, the most common and well-known of 
which is the Implicit Association Test (IAT),67 these scholars found that such 
biases are pervasive and systemic in society.  
Like all tools and tests assessing implicit attitudes, the IAT is based on re-
sponse latencies—that is, the time it takes for people to respond to specific 
 
63. See id. at 3–6. 
64. Id. at 3 (“Aversive racists, in comparison, sympathize with victims of past injustice, support the 
principle of racial equality, and regard themselves as nonprejudiced, but, at the same time, possess negative 
feelings and beliefs about blacks, which may be unconscious.”); see also Tessa E. S. Charlesworth & Mahzarin 
R. Banaji, Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I. Long-Term Change and Stability from 2007 to 2016, 30 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 174, 182 (2019) (explaining the decreasing correlation between explicit and implicit biases, at 
least in part, by the changing social desirability of certain attitudes); Allison L. Skinner & Jacob E. Cheadle, 
The “Obama Effect”? Priming Contemporary Racial Milestones Increases Implicit Racial Bias Among Whites, 34 SOC. 
COGNITION 544, 551 (2016) (“[P]riming the election of Barack Obama as a contemporary racial milestone 
increases implicit racial bias among Whites.”). 
65.  Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 61, at 2. Long before the empirical advancement in the study of 
implicit attitudes, Charles Lawrence proposed the idea that motive-centered legal doctrines are insufficient to 
combat most forms of racial discrimination. He argued that because racial stereotypes are often harbored 
unconsciously, racial discrimination should be legally recognized based on discriminatory impact, irrespective 
of decision-maker motives. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 343–44 (1987). 
66. See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 AM. ECON. 
REV. 25, 50 (1996) (finding that black and Hispanic mortgage applicants are more likely to be turned down 
than similarly situated white applicants); see also Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and 
Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. 
REV. 991, 991–92 (2004) (reporting that black applicants are less likely to receive interview callbacks for job 
postings than similarly qualified white applicants); Gopal K. Singh et al., Social Determinants of Health in the 
United States: Addressing Major Health Inequality Trends for the Nation, 1935–2016, 6 INT’L J. MCH & AIDS 139, 
159–61 (2017); Raj Chetty et al., Race and Economic Opportunity in the United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 
135 Q.J. ECON. 711, 729–30 (2020); Linda Darling-Hammond, Unequal Opportunity: Race and Education, 
BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unequal-opportunity-race-and-education; 
CJ Libassi, The Neglected College Race Gap: Racial Disparities Among College Completers, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(May 23, 2018, 9:39 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-postsecondary/reports/20 
18/05/23/451186/neglected-college-race-gap-racial-disparities-among-college-completers. 
67. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit 
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465–66 (1998). 
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stimuli.68 The IAT measures differences in how reflexive it is for people to as-
sociate certain social groups (e.g., white versus black, men versus women, old 
versus young, and so on) with abstract positive or negative evaluations (e.g., 
good versus bad, pleasant versus unpleasant).69 The reasoning behind the IAT 
is that the quicker people’s responses are (in terms of their reaction time), the 
stronger the implicit association they make between the given group and the 
given evaluation.70 Systematic differences in the ease of association between 
stereotype-consistent stimuli (e.g., black and unpleasant, white and pleasant) 
and stereotype-inconsistent stimuli (e.g., young and unpleasant, old and pleas-
ant) indicate the existence of implicit bias.71 Such biases are termed “implicit” 
in the sense that they occur “automatically, effortlessly, and outside of con-
scious awareness”72 but nevertheless have been shown to affect actual behavior 
in significant ways. Importantly, implicit biases often do not correlate with ex-
plicit attitudes, so the conscious commitment to egalitarian values does not in-
oculate someone against the internalization of implicit biases.73 Moreover, even 
an explicit desire to circumvent or control the effects of implicit biases is, by 
itself, an insufficient means for reducing them.74  
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 1466. 
71. Id. at 1464–65. 
72. John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and 
Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 39, 43 (2009). Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji describe this process in terms of 
“racial mechanics”: an individual (target) is mapped into a social category in accordance with prevailing legal 
and cultural mapping rules. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1085 (2006). Once mapped, the category activates various mean-
ings, including cognitive and affective associations that may be partly hardwired but are mostly culturally 
conditioned. Id. These activated meanings then alter the interaction between the perceiver and the target. Id. 
These processes occur automatically, without effort or conscious awareness on the part of the perceiver. See 
id. at 1064–67, 1085 (using behavioral realism and the science of implicit social recognition to advocate for 
the revision of affirmative-action policies). 
73.  Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 61, at 18–19. For a meta-analysis of explicit and implicit attitudes, 
see Wilhelm Hofmann et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Correlation Between the Implicit Association Test and Explicit 
Self-Report Measures, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1369 (2005) (finding that correlations between 
explicit and implicit attitudes are particularly weak in domains where there are strong social desirability con-
cerns such as race- or gender-based biases). 
74.  Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to 
Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 835 (2002) (“[D]eveloping the personal 
motivation to overcome prejudice does not guarantee that people will respond without bias . . . . [D]espite 
disavowing prejudice consciously and responding without prejudice on easily controllable explicit self-report 
measures, many people who report being low in prejudice show bias on responses that are less amenable to 
control. For example, when race-based bias is assessed with implicit measures . . . bias is often observed even 
among those who claim to be nonprejudiced.” (citation omitted)). The IAT has been the subject of several 
critiques of both its role as a measurement tool and its implications. For a critique of the IAT as a measure-
ment tool, see Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, 
Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1064 (2009) (“In the IAT research, levels of implicit bias 
consistently diverge from levels of conscious bias, but it is difficult to know whether that apparent divergence 
reflects a real underlying difference or is merely an artifact of the systematic understatement of levels of 
conscious bias.”). See also Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Implicit Bias and Accountability Systems: What 
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The fact that systematic disparities persist in the legal system even after it 
became unacceptable to stereotype explicitly in legal proceedings seems to im-
plicate implicit biases in judicial decision-making as a plausible mechanism.75 
This inference is bolstered by the fact that such disparities occur in cases even 
when all relevant legal information appears to be identical, implying they should 
end in identical outcomes. Although there is evidence that implicit biases exist 
at many stages of the legal process in the criminal justice system—from public 
perceptions of crime and criminality,76 to police encounters,77 to prosecutorial 
decisions78—research has specifically documented implicit, if not explicit, bi-
ases in judicial decision-making. For example, data indicate that black defend-
ants receive higher bail amounts when compared with nonblack defendants in 
similar circumstances,79 and convicted black defendants appear to receive 
harsher sentences than their white counterparts as well.80 Implicit biases also 
seem to be distressingly prominent in the process that determines whether a 
defendant receives the death penalty: not only are black defendants dispropor-
tionately subject to capital punishment,81 but also a stereotypically black appear-
ance by itself has been linked to a greater relative likelihood of receiving a death 
sentence, independent of relevant legal considerations such as crime severity 
and criminal history.82 For some black people, racial stereotypes may also be 
intertwined with and reinforced by stereotypes against the poor.83 
 
Must Organizations Do to Prevent Discrimination?, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 3, 6 n.2 (2009) (“[T]here 
is no evidence that the IAT reliably predicts class-wide discrimination on tangible outcomes in any set-
ting . . . .”). For a refutation of these criticisms, see Jost et al., supra note 72, at 46–64 (discussing the robust-
ness of the accumulated evidence demonstrating the predictive validity of the IAT). 
75.  E.g., Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 987, 991–92 (1994) (finding race-based differences in bail rates disfavoring black defendants after con-
trolling for legally relevant variables); see also Mustard, supra note 44, at 300 (showing that black defendants 
receive 12% longer sentences on average than similarly situated white defendants). 
76. See Joshua Correll et al., The Influence of Stereotypes on Decisions to Shoot, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1102, 1114–15 (2007) (finding that people are quicker to shoot black targets holding a gun and black targets 
holding innocent objects than identically situated white targets). 
77. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to 
Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1013–14 (2007) (showing that officers were quicker to 
identify a black target holding a gun and made more errors in deciding to shoot a black target holding an 
innocent object than a white target). 
78. See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 805 (2012). 
79. Ayres & Waldfogel, supra note 75, at 992. 
80. David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical 
and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1675–722 (1998). 
81. Id.; see also DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 142–43 (1990); R.J. Maratea, Overcoming Moral Peril: How Empirical Research Can Affect 
Death Penalty Debates, in RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE LEGACY OF MCCLESKEY V. KEMP 51, 63–67 
(David P. Keys & R.J. Maratea eds., 2015). 
82. Eberhardt et al., supra note 43, at 384. 
83. See generally Michele Benedetto Neitz, When Myths Become Beliefs: Implicit Socioeconomic Bias in American 
Courtrooms, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 131 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017). 
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Many of the studies that document implicit biases among judges do not 
measure judges’ biases directly but instead reason from the existence of inex-
plicable outcome disparities.84 There are, however, at least two studies that ex-
amine the prevalence, strength, and implications of implicit biases among 
judges. This research measures these biases directly using the IAT,85 which gives 
us confidence that implicit biases matter in judicial decision-making.  
Jeffrey Rachlinski and colleagues recruited several dozen judges who agreed 
to take the IAT for racial groups (black and white) and then respond to several 
vignettes simulating judicial decision-making tasks.86 The study produced sev-
eral important results: First, the authors found that judges display implicit biases 
favoring white litigants over black litigants to the same extent as the wider pub-
lic.87 Thus, judicial professionalism and a commitment to impartiality (even 
when under the scrutiny of a researcher) do not appear to prevent the internal-
ization of bias—precisely because such processes can be entirely unconscious 
and occur automatically. Second, white judges exhibited greater prowhite im-
plicit bias than their black peer judges, showing that bias is more pronounced 
in the context of out-group members.88 Third, Rachlinski and his collaborators 
discovered evidence of judicial implicit bias even though the study’s vignettes 
did not specifically include the race of the defendant (to avoid exposing the goal 
of the study); instead, they employed the cognitive manipulation technique of 
racial priming.89 Judges were subliminally exposed to words associated with 
black people, in theory rendering their implicit stereotypes and biases pertaining 
to black people more salient.90 When they were primed to think about black 
people, judges’ implicit biases—as measured by their IAT scores—appeared to 
influence their decision-making processes, ultimately producing harsher sen-
tences.91 Taken together, these findings establish that judges, like all people, are 
 
84. See, e.g., supra note 75. But see Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1205, 1221 (finding that judges 
harbor implicit race-based biases that can influence judicial decision-making through a direct study involving 
the voluntary participation of 133 judges who took the IAT). 
85. Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1209–10; Justin D. Levinson et al., Judging Implicit Bias: A National 
Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 63, 97 (2017). 
86. Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1208 (“The study included a race IAT; two hypothetical vignettes 
in which the race of the defendant was not explicitly identified but was subliminally primed; and another 
hypothetical vignette in which the race of the defendant was made explicit.” (footnotes omitted)). 
87. Id. at 1208–10 & tbl.2 (showing that judges were quicker to respond to stereotype-consistent pairing 
of white and positive descriptors and black and negative descriptors as compared to stereotype-inconsistent 
pairings). 
88. Id. at 1210 (showing that 87.1% of white judges and 44.2% of black judges showed prowhite pref-
erence in their responses to the study’s vignettes). 
89. Id. at 1212. Rachlinski and his colleagues use a task developed in Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, 
Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 487–88 (2004). 
90. Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1213. 
91. Id. at 1214–15 (“We found that the judges’ scores on the race IAT had a marginally significant 
influence on how the prime influenced their judgment. Judges who exhibited a white preference on the IAT 
gave harsher sentences to defendants if they had been primed with black-associated words rather than neutral 
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susceptible to implicit biases and that such biases most likely penetrate and un-
consciously influence judicial decision-making. 
Justin Levinson, Mark Bennett, and Koichi Hioki conducted a similar study 
with hundreds of participating judges, including 180 from the federal judiciary.92 
Levinson and his coauthors sought to measure judges’ implicit and explicit at-
titudes toward Jews and Asians and to identify the effect of the judges’ attitudes 
on their decision-making.93 The participants were first tasked with completing 
a sentencing exercise for a defendant with what they defined as a stereotypically 
white, Asian, Christian, or Jewish name.94 The judges then completed a ques-
tionnaire measuring their judicial philosophy regarding criminal sentencing and 
completed an IAT.95 Last, the researchers asked each participant questions that 
explicitly sought to measure their adherence to stereotypes about the subject 
demographic groups.96 The study found that judges harbor implicit biases about 
both Jews and Asians relative to Christians and whites.97 Their evidence also 
shows that the strength of these biases depends on the judge’s group-based 
identity.98 Further, federal district court judges handed down higher sentences 
to Jewish defendants than they did to their Christian counterparts, though state 
court judges polled gave higher sentences to white defendants than Asians.99 
Levinson et al.’s research further confirms the significance of implicit biases on 
the bench.100 
Implicit bias presents a possibly useful explanation for why outcome dis-
parities persist in the face of explicit social commitments to judicial impartiality. 
In today’s courtrooms, judges are inevitably exposed to party demographics and 
identity markers when making decisions, and despite their best intentions, they 
may fall prey to bias. Focusing on judges when searching for the sources of 
 
words, while judges who exhibited a black preference on the IAT gave less harsh sentences to defendants if 
they had been primed with black-associated words rather than neutral words.” (footnote omitted)). 
92. Levinson et al., supra note 85, at 97. 
93. Id. at 98. 
94. Id. at 100. 
95. Id. at 101. If the sentencing task concerned a white or Asian defendant, the participant’s IAT tested 
only their attitudes toward whites and Asians. If the defendant was Christian or Jewish, the IAT concerned 
only Christians and Jews. See id. 
96. Id. at 101–02 (“For example, participants were asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the 
following statements: ‘Asian Americans are taking more than their fair share of jobs,’ and ‘Jews are trying to 
control America.’”). 
97. Id. at 104. 
98. Id. at 106–08 (finding that male judges display stronger anti-Jewish implicit biases and that Catholic 
and Protestant judges have stronger implicit and explicit biases than judges who claim no religion but also 
finding no evidence that implicit biases vary with the political party of the appointing president). 
99. Id. at 104. 
100. In more recent work, researchers used a “natural language processing” technique to analyze and 
uncover gender-based stereotypes in U.S. appellate court decisions. Arianna Ornaghi et al., Stereotypes in High-
Stakes Decisions: Evidence from U.S. Circuit Courts 2–3 (Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 02/2019, 
2019). They tie their findings on the existence and strength of such stereotypes to legal outcomes. They found 
that judges who use more stereotype-laden language are more conservative in their rulings regarding women’s 
rights issues (e.g., reproductive rights, sexual harassment, and gender discrimination). Id. at 4–6. 
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outcome disparities, however, may blind us to other dynamics also capable of 
generating disparate outcomes in our legal system. Below, we expand on an-
other likely source of group-based disparities: facially neutral procedures—cer-
tain varieties of which can also exacerbate implicit bias.  
C. Structural Biases 
The idea that the underlying structure of legal proceedings can generate 
disparate outcomes even in the absence of explicit or implicit bias reflects a 
more general understanding of the connection between legal procedure and le-
gal substance.101 Although procedure may be intended to be a collection of 
technical rules targeting efficiency, simplicity, and clarity102—separate from the 
values and trade-offs at the heart of substantive law and aiming only to ease the 
achievement of substantive arrangements103—processes can and do shape legal 
outcomes. In this Subpart, we simply recognize that some of the most basic 
features of legal proceedings—many of which seem facially neutral and perhaps 
indispensable, such as face-to-face hearings—may produce systematic dispari-
ties across identity groups. 
Repeat players who have greater familiarity with the legal system and the 
ability to pursue long-term goals over many cases benefit from the legal system 
as it has traditionally functioned. In a seminal article, Marc Galanter uncovered 
the many ways in which legal procedures and structures are systematically ad-
vantageous to the “haves.”104 With the rise of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the significance of procedure 
 
101. THOMAS O. MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 (2006) (“Procedures alter the con-
duct of groups and individuals, and thus can prefer some over others. And procedures can, in a very practical 
sense, negate, resuscitate, or generate substantive rights.”); Jeremy Lever, Why Procedure Is More Important than 
Substantive Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 285, 285 (1999) (“[T]he outcome of cases, whether criminal or civil, 
is in practice more likely to be affected by procedural rules than by any niceties of substantive law . . . .”); Jay 
Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. 877, 877–78 (2011) (“[This] Article’s point of de-
parture is the one matter on which Justice Scalia, Justice Stevens, and Justice Ginsburg . . . agreed: procedural 
rules affect the outcomes of lawsuits.”). 
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“The[ Rules] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court 
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”); 
J. A. JOLOWICZ, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 59 (2000) (“[M]ost people are content to adopt . . . procedure as the 
course taken for the execution of the laws . . . ‘[T]he relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is 
intended to be that of handmaid rather than mistress.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting In re Coles and Ra-
venshear [1907] 1 K.B. 1, 4 (Collins M.R.))); see also ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE 
OF PROCEDURE iii (1979); id. at 6 (“Procedure . . . ought to be the means by which correct decisions . . . are 
rendered more probable and more public.”); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes: A 
Plea for “Process Values,” 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1974). 
103. Under this narrow perspective, value is placed on the formal application of procedural rules, irre-
spective of the effect such procedures might have on different parties. The specific content of procedural 
rules is far less important than their simplicity and clarity, which should allow for efficient proceedings, con-
sistent application of procedural law, and, in turn, predictable results. See Summers, supra note 102, at 25–26 
(referring to such values under “procedural legality”). 
104. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). 
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grew more conspicuous as it became clear that the parties choosing ADR over 
traditional litigation knew very well that their choice could lead to a different 
outcome despite the same substantive law governing in the background.105 In-
deed, mediation has been hailed precisely because of the opportunity it provides 
to devise creative outcomes that are tailored to the circumstances of the case, 
as opposed to relying on courts’ “limited remedial imagination.”106  
At the same time, at least one initial perspective on the several dispute-
resolution processes that have emerged—e.g., litigation, arbitration, and medi-
ation—was that each process had its own “moral integrity,”107 which ultimately 
shapes the substantive outcome as well as the perceptions of its legitimacy.108 
This essentialist view has morphed over the years as ADR became institution-
alized in courts and variations in both ADR and court processes proliferated.109 
Examples include the emergence of different mediation models, processes such 
as early neutral evaluation, judicial settlement conferences, compensation funds, 
and even specialized courts.110 These developments both fed on and further 
perpetuated the evolution of a new field: dispute systems design.111 This field is 
erected on the fundamental understanding that procedural design in dispute 
resolution is central to law because of the strong connections among procedural 
design, substantive outcomes, and legitimacy.112  
 
105. See Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons from 
Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 570–71 (2007) (“The growth of ADR . . . sparked a series of significant 
critiques by people concerned with the privatization and informalization of dispute resolution. . . . [W]hen 
private companies . . . resolve disputes outside the courtroom, companies have an incentive to skew the pro-
cesses in their favor.” (footnotes omitted)). 
106. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or 
“The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991). 
107. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lecture, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes of Legal Processes, 
94 GEO. L.J. 553, 561 (2006). 
108. See id. at 576. 
109. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 13–14 (2000). 
110. See Benjamin F. Tennille et al., Getting to Yes in Specialized Courts: The Unique Role of ADR in Business 
Court Cases, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 35, 44–54 (2010) (providing an overview of specialized courts and 
forms of ADR). Examples in courts range from small-claims courts, through class actions, to problem-solv-
ing courts. Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, The New New Courts, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 165, 176–77 (2017) 
(small-claims courts and class actions); Problem-Solving Courts Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS, https://www.ncs 
c.org/Topics/Alternative-Dockets/Problem-Solving-Courts/Home.aspx (last visited May 2, 2020) (prob-
lem-solving courts). For the various contexts in which dispute-systems-design principles can be seen and 
employed, see generally Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 
14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009) (describing the field of dispute systems design). 
111. While of course there have been procedural reforms in traditional litigation over the years, sys-
tematic thinking about the impact of procedural design began in the area of ADR and only in later years did 
it expand to include procedure in courts. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 107 (surveying legal process 
theory from Lon Fuller to the Legal Process School of the 1950s to modern process pluralism). 
112. See Orna Rabinovich-Einy, The Legitimacy Crisis and the Future of Courts, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 32 , 27 (2015) (“[P]roper design was viewed as a means of ensuring more effective and fair processes 
in an era of increasing privatization of the dispute resolution realm.”). 
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The reality of “process pluralism,”113 which exists across and within indi-
vidual categories of legal processes, has since generated important questions 
about the consequences of procedural choice on outcome disparities across so-
cial groups. Early on, Richard Delgado and his coauthors explored the implica-
tions of informal ADR processes for minorities.114 In an article citing social-
science research, they warned that ADR processes may disfavor members of 
disempowered groups precisely because of ADR’s informal structure.115 Del-
gado and his collaborators emphasized the significance of rules and formality 
for inhibiting prejudice.116 Following this article and other critical writing, schol-
ars sought to explore explicitly the connection between procedural choice and 
outcome disparities across race and gender,117 but the resulting body of empir-
ical research neither confirmed nor rejected Delgado and his colleagues’ infor-
mality hypothesis—due, inter alia, to methodological weaknesses, small sample 
sizes, and missing information in a number of relevant studies.118  
One important theme of this research has been the ability of structural de-
sign to constrain, empower, and guide decision makers. But these studies also 
implicitly highlight the corresponding relationship between procedure and the 
behavior of litigants. Process can influence litigant participation and behavior, 
and the efficacy of both.119 For instance, in her writing on structural bias in 
dispute resolution, Lisa Bingham shifts the focus from decision-maker bias to 
the impact of “control” in dispute systems design.120 We offer a related per-
spective. Litigation structures—the very physical setting and the most basic 
 
113. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 107, at 555. 
114. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1360–61. 
115. Id. at 1361. 
116. Id. at 1370–75. 
117. Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
RESEARCH 597, 610 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2010). Most notably, Michele Hermann, Gary 
LaFree, and Christine Rack compared mediated outcomes with litigated outcomes in a small-claims court in 
New Mexico across gender and ethnicity, drawing on both objective (amount sought compared with amount 
ordered) and subjective (party satisfaction) criteria. See MICHELE HERMANN ET AL., THE METROCOURT 
PROJECT FINAL REPORT xvi–xviii (1993). Their findings showed a complex state of affairs with limited sup-
port for the “informality hypothesis” (i.e., that minorities and women fare worse in mediation relative to 
court-based litigation). See id. at xviii–xxxii; see also LaFree & Rack, supra note 38, at 780–81, 788–89 (finding 
the largest disparities under the “informality hypothesis” for minority male claimants, with outcomes corre-
lated with repeat-player effects and other case characteristics). 
118. In a recent article, Gilat Bachar and Deborah Hensler compile and study the various empirical 
analyses that have been conducted on this topic (including HERMANN ET AL., supra note 117). See Gilat J. 
Bachar & Deborah R. Hensler, Does Alternative Dispute Resolution Facilitate Prejudice and Bias? We Still Don’t Know, 
70 SMU L. REV. 817, 829–30 (2017). 
119. J.J. Prescott, Assessing Access-to-Justice Outreach Strategies, 174 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 34, 51, 55–56 (2018); Prescott, supra note 15, at 2046–47. 
120. Lisa B. Bingham, Control over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 225 (2004); Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Dispute System Design and Justice in Employ-
ment Dispute Resolution: Mediation at the Workplace, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009); Lisa B. Bingham, Self-
Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873, 879 (2002). 
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processes, those not even considered “law” by most121—influence how parties 
interact with each other and with decision makers en route to substantive legal 
outcomes. We maintain that the design of litigant procedures, by shaping how 
individuals can participate successfully in dispute resolution, may affect the out-
comes for different social groups differently. 
In our context, we hypothesize that a shift from real-time face-to-face legal 
proceedings to asynchronous, written, online ones could significantly affect a 
party’s ability to convey arguments and narrative effectively. Implicit in this re-
alization is that the status quo arrangement may inherently work to the relative 
benefit of one social group over another. When parties testify or communicate 
in person, delivering a coherent and convincing story may be a function of al-
most anything—specified facts, narrative emphasis, argumentation style, tone 
of voice, body language, eye contact, dress and appearance, question response 
style, etc.122 On the other hand, in written communication, many of these phys-
ical cues disappear; focus must be on the style and content of text.123 When 
communication with a court or another party is asynchronous (i.e., it need not 
occur in a single session but can be stretched over time, as in an e-mail exchange 
over a few days), a litigant can devise a strategy at their leisure, taking additional 
time and accessing resources or the assistance of others whenever helpful.124 In 
 
121. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 225–26 (explaining, for example, how a court’s hours of 
operation will affect a litigant’s decision to challenge a ticket due to that litigant’s work schedule); Prescott, 
supra note 15, at 2005 (“There is an extensive list of nonlegal costs to using a brick-and-mortar court-
house. . . . Employed litigants who must go to court during business hours to meet with a prosecutor or have 
a hearing before a judge . . . often face important economic opportunity costs.”). 
122. See, e.g., Robert J. Cramer et al., Expert Witness Confidence and Juror Personality: Their Impact on Credibility 
and Persuasion in the Courtroom, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 63, 64 (2009) (noting that an expert witness 
may be viewed as more credible based on speed of speech, word choice, or cues of nervousness); Elizabeth 
A. LeVan, Nonverbal Communication in the Courtroom: Attorney Beware, 8 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 83, 94 (1984) 
(explaining that speaker persuasion is determined at least in part by eye contact, gestures, facial activity, self-
touching, relaxation, distance, volume, rate of speech, and whether the speaker faces the audience). 
123. See, e.g., Sean Flammer, Persuading Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Writing Style, Persuasion, and the Use 
of Plain English, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 183, 183–84, 202 fig.4.4 (2010) (noting that the content of a 
written argument is the key factor in persuading a judge, explaining the importance of clearly communicating 
that content, and finding judges prefer plain-language explanations of arguments); P. Karen Murphy, What 
Makes a Text Persuasive? Comparing Students’ and Experts’ Conceptions of Persuasiveness, 35 INT’L J. EDUC. RES. 675, 
679 (2001) (“Along with the content and structure of the argument, . . . persuasion is reliant on the compre-
hensibility and meaningfulness of the base message.”); id. at 694 (“Among other things, undergraduates and 
experts concur that persuasive texts need to be easy to comprehend.”). 
124. See Jane Guiller et al., Peer Interaction and Critical Thinking: Face-to-Face or Online Discussion?, 18 
LEARNING & INSTRUCTION 187, 194 (2008) (“[A]synchronous discussion groups do promote the use of 
formal research evidence to support opinions and arguments, in comparison to face-to-face discussion.”); 
Richard Joiner & Sarah Jones, The Effects of Communication Medium on Argumentation and the Development of Critical 
Thinking, 39 INT’L J. EDUC. RES. 861, 862 (2003) (“The first advantage of asynchronous communication is 
that it allows time for deliberation. Group members can reflect on previous arguments and reply with a 
thoughtful response.”). 
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asynchronous communication, the two-way interaction that occurs in tradi-
tional face-to-face settings—i.e., questions and answers, back-and-forth discus-
sions—disappears, and the exchange takes place in parallel.125 
But more important, for our purposes, than the fact that the particulars of 
proceedings may randomly make some individuals better and others worse off 
is the question whether any outcome differences systematically accrue to spe-
cific groups. Procedural structures in litigation have the potential to impose 
what amounts to a disparate impact on litigants from certain identifiable social 
groups—for example, procedural choices may preclude members of marginal-
ized groups from delivering their “story” as effectively as others to a decision 
maker. Policymakers, including judges, ought to care about whether procedures 
result in systematic disadvantages for certain groups and how to identify and 
remedy such outcome disparities when they exist.126 
There is good reason to suspect that the structural features of legal pro-
ceedings may disparately affect certain groups: traits that seem highly relevant 
to success in litigation are highly concentrated in certain identifiable groups. 
Success in face-to-face proceedings that take place in a courthouse, for example, 
is heavily dependent on: (1) education, experience, and resources that are une-
qually distributed in society because of socioeconomic and other historical dis-
parities;127 (2) cultural expectations of decision makers, which comport with 
those of certain usually dominant social groups;128 and (3) resilience to the an-
ticipated psychological costs of suffering through litigation,129 which varies with 
social status, which itself is correlated with certain identity traits.130 
 
125. Joiner & Jones, supra note 124, at 862 (“[C]omputer-mediated communication . . . provides the 
opportunity for group members to post opinions simultaneously.”). 
126. Cf. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED 
NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, 
XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED INTOLERANCE 12 (2018) (discussing racial disparities at each stage within the 
criminal justice system and advocating that policymakers require, for example, racial impact statements to 
assess any potential racial effects of proposed legislation); Travis Korte & Daniel Castro, Disparate Impact 
Analysis Is Key to Ensuring Fairness in the Age of the Algorithm, CTR. FOR DATA INNOVATION (Jan. 20, 2015), 
https://www.datainnovation.org/2015/01/disparate-impact-analysis-is-key-to-ensuring-fairness-in-the-age-
of-the-algorithm (discussing the importance of disparate impact assessments as a tool for policymakers to 
prevent discrimination in housing and other areas). 
127. See Donald R. Songer et al., Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s Framework 
to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925–1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 811, 827 (1999) (“[P]resumed . . . re-
peat players with superior resources consistently fared better than their weaker opponents and the disparity 
in success rates was greatest when the disparity in strength was greatest.”). 
128. See Solangel Maldonado, Bias in the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Custody Disputes, 55 FAM. 
CT. REV. 213, 219–26 (2017) (surveying the emergence of implicit biases in family law cases, where judges 
decide custody disputes according to their own cultural norms); Masua Sagiv, Cultural Bias in Judicial Decision 
Making, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 229, 232–35 (2015) (explaining the inevitable manifestations of cultural 
biases in the courtroom through case law and literature). 
129. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 8–10 (1986) (explaining 
litigation’s significant psychological and social costs). 
130. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, STRESS & HEALTH DISPARITIES: CONTEXTS, MECHANISMS, 
AND INTERVENTIONS AMONG RACIAL/ETHNIC MINORITY AND LOW SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 
POPULATIONS 9–11 (2017), https://www.apa.org/pi/health-disparities/resources/stress-report.pdf 
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In terms of the necessary skills, knowledge, and resources to access and 
succeed in a traditional face-to-face legal proceeding, minorities, people with 
disabilities, the elderly, and immigrants face more difficulty because they are 
often poor and less legally sophisticated.131 These barriers not only affect phys-
ical access to courts and legal services but also make it more difficult for mem-
bers of these groups to maneuver their way through procedural mazes on the 
fly as well as withstand dilatory tactics and procedural delays.132 Members of 
certain groups, especially if unrepresented, may be less able to devise a convinc-
ing story in court if they are regularly interrupted by the judge.133 In terms of 
cultural expectations, the structure of legal proceedings is premised on certain 
conventions that are more agreeable, all else equal, to members of particular 
groups.134 Legal feminist scholars, for example, have long argued that the in-
your-face adversarial nature of proceedings (as well as certain strands of ADR) 
is a better fit for “male” perceptions of justice.135 Finally, in-court processes 
 
(demonstrating through a literature review that stress is inversely correlated with income and is higher in 
minority populations). 
131. E.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 11 (2009) (“Other barriers, such as geographical 
distance and isolation, low literacy, physical or mental disability, limited English proficiency, culture and eth-
nic background, and apprehension about the courts and the legal system, also pose impediments.”); Russell 
Engler, Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines: When Does Access to Justice Mean Full Representation 
by Counsel, and When Might Less Assistance Suffice?, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 97, 99 (2010) (“Unrepresented 
litigants are disproportionately minorities and are typically poor. They often identify an inability to pay for a 
lawyer as the primary reason for appearing without counsel. Unrepresented litigants often fare poorly in the 
courts, which can have devastating consequences.” (footnotes omitted)); Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class, 
and Access to Civil Justice, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1288–89 (2016) (finding that poor people and members of 
minority groups make less use of the civil legal system because they distrust institutions based on past negative 
experiences and because they are unfamiliar with its procedures); Sagit Mor, With Access and Justice for All, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 611, 628 (2017) (“[People with disabilities] are more likely to be poor, and poor people 
are more likely to be disabled. In an inaccessible society, the extra costs of disability are higher, and disabled 
people are prone to poverty and economic marginality.” (footnote omitted)). 
132. But merely simplifying legal procedures will not necessarily improve pro se litigants’ performance. 
Some of the research on small-claims courts exemplifies this point well. See, e.g., William M. O’Barr & John 
M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
661, 698 (1985) (“[W]itnesses giving testimony . . . often lack any understanding that the law imposes highly 
specific requirements on narratives. . . . [I]t is common to find accounts that fail to include a full theory of 
the case that links an agent with an action that caused harm to the plaintiff. . . . [The court] is unable to respond 
affirmatively when accounts are incomplete. Failure to generate a complete hypothesis for testing against the 
facts to be presented may result in losing the case.”). 
133. Ayelet Sela, Streamlining Justice: How Online Courts Can Resolve the Challenges of Pro Se Litigation, 26 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 331, 359 (2016) (“[T]he structural dynamic of the process results in [self-repre-
sented litigants’] accounts being regularly interrupted and dismissed, leading to their effective ‘silencing.’”). 
134. Not everyone shares mainstream U.S. values, assumptions, and expectations, and those cultural 
differences can reinforce other concentrated differences across groups. Thus, American judges may expect 
an innocent party to speak for themselves and refrain from outbursts, whereas other cultures may view reli-
ance on an elder (e.g., a judge) as a sign of respect and emotional outbreaks as reliable protestations of inno-
cence. Karen Arnold-Burger et al., Hearing All Voices: Challenges of Cultural Competence and Opportunities for 
Community Outreach, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 197, 203–05 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017). 
While judges often interpret eye contact as a sign of truthfulness, in some cultures refraining from eye contact 
with the judge may actually stem from respect or fear. Id. at 212–13. 
135. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women’s Lawyering Process, 1 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 50–51 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice]; Carrie 
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necessarily involve a “performance” before a decision maker, often—certainly 
in low-level offenses and small-scale claims—by the litigants themselves. All 
may face the same formal process, but experience, skill, and even the psycho-
logical implications may vary by group. For instance, awareness of a stereotype 
of one’s group can increase anxiety (i.e., stereotype threat), which can diminish 
performance, particularly in high-stakes situations.136 Stress may manifest in 
avoiding eye contact, stuttering, and sweating, which a judge might mistakenly 
interpret as undermining a witness’s credibility.137  
Thus, we have at least two potential mechanisms. First, a focus on human 
judges as the primary “source” of a judicial system’s results links the disparities 
in litigation outcomes to implicit (or explicit) biases influencing an individual 
decision maker. Second, the structural view connects the structure and design 
of court proceedings directly to pervasive and sizable disparities. These two 
mechanisms are, of course, not mutually exclusive; they presumably often op-
erate in tandem and may mutually reinforce each other in many contexts. For 
instance, when procedural arrangements allow for more—rather than less—
judicial discretion or independence, the design may also permit greater implicit 
bias and stereotype-based decision-making. The key point is that, regardless of 
whether decision-maker biases exist, the characteristics of legal processes and 
proceedings seem likely—at least in some cases—to be relatively more advan-
tageous to some groups over others. 
 
 
 
 
Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 75, 
84–86 (1994) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux]. The combative win-lose nature of such procedures 
is less attractive to women, arguably deterring some of them from accessing or maximizing the opportunities 
of the justice system. Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra, at 88–89. Similarly, in our context, one could easily 
argue that the online nature of more recent process innovations corresponds with younger parties’ prefer-
ences, presenting a better fit for them relative to older generations, even holding constant income, education, 
and technological literacy. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is ODR ADR?, 3 INT’L J. ON ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 1, 5 
(2016) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Is ODR ADR?]. 
136. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613, 619–22 (1997); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellec-
tual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 805 (1995). For example, 
black participants appear to perform worse in verbal, SAT-like tests when stereotypes regarding poor aca-
demic performance by blacks are more salient. Steele, supra, at 615. These same dynamics seem highly likely 
to emerge in legal settings, as they have in police encounters. Cf. Cynthia J. Najdowski et al., Stereotype Threat 
and Racial Differences in Citizens’ Experiences of Police Encounters, 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 463, 471 (2015). 
137. Vincent Denault & Laura Dunbar, Nonverbal Communication in Courtrooms: Scientific Assessments or 
Modern Trials by Ordeal?, 47 ADVOCATES’ Q. 280, 284 (2017); see also Cynthia J. Najdowski, Stereotype Threat in 
Criminal Interrogations: Why Innocent Black Suspects Are at Risk for Confessing Falsely, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 562, 572 (2011) (“[B]ecause threatened Black suspects are more likely than nonthreatened White suspects 
to experience anxiety and arousal and engage in self-regulatory efforts and, in turn, experience cognitive load, 
they are more likely to behave, nonverbally, as though they are lying or guilty in interrogations.”). 
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D. Attempts to Reduce Outcome Disparities 
Following our collective awakening to the prevalence of group-aligned dis-
parities in outcomes in judicial decision-making and a growing awareness of the 
ways in which procedural design can produce (or curb) group-based disparities, 
many researchers began to explore how we might reduce these disparities, if 
not eliminate them altogether.138 We focus our discussion on attempts to tem-
per implicit biases, but we should be clear: societal understanding of how to 
address unwarranted disparities is lamentably anemic when compared to our 
grasp of the existence, prevalence, and impact of such biases. While we are 
making progress,139 researchers have also recognized the many difficult chal-
lenges of countering implicit biases in judicial decision-making.140 
 For years now, academics and policymakers have sought to develop prac-
tical, real-world strategies and tools to mitigate the impact of judicial biases on 
litigation outcomes by drawing on research in other decision-making contexts 
and by leveraging insights gleaned from judicial focus groups and other sources 
of data.141 Reformers have proposed diverse means for reducing judicial biases; 
they include auditing judges and judicial decision-making,142 increasing judicial 
self-awareness,143 educating judges about various biases and their sources,144 
and monitoring judicial performance ex post.145 
 
138. See, e.g., Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1169–86; Traci Schlesinger, Racial Disparities in Pretrial Diver-
sion: An Analysis of Outcomes Among Men Charged with Felonies and Processed in State Courts, 3 RACE & JUST. 210, 
229–30 (2013) (finding disparities in pretrial diversion decisions based on race and recommending the use of 
racial-impact studies and racial and ethnic task forces for reform); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Christopher 
T. Robertson, Introduction to BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW 3, 3 (Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016) (“The 
classic icon of Lady Justice wearing a blindfold symbolizes the paradoxical insight that less information can 
sometimes produce better decisions. Should we encourage more opportunities for professionals to be blinded 
to potentially biasing influences?”). 
139. See Pamela M. Casey et al., Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts, 49 CT. REV. 64, 64–65 (2013). 
140. See, e.g., Lindsay M. Perez et al., Assessing Interventions to Reduce Judicial Bias: Fighting Implicit Bias—
What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 317 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017) 
(emphasizing why policymakers and others need to regularly reassess the effectiveness of interventions that 
seek to reduce judicial implicit bias). 
141.  NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: STRATEGIES TO 
REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS 2–5 (2012), https://horsley.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/I 
B_Strategies_033012.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIES] (borrowing from bias research to make recommenda-
tions to courts). 
142. Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1230 (arguing that such a measure would both “increase the 
available data regarding the extent to which bias affects judicial decisionmaking” as well as “enhance the 
accountability of judicial decisionmaking”). 
143. STRATEGIES, supra note 141, at 7. 
144. Id. at 5–6. 
145. Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1231 (suggesting that appeals be conducted by a panel of three 
diverse judges and that clear error scrutiny be replaced with de novo review, which together would uncover 
any missteps caused by biases and reduce the likelihood of a biased decision by the higher court). Obviously, 
monitoring judicial performance also requires that judicial decision-making data be collected and analyzed on 
a regular and ongoing basis. Cf. Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1178 (“If judges do not seek out the information 
that could help them see their own potential biases, those biases become more difficult to correct.”). 
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Early innovators in debiasing were optimistic that explicit awareness of the 
existence of implicit biases—combined with a judge’s commitment to reduce 
them—would largely alleviate their impact on judicial decision-making. Studies 
have shown that when decision makers are made aware of the existence of im-
plicit biases in human thinking, are motivated to be unbiased, and have cogni-
tive resources to compensate for such inclinations, bias in decision-making 
diminishes (although eliminating it altogether proved unattainable).146 With re-
spect to judicial decision-making, for example, “when judges are [made] aware 
of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence of implicit racial 
biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear able to do so.”147 
According to this debiasing approach, awareness of implicit biases is a critically 
necessary, albeit insufficient, step toward reducing their impact.148  
Yet self-audit as a practical debiasing strategy met with skepticism in light of 
judges’ lack of resources and even the skills necessary to regularly perform such 
auditing tasks.149 Perhaps just as important is the fact that such measures seem 
to run “counter to overwhelming evidence of how habits are formed.”150 Judges 
must be motivated to avoid bias, which reformers merely assume to be true in 
view of their public commitment to impartiality and rule of law.151 But probably 
the most severe obstacle to this approach to debiasing is that awareness of bi-
ases and motivation to reduce them must be accompanied with deliberate deci-
sion-making, which in turn demands significant individual and institutional 
resources, both scarce in real-world judicial settings.152 Indeed, this is where 
 
146. Cynthia Lee, Awareness as a First Step Toward Overcoming Implicit Bias, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: 
REDUCING BIAS 289, 295 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017). 
147. Rachlinski et al., supra note 40, at 1221; see also Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit 
Bias in Judicial Decision Making: How It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: 
REDUCING BIAS 87, 109 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017) (“[I]ndividual judges could self-audit by recording data 
such as sentence length, defendant’s race, victim’s race, and so on and periodically reviewing it for con-
sistency.”). 
148. Recommended actions include reading about implicit biases, taking the IAT, and participating in 
educational sessions facilitated by judges, which demonstrate the impact of judicial biases in legal and other 
professional contexts. See Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1176–77. Another technique is “consider-the-opposite” 
or “consider-the-alternative,” which works by asking judges to imagine coming to a conclusion that is the 
opposite of the opinion they currently hold and then to generate explanations that would justify holding such 
an alternative view of events. See Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 147, at 112–13. 
149. Indeed, scholar-critics have shown that long-term eradication of biases is difficult. Stanley P. 
Williams Jr., Double-Blind Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal Bias in the Courtroom, 6 IND. J.L. & SOC. 
EQUALITY 48, 63 (2018). 
150. Id. at 64. 
151. Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1174–76 (examining a California-based study that found that 
education assists judges in becoming aware of their biases); id. at 1174 (“A powerful way to increase judicial 
motivation is for judges to gain actual scientific knowledge about implicit social cognitions.”). 
152. Raising awareness has been described as “an important first step.” Lee, supra note 146, at 291. To 
successfully minimize bias in this fashion, one must have a high degree of self-awareness and focus on not 
only the outcome but also the entire decision-making process to reduce opportunities for schemata, stereo-
types, and intuitions to color parties’ interactions, the weighing of evidence, and the determination of facts. 
See Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1177–78. Such deliberate decision-making requires alleviating personal and 
institutional sources of stress. Id. 
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biases in human decision-making and structural biases coalesce, and therefore, 
efforts to mitigate biases must operate in both spheres simultaneously. 
Others have recommended thwarting implicit biases harbored by judges 
(and jurors) by exposing them to counterstereotypical portrayals of members 
of stigmatized groups.153 Apparently useful in pursuing this strategy is the re-
moval of any verbal or visual materials or other cues in a court, say, that might 
contain or display information that could increase the weight of any stereotype-
based thinking or otherwise activate implicit biases.154 Beyond cleansing a court 
of physical triggers, research suggests that active engagement with individuals 
who controvert group-based stereotypes—ideally, individuals of equal status—
can be effective at reducing the general level of implicit bias toward members 
of a particular group.155 But the potential upside of counterstereotypical expo-
sure is inherently limited when decision makers frequently encounter “stereo-
type-consistent” group members who reinforce implicit biases.156  
Research has also pointed to judicial training as a potentially scalable means 
of debiasing the judicial system. These calls for education emphasize the neces-
sity of implementing training regimens on a voluntary basis and in a nonthreat-
ening manner by focusing on certain biases rather than others and by refraining 
from asking judges to disclose or publicly acknowledge their IAT scores.157 Rec-
ommendations include institution-wide, diversity-oriented training programs 
with a multicultural perspective that recognizes individual and group differ-
ences.158 More generally, ongoing, transparent, and nonthreatening feedback 
 
153. One avenue for such exposure is through the types of pictures, posters, and pamphlets courts 
display in judges’ offices and their surrounding areas—and even in judges’ immediate work environment, 
through displays of atypical roles for minorities and women on judges’ screensavers. Kang et al., supra note 
10, at 1171 (“In chambers and the courtroom buildings, photographs, posters, screen savers, pamphlets, and 
decorations ought to be used that bring to mind countertypical exemplars or associations for participants in 
the trial process.”); STRATEGIES, supra note 141, at 19–21 (promoting the exposure of judges to counterstere-
otypical information and exercises that promote such associations); Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 147, at 
115 (suggesting creating a “[c]onstructive [c]ourtroom [e]nvironment” and fostering diversity in judges’ per-
sonal lives). This idea is based on the contact hypothesis. See Yehuda Amir, Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations, 
71 PSYCHOL. BULL. 319, 319 (1969) (predicting that more contact enables individuals “to know each other 
better and that this close contact will reduce ethnic prejudice and intergroup tension and improve relations”). 
154. Casey et al., supra note 139, at 69. 
155. Id. 
156. Michael Gross, Can We Change Our Biased Minds?, 27 CURRENT BIOLOGY R1089, R1091 (2017). 
157. Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1176–77 (“First, training should commence early, starting with new-
judge orientation when individuals are likely to be most receptive. Second, training should not immediately 
put judges on the defensive, for instance, by accusing them of concealing explicit bias. . . . Third, judges 
should be encouraged to take the IAT or other measures of implicit bias. . . . That said, we do not recommend 
that such tests be mandatory . . . . Moreover, judges should never be expected to disclose their personal re-
sults.”); see also STRATEGIES, supra note 141, at 6–7. Such training is meant to reduce biases, not to make 
judges “color-blind,” which could actually increase discrimination. See id. But see Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra 
note 147, at 107 (warning that although training could promote conscious self-correction, it might make 
judges more prone to other types of bias by depleting their cognitive resources). 
158. Casey et al., supra note 139, at 66. This approach highlights individual differences rather than a 
color-blind approach. Id. Promoting such training on a court-wide basis with appropriate institutional and 
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that relates to the decision-making process, and not only to court outcomes, 
may allow judges to learn from their past experiences and reduce biases.159 Here 
again, reality presents hurdles to these strategies, both in terms of the resources 
required to collect relevant data and in terms of delivering feedback in an effec-
tive manner.160 Calls for augmenting judicial appellate review have been met 
with similar reservations—it may be too costly and inefficient to justify as an 
ongoing solution—but also with concerns that it may backfire: “Substitution of 
one bias for another is no remedy.”161 
Another more structural recommendation in the campaign to curtail im-
plicit biases in judicial decision-making is to reduce legal ambiguity and, thus, 
the ambit of judicial discretion. Judges can use ambiguity to account for dispar-
ate outcomes, and it creates fertile ground for using stereotype-based evidence 
or facts.162 One way to counter these tendencies is to establish concrete stand-
ards and criteria before any decision-making phase.163 This limits the human 
tendency to rely on schemas and stereotypes to simplify a situation and reduce 
ambiguity.164 Increasing structure and limiting discretion may inoculate judges 
from stereotypical thinking and make it easier to detect variation in outcomes. 
But, as we stress, process changes can generate pernicious disparities in their 
own right, and there has recently been, if anything, greater reliance on informal, 
flexible processes (with a high degree of ambiguity) and managerial judging 
practices in the name of judicial efficiency.165 The fact that many, if not most, 
judges—especially in state courts—face incessant pressure to streamline their 
case processing in the face of an ever-growing docket seems to be driving courts 
 
financial resources should minimize bias given that research has demonstrated that egalitarian workplace 
norms reduce levels of individual implicit bias. Id. 
159. Id. at 68. In this vein, scholars and others have recommended that courts monitor judicial deci-
sions and provide feedback by reviewing court data and organizing sentencing roundtables in which judges 
can discuss and reflect on real and simulated cases. Id. 
160. The prospect of reducing bias under conditions of a heavy caseload, a constant reality for many 
overworked judges in the United States, may be far-fetched. See Williams, supra note 149, at 64. Moreover, 
critics fear that even if such training efforts do affect judges, the overall effect could be negative if judges 
overcorrect for their biases. See id. at 62. 
161. Id. at 65. 
162. See M. Bertrand & E. Duflo, Field Experiments on Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF FIELD 
EXPERIMENTS 309, 313 (Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee & Esther Duflo eds., 2017) (“Implicit biases are more 
likely to drive behavior under conditions of ambiguity, high time pressures and cognitive loads, or inattentive-
ness to the task.”). 
163. Casey et al., supra note 139, at 68. 
164. Id. 
165. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 395 (1982) (“Since the early 1900’s, 
judges have attempted to respond to criticism of their efficiency by experimenting with increasingly more 
managerial techniques.”); id. at 405 (“Once brought into the enforcement process, however, the judge often 
uses informal management techniques in an effort to save time and avoid the pressures of public contro-
versy.”); see also id. at 429–30 (contrasting traditional judging activities with judges as “pretrial case managers” 
who “operate in the freewheeling arena of informal dispute resolution”). 
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in the exact opposite direction, thereby encouraging judges to rely more on in-
tuition, schemas, and stereotypes.166  
We would be remiss to ignore judicial diversification as a strategy to address 
implicit bias,167 although this approach operates not by debiasing existing judges 
but by selecting judges so as to reduce any systematic group disparities that 
biases may produce. Various critical movements have revealed the ways in 
which legal norms and judicial decision-making have been skewed in favor of 
white males relative to disempowered groups—racial and ethnic minorities,168 
women,169 and people with disabilities.170 While rulings by white male judges 
once stood as the benchmark of impartiality,171 these critical studies detail the 
prevalence of dominant but often inaccurate narratives in judicial decision-mak-
ing—a consequence that many (at least partially) attribute to a nondiverse 
bench.172 For diversification proponents, identity is an inherent lens through 
 
166. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29 
(2007) (“The intuitive approach to decision making is quick, effortless, and simple . . . . The obvious ad-
vantage of [the intuitive approach] is its speed; judges with heavy dockets can rely on intuition to make 
judgments quickly.”). 
167. Melissa L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit Bias, Judicial Diversity, and the Bench 
Trial, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1072 (2019) (“A diversified bench might lead to better and informed decision 
making as well as reducing bias.”). Of course, judicial diversification has been a goal for many in and of itself, 
and the case for such diversification extends beyond benefits relating to the implicit-bias phenomenon. 
168.  Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in An-
tidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1369 (1988); Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction 
of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1757–58 (2001). 
169. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237–49 (1989) 
(“From a feminist perspective, male supremacist jurisprudence erects qualities valued from the male point of 
view as standards for the proper and actual relation between life and law. Examples include standards for 
scope of judicial review, norms of judicial restraint, reliance on precedent, separation of powers, and the 
division between public and private law.”). 
170. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN 
LAW 51 (1990) (“[W]e typically adopt an unstated point of reference when assessing others. It is from the 
point of reference of this norm that we determine who is different and who is normal. . . . Handicapped 
persons are different in relation to the unstated norm of able-bodiedness . . . . The unstated point of com-
parison is not general but particular, and not inevitable but only seemingly so when left unstated.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
171. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 405, 459–61 (2000) (“[I]f black and female judges are suspected of bringing racialized or gen-
derized perspectives to bear on issues of discrimination, then we must assume that white and male judges 
also bring race and gender perspectives to their decision-making. . . . [C]ases suggest that white judges may 
be enjoying a perception of built-in racial impartiality that parties deny to black judges.”). 
172. Id. at 440 (“Often masquerading as ‘neutral principles,’ racial and gender narratives have informed 
and shaped the construction and interpretation of legal principles such as merit, discrimination, colorblind-
ness, property, parental autonomy, individual rights, and reasonableness.” (footnotes omitted)). Given the 
“inevitability of the existence of a perspective” in judicial decision-making, many believe the diversification 
of the bench is essential to including the unique perspectives and experiences of nondominant groups. Id. at 
461 (“Seeking a form of impartiality that is neither ‘raced’ nor ‘gendered’ is both impractical and impossible. 
As Martha Minow cautioned some time ago, ‘[t]his aspiration of impartiality . . . is just that—an aspiration 
rather than a description—because it may suppress the inevitability of the existence of a perspective.’” (alter-
ations in original) (quoting Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 45 (1987))); see 
also id. at 451 (“Minority judges’ ability to bring to the bench particular perspectives to help understand racial 
bias and discrimination should be conceived of as a valuable asset to judicial decision-making.”); id. at 453–
54 (describing a study of federal judges’ decisions in race discrimination cases and observing that “the lack of 
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which judges view and weigh the facts and interpret and apply the law.173 But 
so far, diversification has proven difficult,174 and research indicating that judicial 
identity may be less important to most litigation outcomes than many initially 
expected reinforces worries that such steps would constitute tokenism.175 
E. Reducing Disparities Through Online Proceedings? 
The legitimacy of our legal system is premised on impartiality, and yet “jus-
tice” in the U.S. somehow seems to walk hand in hand with large and persistent 
group-based outcome disparities.176 We seek in Part I to identify reasons for 
this strange discrepancy, arguing that the arrangement of traditional legal pro-
ceedings—including the prominence of in-person hearings in front of judges—
may be a key source of disparities in legal outcomes. Specifically, legal proceed-
ings like hearings seem inevitably to involve face-to-face encounters, which au-
tomatically expose judges to many irrelevant, identifying characteristics of 
parties. It is this physical exposure to identity features that can routinely trigger 
implicit schemas, biases, and stereotypes and thus produce disparities.177 But 
customary hearings also rely on oral, real-time presentations of parties’ stories, 
arguments, and evidence before a judge—who has considerable discretion over 
how the proceeding unfolds,178 especially when ambiguity reigns, as is the rule 
 
full racial diversity on federal appellate courts determines the outcome of discrimination cases at the appellate 
level . . . [and] may be shaping the development of federal anti-discrimination law” (footnote omitted)); Men-
kel-Meadow, supra note 59, at 202 (“[W]omen may not only arrive at different outcomes in some kinds of 
cases, but they are likely to ‘reason’ differently, or consider different facts, circumstances, and conditions as 
they consider what to decide in granting asylum or not . . . .”). 
173. Indeed, research even hints that diversification serves the instrumental goal of reducing bias, par-
ticularly when decisions are made in diverse judicial panels. See Grossman et al., supra note 43, at 45–46. 
174. Ifill, supra note 171, at 434; see also TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 
FOR L. & POL’Y, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT IN STATE COURTS? 1, 13, http://gavelgap.org/ 
pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2018) (demonstrating that women and minority judges are un-
derrepresented in state courts). Some worry that such steps serve symbolic ends rather than substantives 
ones. See Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American Courts, 10 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 153, 179–80 (2004); Ifill, supra note 171, at 409, 481; id. at 487 (“The goal is to increase not just cosmetic 
diversity, but to increase the number of judges who can authentically articulate and legitimate the perspectives 
and values of ‘outsider voices’ in judicial decision-making.”). 
175. See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (finding that judge identities influence procedures but do not influence 
outcomes in a study of 2,258 federal civil rights and prisoner cases filed in three district courts). Cf. Ifill, supra 
note 171, at 487–88 (arguing that “diversity candidates” for the judiciary should not come only from racial 
minority groups, because white judges who represent marginalized voices may be better able to legitimate 
these voices’ values in the application of the law). But see text accompanying notes 47–54.  
176. See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
177. Casey et al., supra note 139, at 69. 
178. Cf. Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 514 (1996) (“Many if not 
most Federal Rules make no policy choices. Rather, they confer discretion on the trial judge, thereby insulat-
ing the Rules from effective challenges . . . .”). 
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with respect to minor legal issues.179 Every aspect of the process—who speaks, 
when, about what, to whom, under what conditions and restrictions—can ben-
efit certain parties and disadvantage others. Whenever these benefits or disad-
vantages become concentrated in groups, “normal” court proceedings result in 
structure-driven outcome disparities.  
And yet the essence of legal proceedings—the physical, in-person nature 
of which has always seemed fundamental to the adversarial process underpin-
ning our legal system180—is in a state of flux. Court processes of all kinds are 
confronting transformation by online communications technology, which may 
offer new avenues for curbing the judicial and structural biases that may be 
entrenched in face-to-face proceedings.181 A shift to online hearings could re-
duce disparities in outcomes for (at least) two main reasons.  
The first reason online procedures might reduce unwarranted outcome dis-
parities is that online interactions mechanically reduce the salience of identity fea-
tures—especially of the parties.182 A “blinding” measure of this sort has always 
been thought impossible to implement in courts due to the nature of legal ad-
judication. People have understandably assumed that litigation must occur in a 
courtroom, making parties’ and judges’ identity features salient, allowing for 
unstructured interaction, and relying on face-to-face oral communication.183 
Unlike most of the debiasing approaches we discuss in Part I.D, which seek to 
cure implicit biases that follow judicial exposure to activating stimuli, online pro-
ceedings remove the face-to-face element of dispute resolution altogether. By 
eliminating bias preexposure, they effectively shield judges. 
Obscuring group-identity features from decision makers has been a suc-
cessful strategy for reducing biases and attaining greater impartiality in other 
domains.184 Today, a few institutions use anonymous hiring practices to remedy 
 
179.  See supra notes 162–66 and accompanying text (advocating for standards as a means of imposing 
structure and abating ambiguity). 
180. E.g., Amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 207 F.R.D. 89, 93–94 
(2002) (argument by Justice Scalia that reciprocal video transmission is an insufficient replacement for in-
court, in-person confrontation in a criminal trial). 
181. See, e.g., BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., FOSTERING INNOVATION IN THE U.S. COURT SYSTEM: 
IDENTIFYING HIGH-PRIORITY TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER NEEDS FOR IMPROVING COURT OPERATIONS 
AND OUTCOMES ix (2016) (“Use of new technologies could result in better data management and sharing 
across the criminal justice system. Changes in policy could enable new approaches to address disparities or 
assist individuals who choose to represent themselves in court proceedings.”). 
182. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 209; Kesselheim & Robertson, supra note 138, at 4; Meghan 
M. O’Neil & J.J. Prescott, Targeting Poverty in the Courts: Improving the Measurement of Ability to Pay, 82 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 220–21 (2019); Christopher T. Robertson, Why Blinding? How Blinding? A Theory of 
Blinding and Its Application to Institutional Corruption, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING 
BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW, supra note 138, at 25, 36. 
183. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
184. Lawrence Lessig, Foreword, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING 
BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW, supra note 138, at xv, xv–xvi (“If you are skeptical 
that the best violinists are only men, then conduct the auditions behind a screen. If you are worried that the 
vote of employees against a union was affected by their fear of retaliation by the employer, make the ballot 
secret.”). 
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persistent outcome gaps in hiring decisions involving women and minorities.185 
A number of orchestras, institutions that are infamous for being male-domi-
nated, have implemented one of the most literal methods one can imagine for 
ensuring anonymity in hiring—conducting auditions behind a screen (and ex-
plicitly instructing women not to wear heels).186 Blinding measures like these 
have proven quite effective at diversifying orchestras.187 Similarly, anonymiza-
tion via double-blind peer-review procedures in academic publishing has, at 
least in some cases, succeeded in reducing bias toward women and academics 
from lower-ranked institutions.188 
The second reason that shifting to an online medium for hearings might 
lead to fewer outcome disparities has to do with everything else that changes—
and perhaps especially the enhanced structure and limited judicial discretion 
associated with the introduction of software-driven communication. Online 
proceedings invariably differ in ways beyond simply “blinding” a judge from a 
litigant’s group-identity traits. The precise structure of the process (i.e., soft-
ware’s programmed workflow) limits judicial “process discretion,”189 similar in 
spirit to how guidelines can constrain sentencing practices.190 Other differences, 
however, may not alleviate disparities. In theory, they may even exacerbate them 
or offset one another. If, instead of appearing and arguing in person, parties use 
online tools to participate asynchronously in their hearings through writing, this 
 
185. David Hausman, Note, How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by Promoting Anonymous Hiring, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1352–53 (2012). 
186. Kesselheim & Robertson, supra note 138, at 3. 
187. Id.; see also Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions 
on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 737–38 (2000) (showing that these measures significantly reduce 
gender-biased hiring and employment disparities in symphony orchestras). Unfortunately, while effective in 
expanding the number of female orchestra players, these measures have not necessarily eradicated discrimi-
nation between male and female players once hired. See Jennifer Schuessler, Star Flutist Sues Boston Symphony 
over Pay Equity, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/06/arts/music/boston-sym 
phony-orchestra-equal-pay-massachusetts.html. 
188. Emily A. Largent & Richard T. Snodgrass, Blind Peer Review by Academic Journals, in BLINDING AS 
A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW, supra note 
138, at 75, 83; Andrew Tomkins et al., Reviewer Bias in Single- Versus Double-Blind Peer Review, 114 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 12708, 12708 (2017) (demonstrating that single-blind review benefits well-known authors and 
those belonging to prestigious institutions). But see Christopher T. Robertson, Disclosure Discretion and Selection 
Bias in Blinding of Experts, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, 
FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW, supra note 138, at 211, 211 (“Blinding is not ideal. It is a second-best solu-
tion.”); Julian Kolev et al., Is Blinded Review Enough? How Gendered Outcomes Arise Even Under Anonymous Evalu-
ation 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25759, 2019). 
189. More precisely, a software-driven process will follow fixed, predesigned steps in a rigid and trans-
parent way. O’Neil & Prescott, supra note 182, at 214 (“[T]he process is fixed in advance and therefore applied 
equally to everyone, regardless of race, gender, or class, and the entire exchange between the litigant and the 
court can be recorded for later audit.” (footnote omitted)). For better or worse, software does not “free-
wheel,” so all parties in all groups (with similar cases) should expect to go through the same stages. 
190. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 1–2 (2018) (explaining that 
the federal sentencing guidelines were created to address the “unlimited discretion” of judges, to reduce sen-
tencing disparities, and to limit “the broad discretion of sentencing courts and parole [officials]” by mandating 
steps that judges had to follow to impose a sentence (alteration in original) (quoting Peugh v. United States, 
569 U.S. 530, 535 (2013))). 
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switch in process may benefit some groups more than others, and if the groups 
that benefit most are already “haves,” then disparities will grow, not shrink.191 
However, many of the differences between online and offline settings do not 
generate obvious predictions for group-based disparities, making data-driven 
research to explore the possibilities all the more important.192 
Investigating whether and how conducting court proceedings online has 
consequences for existing group-based disparities in legal outcomes is essential 
as more and more courts move toward providing remote online services for 
more and more legal matters. How any encouraging effects might compare to 
the potential benefits of alternative reforms targeting disparities, like many of 
the debiasing strategies we discuss above, is just as important. In the next Part, 
we empirically explore the impact of technology and online tools in courts 
(which we sometimes denote as “online courts”) on the existence of disparate 
outcomes, both those that might originate in judicial decision-making (implicit 
bias) and those that might be attributable to the procedural features of face-to-
face hearings that are missing in online hearings (structural bias), such as oral, 
real-time communication between the judge and the parties. 
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LEGAL OUTCOMES ONLINE AND OFFLINE: 
DISPARITIES AND POTENTIAL BIASES 
A. Background: Online Court Proceedings 
Identifying sources and solutions for group-based outcome disparities in 
litigation has taken on greater urgency as courts across the world encounter a 
sea change—one that may carry an opportunity to make the U.S. legal system 
more impartial. This evolution is the shift from traditional face-to-face court 
proceedings to those that can occur remotely through technology.193 Remote 
proceedings operate through online platforms that connect judges, parties, and 
court personnel to each other virtually; they permit negotiation, mediation, and 
even adjudication over the Internet.194 This development blossomed from two 
independent advances: the rise of first-generation ODR technology as a way to 
resolve private (usually) consumer disputes remotely and the diffusion of digital 
 
191. See KENTARO TOYAMA, GEEK HERESY: RESCUING SOCIAL CHANGE FROM THE CULT OF 
TECHNOLOGY 49 (2015) (explaining that the haves are better positioned than the have-nots to take advantage 
of technologies where access is not assured for all). 
192. Online proceedings and procedural tools are surely susceptible to new forms of bias stemming 
from the qualities of the online medium, and they may generate other benefits (e.g., efficiency) or costs (e.g., 
less legitimacy) that affect the overall appeal of online solutions to dispute resolution. See id. 
193. Keith B. Kaplan, Will Virtual Courts Create Courthouse Relics?, AM. B. ASS’N (May 1, 2013), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/judges_journal/2013/spring/will_virtual_cou 
rts_create_courthouse_relics/. 
194. Prescott, supra note 15, at 2020. 
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technology into courts.195 Concern over eliminating group-based outcome dis-
parities has not been a driving factor in these two trends, but improved impar-
tiality may be an important and long-lasting unintended consequence.196 
At its inception, ODR was not meant for the courts. It arose in the mid-
1990s as a subfield of ADR to fill a dispute-resolution vacuum.197 As e-com-
merce began to flourish, new disputes also cropped up, frequently between dis-
tant strangers who could not resolve their differences face-to-face.198 Traveling 
any distance to resolve quarrels over relatively small sums of money was un-
likely in practice and, in any event, inefficient. This friction threatened the new 
form of commerce; therefore, a real need for effective mechanisms of redress 
surfaced in the new online commercial arena.199 But, much like ADR processes 
and courts, attractive ODR processes had to be efficient, accessible, flexible, 
and fair200—or commercial actors had to perceive them as such. Consequently, 
 
195. Id. at 2010; see also Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Lessons from Online Dispute Resolution for 
Dispute Systems Design, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 51, 52–54 (Mohamed S. 
Abdel Wahab et al. eds., 2012) (discussing the origins of ODR as a consumer dispute-resolution platform for 
websites like eBay and Wikipedia and its eventual use in resolving legal disputes). 
196. See infra Part III.A; see also William E. Crozier & Brandon L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical 
Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina, 69 DUKE L.J. 1585, 1621–25 (2020) (observing that 
members of disempowered groups are less likely to appear in court, potentially because of economic hardship 
or the absence of notice to appear, and further finding these individuals suffer disproportionately from the 
consequence of failing to appear: the suspension of their driver’s licenses). 
197. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 195, at 51–52 (“In the late 1990s . . . . [t]he unique features 
of online communication made traditional, face-to-face dispute resolution processes irrelevant. . . . The real-
ization that the very features that have contributed to the emergence of disputes online—mainly the commu-
nication over geographical, cultural and linguistic differences—have also served to make traditional dispute 
resolution avenues ineffective, has given rise to the development of what has been termed ‘online dispute 
resolution,’ or ODR. Originally, the term referred to processes for dispute resolution that relied on ICT or 
were being offered through the internet for addressing conflicts that arose online (namely in the e-commerce 
setting or on online social forums) or were related to the digital environment (such as copyright abuse). Over 
time, use of such processes has expanded, and these mechanisms are increasingly being offered for the reso-
lution of offline disputes (although interestingly some of the very early ideas for using ODR targeted offline 
conflicts, offering online processes for addressing family disputes).”). 
198. ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH-EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
INTERNET OF DISPUTES 9–10, 29–33 (2017). 
199. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 195, at 51–52. 
200. See Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, The New Handshake: Where We Are Now, 2 INT’L J. ON ONLINE 
DISP. RESOL. 84, 93–94, 96–98 (2016). The eBay ODR system developed by Colin Rule and his team pro-
vided “proof of concept” as it grew to handle 60 million disputes per year, primarily through automated 
means (alongside human intervention), and received high levels of trust from eBay users. See Prescott, supra 
note 15, at 2017 (“[T]o succeed, technology that enhances access to justice must ensure fair process and 
proper procedural protections through the right balance of automation and human involvement and over-
sight . . . .”); Colin Rule, Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Effective Redress: Large E-Commerce Data Sets and the 
Cost-Benefit Case for Investing in Dispute Resolution, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 767, 772–74 (2012) (meas-
uring satisfaction by user loyalty and showing that eBay users who went through ODR, whether they “won” 
or “lost” their case, increased their website activity by greater rates than those who did not experience a 
dispute or did not go through ODR). 
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the growing sophistication in the design of ODR processes and systems—to-
gether with changing habits in the daily use of online communication201—even-
tually rendered ODR processes a potentially valuable new option outside of the 
e-commerce setting, with applications extending to traditional consumer, neigh-
bor, and family legal disputes.202 Indeed, over the last few years, ODR has 
evolved from fairly simple software capable of providing online redress for con-
sumers to an important general dispute-resolution tool for enhancing access to 
justice, particularly through its adoption by courts.203 
While online court proceedings are still a novel approach to dispute reso-
lution, they build on a solid (if imperfect and uncoordinated) foundation of 
technology adoption by courts.204 Implementing online court proceedings has 
only been possible because of previous eras of technology acceptance for data 
collection, case management, process modernization, and internal court com-
munication.205 While these advances began toward the end of the twentieth 
century, they gained real significance in the last two decades as courts digitized 
their historical files and work processes, with a large number of courts now 
offering online filing services, opportunities for digital display of evidence in 
court, and state-of-the-art videoconferencing facilities.206 These early efforts to 
deploy digital technology were primarily about efficiency: streamlining the ad-
ministration of cases by allowing access from afar to lawyers and judges, auto-
mating some of the workflow functions, and allowing for court decisions to be 
published online.207 Over time, it became clear that digital technology would 
 
201. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 206–07 (“Starting and managing bank accounts, initiating 
stock sales, filing mortgage applications, applying for student loans, and purchasing insurance, both auto and 
property, are just a few of the areas in which technology has saved time and expense on all sides of the 
market.” (footnotes omitted)). The distinction between online and offline disputes itself became elusive with 
the spread of smartphones and the rise of social media. Smartphones made online interaction pervasive and 
freed online access from being tied to personal computers that were located in homes, offices, or libraries. 
See Aaron Smith, Chapter One: A Portrait of Smartphone Ownership, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www. 
pewresearch.org/internet/2015/04/01/chapter-one-a-portrait-of-smartphone-ownership/ (noting that 15% 
of Americans reported that they had a “limited number of options” to access the Internet and 10% had no 
other form of Internet access beyond their smartphone). Social media changed our habits and preferences, 
making online interaction with those closest to us as prevalent as, and perhaps more prevalent than, commu-
nication with distant strangers. See KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 198, at 33. 
202. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 187. See also O’Neil & Prescott, supra note 182, at 
211–12 (explaining the benefits of online courts in ability-to-pay hearings). 
203. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 203–12; see also J.J. Prescott & Alexander Sanchez, 
Platform Procedure: Using Technology to Facilitate (Efficient) Civil Settlement, in SELECTION AND DECISION IN 
JUDICIAL PROCESS AROUND THE WORLD 30, 38 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2020) (“Over the last few years, 
advances in platform technology have made it possible for courts to offer new dispute resolution services to 
litigants.”). But see Menkel-Meadow, Is ODR ADR?, supra note 135, for critiques of ODR and a discussion 
of its limitations. 
204. See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text. 
205. KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 198, at 154–56. In many respects, these developments 
in the courts are no different than those that took place in workplaces more generally, replacing paper with 
digital files and archives with digital backups. Id. at 155–56. 
206. Id. at 154–56. 
207. Id. at 155. 
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not merely amplify the effectiveness of existing processes but would also culti-
vate opportunities for reimagining what court processes could be.208 
In the course of the last decade, several innovative court systems in the U.S. 
have instituted ODR and online court proceedings, a choice that is quickly gain-
ing momentum and inspiring courts worldwide.209 The platform we use in our 
study, Matterhorn, has been operating in courts since 2014;210 Matterhorn now 
operates in more than one hundred state courts and agencies and has contracts 
in at least thirteen states.211 Courts currently use Matterhorn to facilitate the 
online resolution of a range of legal disputes, including minor arrest warrants, 
civil infractions, minor misdemeanors, ability-to-pay determinations, foreclo-
sures, family issues, and small claims.212 Matterhorn is not alone in the ODR 
space, however.213 For example, Tyler Technologies—one of the largest tech-
nology service providers for local governments in the U.S.—merged with Mo-
dria, a start-up that designed online proceedings and other dispute-resolution 
solutions, in 2017 and offers ODR in county courts.214  
And the world is taking notice. For example, in 2016, an online tribunal 
began operating in British Columbia, addressing small claims and certain dis-
putes between neighbors.215 As part of a large reform effort of its court system, 
the U.K. government is designing and implementing an online-solutions court 
to address disputes of up to £25,000, which accounts for a significant share of 
the civil caseload in that country.216 Developed by local legal-aid providers, an 
online process in the Netherlands for a time offered new opportunities for 
reaching consensual divorces and addressing neighbor disputes.217 Another 
 
208. See Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 169–70. 
209. Kaplan, supra note 193; Kieren McCarthy, China’s Cyber Court Opens for Business; A Gavel-Free Zone?, 
REGISTER (Aug. 21, 2017, 7:39 PM), http://theregister.co.uk/2017/08/21/chinas_cyber_court_opens 
_for_business (discussing online tribunals in China, Canada, and the U.K.). 
210. Anna Stolley Persky, Michigan Program Allows People to Resolve Legal Issues Online, ABA J. (Dec. 1, 
2016, 3:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/home_court_advantage (stating that Michi-
gan courts started using Matterhorn in 2014). 
211.  E-mail from M.J. Cartwright, Chief Exec. Officer of Matterhorn Inc., to J.J. Prescott, Professor 
of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. (Apr. 27, 2020) (on file with authors); see also MATTERHORN, 
https://getmatterhorn.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2020) (“Matterhorn online dispute resolution (ODR) is 
trusted by over 70 courts, resolution centers, and municipalities . . . .”). 
212. Civil Case Online Resolution, MATTERHORN, https://getmatterhorn.com/odr-solutions/civil/ (last 
visited May 15, 2020); ODR Solutions, MATTERHORN, https://getmatterhorn.com/odr-solutions/ (last visited 
May 15, 2020); see also Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 197–98. 
213. See Provider List, NAT’L CTR. FOR TECH. & DISP. RESOL., http://odr.info/provider-list (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2020) (listing over ninety known ODR providers). 
214. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 201–03. Hawaii recently selected TurboCourt to 
implement ODR in its courts. Press Release, TurboCourt, Hawaii Judiciary Selects TurboCourt to Activate 
ODR (Sept. 3, 2019), https://turbocourt.com/go.jsp?act=actShowScreen&source=scrShowNews &scr=sc 
rShowNews&srcde=dteNews&dstde=dteNews&form=frmNews&id=514847496. 
215. Id. at 190–92. 
216. Id. at 194–96. 
217. Id. at 193–94. Although this platform was eventually discontinued, it may yet be resurrected and 
has served as an inspiration for other online court initiatives. Id. at 194. 
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court, in the District of Hangzhou, China, is already handling e-commerce, cop-
yright, and financial-services-related claims online.218 More recently, Singapore 
incorporated ODR into its court system for two claim types: motor-accident 
claims and spousal- and child-support actions.219 
As courts acclimate to these advances in communications technology—
morphing from being a “place” to a group of “services”220—the role of policy-
makers and academics is to understand the consequences, intended or other-
wise, that may follow this type of transformation. We must appreciate how 
online courts will shape the values, processes, and outcomes of the legal system; 
the roles played by judges and lawyers; and the perceptions of individuals using 
online court proceedings.221 One particularly important dimension, we believe, 
is how online proceedings will affect the ability of courts to deliver on their 
institutional commitment to impartiality.  
We exploit this setting—and the variation in the availability of online pro-
ceedings over time and across courts—to better understand the origins of out-
come disparities between members of different social groups and how we might 
use technology as a way to combat them. We postulate that online proceedings 
may improve matters. We expect that the reduced salience of identity traits dur-
ing online hearings, coupled with the additional structure such procedures af-
ford, will make social-group membership affect litigation outcomes less than it 
would in traditional face-to-face proceedings.222 But there may be countervail-
ing forces at work: online court proceedings differ from in-person proceedings 
 
218. HANGZHOU INTERNET COURT, https://netcourt.yuncourt.com/portal/main/en/index.htm 
(last visited July 8, 2018); see also Hangzhou Internet Court, NAT’L CTR. FOR TECH. & DISP. RESOL. (Aug. 18, 
2017), http://odr.info/hangzhou-internet-court. 
219. 2019 ODR International Forum: ‘Online Dispute Resolution Is Here to Stay,’ NAT’L CTR. ST. CTS., 
https://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/at-the-center/november-2019/ODR-Forum.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 
2020); Theresa Tan, Family Justice Courts Launch Cheaper and Faster Way for Users to File Applications, STRAITS 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2019, 1:44 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/family-justice-court-launches-
cheaper-and-faster-way-for-users-to-file-applications. 
220. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE 109 (2d 
ed. 2017). 
221. Compare Richard Atkinson, Opinion, Virtual Courts: More Speed, Less Justice?, GUARDIAN (July 18, 
2012), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jul/18/virtual-courts-speed-justice (“Little 
consideration seems to have been given to the need to balance speed with justice—justice being about con-
victing the guilty and acquitting the innocent, rather than focusing on the desire for retribution.”), with O’Neil 
& Prescott, supra note 182, at 220 (“Most respondents contend that the tool is easier to use and less biased 
than in-person ability-to-pay determinations. Specifically, judges feel that minorities, the elderly, the disabled, 
and non-English speakers obtain better access to justice using the assessment tool.”). 
222. In an early study of online court proceedings, one of us analyzed data from both online and face-
to-face proceedings in courts employing the Matterhorn platform. Prescott, supra note 15, at 1993. The study 
focused on court ODR’s effect on access to justice; it examined case duration, payment, and default rates in 
civil-infraction cases, finding that ODR had a dramatic impact on these outcomes, enhancing access to justice 
both on and off the platform. Id. at 2026–50. See also id. at 2050 (finding that adopting court ODR can reduce 
case duration, improve satisfaction, and reduce default rates, all indicators of enhanced access to justice). To 
date and to our knowledge, there has been no study of how the shift from face-to-face to online proceedings 
affects outcome disparities by litigant-identity characteristics. 
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in ways other than simply reducing the salience of group identity (e.g., by sub-
stituting asynchronous, text-based communication for oral, real-time ex-
changes). These changes in process may influence outcomes differently for 
different identity-based groups, and these differences may magnify, offset, or 
overwhelm any reduction in implicit bias-based disparities. 
In our work, we statistically compare the outcomes of online and face-to-
face proceedings for resolving civil-infraction cases (specifically, traffic viola-
tions), which constitute much more than 50% of cases in state courts,223 touch-
ing most of the population and rendering them important determinants of the 
legal system’s reputation for legitimacy. We analyze litigation outcome dispari-
ties across three different types of litigant-identity traits: age, gender, and race. 
The existing literature on party-identity characteristics and their effects on legal 
outcomes is compelling but does not encompass all types of cases or courts. 
For example, while there is substantial research on the impact of party race on 
judicial outcomes in the criminal justice arena broadly,224 and in some civil con-
texts,225 there is significantly less research on judicial biases and systematic dis-
parities in the context of civil infractions and minor legal matters.226  
This is a significant gap, especially given that most cases in U.S. courts in-
volve relatively minor matters.227 Americans are far more likely to interact with 
courts, judges, and other parties like law enforcement over minor legal issues 
(as opposed to more complicated and weighty legal problems), and the collat-
eral effects of even minor civil infractions can be surprisingly serious, particu-
larly for the poor.228 The associated fines disproportionately affect people of 
 
223. More than half of cases in state courts fall into the traffic category. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN 
ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 
STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2012), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DA 
TA%20PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx. 
224. See, e.g., Berdejó, supra note 4; Johnson, supra note 4; Mustard, supra note 44; see also supra note 38 
and accompanying text. 
225. See, e.g., AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS 
IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 37–46 (1985) (concluding, after analyzing 9,000 jury trials, that black plain-
tiffs are less likely than white plaintiffs to prevail in similar cases and that plaintiffs between ages forty and 
fifty-nine win more in damages than those in other age brackets); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, 
Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 51–52 (2003) (finding 
that tort awards by county are negatively correlated with white poverty rates but positively correlated with 
poverty among minorities). 
226. See, e.g., Kang et al., supra note 10, at 1164 (“In the criminal trajectory, we already learned of juror 
bias via meta-analyses as well as correlations with implicit biases. Unfortunately, we lack comparable studies 
in the civil context.”); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 
731, 737 (2018) (finding “profound racial disparity” in arrest rates for most kinds of misdemeanors, with 
“variation in racial disparity across offense types” remaining “remarkably constant over the past thirty-seven 
years”). 
227. See LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., supra note 223, at 3. 
228. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1081–82, 
1084–86 (2015) (discussing the risk of incarceration for failure to pay civil fines and fees); see also Bulinski & 
Prescott, supra note 11, at 224 (noting the lost wages workers experience when they are required to go to 
court during business hours). See generally Crozier & Garrett, supra note 196 (considering the far-reaching 
consequences of relatively minor infractions when they result in license suspension).  
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color and often lead to more frequent (and more disruptive) interactions with 
courts.229 If citizens form conclusions about the impartiality of courts, law en-
forcement, and government in general, at least in part, from their experiences 
with courts, then addressing disparities in resolving civil infractions in state 
courts is vital to the overall success of the U.S. legal system. 
Finally, and importantly, minor civil cases appear especially subject to im-
plicit biases in judicial decision-making because judges face more serious con-
straints on time and other resources in this domain. Caseload pressures are 
likely to exacerbate any bias by making the use of heuristics and rules of thumb 
more attractive and therefore more frequent.230 Moreover, when courts resolve 
disputes over civil infractions, they commonly use more informal processes, 
allowing for greater discretion and potentially aggravating any unwarranted out-
come variation.231 In this vein, research has documented that identity traits—
age, gender, and race—affect traffic-related policing decisions,232 which share 
many features with traffic-related judicial decisions. For example, female drivers 
are more likely to be warned but less likely to be cited by police relative to 
similarly situated male drivers.233 And older drivers are more likely to be warned 
but less likely to be cited compared to their younger counterparts.234 Our data 
allow us to examine whether similar dynamics and resulting disparities exist af-
ter law enforcement has already issued a citation at the level of judicial outcomes 
along the axes of age, gender, and race. 
 
 
 
 
229. ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR 
156 (2016) (“Existing racial and ethnic disparities in criminal justice contact and its consequences are exacer-
bated by the imposition of monetary sanctions. African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos are dis-
proportionately convicted and incarcerated, and the burden of monetary sanctions is disproportionately 
borne by people of color.”). 
230. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
231. See Daniel Klerman & Holger Spamann, Law Matters—Less Than We Thought 20 (USC Gould Sch. 
of Law Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 19-25, 2019), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3439526 (“The experiment provides some support for the idea that ap-
plication of a rule is more predictable than application of a standard and that judges under a rule feel more 
bound to reach the correct results.”). 
232. Rob Tillyer & Robin S. Engel, The Impact of Drivers’ Race, Gender, and Age During Traffic Stops: As-
sessing Interaction Terms and the Social Conditioning Model, 59 CRIME & DELINQ. 369, 381–85 (2013). Stevenson 
and Mayson “estimate[] that there are 13.2 million misdemeanor cases filed each year and that such cases 
disproportionately affect poor people and people of color.” Crozier & Garrett, supra note 196, at 1597 (citing 
Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 226, at 731). But “studies of misdemeanor outcomes often exclude data 
from traffic cases—or at least non-DWI traffic cases” because traffic-court dockets are too large, outcomes 
are inconsistently reported, and data are difficult to obtain in traffic cases. Id. (citing Stevenson & Mayson, 
supra note 226, at 773–75). 
233. Tillyer & Engel, supra note 232, at 318. 
234. Id. 
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B. Online and Offline Legal Proceedings 
We study case outcomes in state courts that implemented online proceed-
ings to resolve disputes over alleged traffic-related civil infractions. These 
courts offered offline, face-to-face proceedings throughout the period we study 
but made online proceedings available to litigants partway through the sample 
period,235 meaning that remote options were unavailable at the outset of our 
quasi-experiment. We leverage the midstream adoption of online proceedings 
to evaluate their effects on group-based outcome disparities. The courts we 
study administered the Matterhorn ODR platform,236 which was designed to 
mimic, as closely as possible, the basic workflow of face-to-face hearings in the 
courts that use it.237 Matterhorn operated during the period we observe in a 
similar way across our sample courts, simplifying our comparison of online 
hearings and traditional face-to-face proceedings. 
The courts we study only offer online hearing opportunities to litigants with 
eligible cases,238 and litigants must choose to use the online platform in lieu of the 
physical in-court process (or in lieu of accepting responsibility and paying their 
ticket). Thus, the online proceedings operate in the courts we investigate as a 
substitute for traditional “informal” face-to-face hearings, which occur in a 
brick-and-mortar courtroom. These in-court hearings are similar in important 
ways to the thousands that occur in state courts throughout the country every 
day: they bring together, in the same room, the litigant and an officer or prose-
cutor before a judge. The litigant seeks a reduced charge or fine or some other 
relief. The magistrate or judge invites the parties to recount their version of 
events, make their arguments, and answer any questions.239 
The court’s online hearing platform similarly solicits input from the parties 
(in writing) through a process in which the litigant assumes responsibility for 
 
235. Our sample period runs from approximately 2012 to 2019, with courts adopting their online plat-
forms at least a couple of years after the beginning of our sample period. We discuss the details of the sample 
period and cases in the data section below. See infra Part II.C. 
236. Matterhorn was developed in 2013 to enhance access to justice by connecting litigants directly to 
decision makers through online technology. Several Michigan state courts piloted the platform, and its devel-
oper, Court Innovations Inc., initially targeted the resolution of civil infractions and outstanding minor war-
rants. Matterhorn later expanded to other jurisdictions and was reconfigured to handle additional case types. 
Andrew Mohr, The University of Michigan—Making the Justice System More Accessible, MATTERHORN (Mar. 1, 
2015), https://getmatterhorn.com/the-university-of-michigan-making-the-justice-system-more-accessible; 
Persky, supra note 210. 
237. E-mail from M.J. Cartwright, Chief Exec. Officer of Matterhorn Inc., to J.J. Prescott, Professor 
of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. (Apr. 26, 2020) (on file with authors). 
238. By “litigants with eligible cases,” we mean individuals who have been charged with civil infractions 
that the courts determine can be resolved through the online platform. These infractions include most, but 
not all, traffic offenses. Prescott, supra note 15, at 2022 n.156 (“Eligibility criteria typically relate to the nature 
of the offense and the litigant’s criminal history or driving record.”). 
239. Inevitably, and as labeled, this is an informal setting with significant discretion. Judges do not 
follow a script, can ask any question they deem relevant (in any fashion they choose), and can make a decision 
whenever they wish. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 242. 
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the incident but the particular outcome (i.e., the charge and/or the monetary 
fine) is contested.240 At least in the online proceedings we observe, the content, 
presentation, and order of the judge’s questions are identical in every case, de-
termined by the court in advance as the “right” questions to assemble the in-
formation necessary to resolve the case. Litigants answer questions and provide 
their story, and law enforcement can respond. All parties can participate at any 
time of day. After digesting the written arguments and case documents, the 
judge issues a decision along with a sanction—usually a conviction on a specific 
charge and the final fine amount—if appropriate.241 
Despite their formal similarities, online proceedings differ from face-to-
face hearings in several respects. First, as we note above, all parties are able to 
access the platform at any time on any day of the week, meaning that arguments 
and decisions are often made when the courts are physically inaccessible.242 Sec-
ond, communication and argumentation take place asynchronously,243 operat-
ing like instant messaging, e-mail, and court briefs. Communication between 
parties and judges can stretch over days, giving parties more time to consider 
and craft their submissions.244 Indeed, litigants may even ask someone to draft 
a statement on their behalf. In general, communication on the platform be-
tween the party and the judge is one-sided and occurs in parallel, in contrast to 
an in-court interaction that occurs in real time and involves a two-way exchange. 
Third, and critically, parties interact through the Internet entirely via text-based 
writing and the submission and exchange of electronic text, documents, and 
other electronic files.245 The parties and judges do not see each other’s faces or 
bodies, hear each other’s voices, or see each other’s clothes (unless a party up-
loads an image or audio file with this content as evidence; we are unaware of 
this ever having happened through the Matterhorn platform).246 Judges, how-
ever, are exposed to party names, which can carry information about gender 
 
240. Because online litigants are a self-selected sample, any inferences we draw must take into account 
the possibility of selection bias. For instance, people who wish to contest their ticket will not choose the 
online platform. The possibility of the ticketing officer’s age-, gender-, or race-related bias also comes into 
play—these biases will influence whether an officer lets a driver leave with a warning. And face-to-face hear-
ings may have higher numbers of young, male, or black litigants because they might be more likely to receive 
a ticket under perceived “unfair” circumstances and attempt to contest the charges. 
241. See Prescott, supra note 15, at 2022–25. 
242. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 226. In theory, although this 24/7 access factor might change 
a proceeding’s outcome, it seems unlikely to do so because of a judge’s partiality to one group over another, 
unless a judge draws inferences based on communication time stamps. However, it does seem plausible that 
greater access to dispute-resolution opportunities may benefit some groups over others. 
243. Id. 
244. Id.; see also Guiller et al., supra note 124, at 193–94 (“[Evidence] suggests that asynchronous dis-
cussion groups do promote the use of formal research evidence to support opinions and arguments, in com-
parison to face-to-face discussion.”). 
245. Prescott, supra note 15, at 2022 (“Matterhorn asks litigants to explain in writing their reasons for 
using the platform . . . and to defend their request with valid reasons and evidence.”). 
246. Admittedly, judges do read litigants’ writings and see their answers to questions. With respect to 
the former (the latter can be regulated), a judge might be able to assess someone’s facility with English, 
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and national origin (and perhaps age), and they can locate a party’s gender and 
date of birth when looking at the party’s driving history.247 
Operationally, litigants initiate their online judicial proceeding on the 
court’s website.248 Individuals search for their case using their identifying infor-
mation—for example, their name, birthdate, or driver’s license number—and 
provide contact information for subsequent communication between the par-
ties and the court.249 The system reviews dockets for cases involving the indi-
vidual and, if the search is successful,250 it runs each case through eligibility 
filters to determine whether the case qualifies for ODR procedures.251 For eli-
gible cases, litigants have the option to proceed by engaging with a prosecutor 
and a judge online to resolve their case—with the same outcomes possible that 
a litigant would face at an in-person informal hearing in the courthouse.252 If a 
litigant decides to continue with an online hearing, the court gives the litigant 
instructions and asks questions through the platform.253 The litigant can choose 
whether and how to respond, just as in real court.254 The system is configured 
by each court to collect the kind of information judges assert is relevant in face-
to-face proceedings.255 Just as a judge would do in a face-to-face hearing, the 
 
educational level, and perhaps wealth or socioeconomic background. In the future, one can imagine technol-
ogy that could automatically dampen or obscure revealing features of language usage without compromising 
substantive effectiveness, or optional functions like spell-checking or grammar-checking, or the use of tem-
plates for standard filings or communications. 
247. See Andy Mohr, ODR Video: College Town Court Connects with the Public Online, MATTERHORN (May 
9, 2019), https://getmatterhorn.com/odr-video-college-town-court-connects-with-the-public-online; see also 
Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 248 (“Some litigants may be concerned, of course, that even though the 
judge cannot see them, the judge (or a clerk) might still discern information like race, gender, or nationality 
from other information like names on files or forms.”). 
248. See How It Works, MATTERHORN, https://getmatterhorn.com/how-it-works/ (last visited May 15, 
2020) [hereinafter How It Works]; Plea Online, MATTERHORN, https://getmatterhorn.com/matterhorn-plat-
form/plea-online/ (last visited May 15, 2020). 
249. See, e.g., Alex Tekip, Online Ticket Review System Streamlines Process of Resolving Traffic Citations, C & G 
NEWSPAPERS (June 24, 2016), https://www.candgnews.com/news/online-ticket-review-system-streamlines-
process-resolving-traffic-citations-93940 (“Before a driver can have his or her ticket reviewed online [in the 
particular district court], he or she must input his or her driver’s license number and date of birth . . . .”). 
250. Accept Uploads for Waivable and Correctable Traffic Offenses Online, MATTERHORN, https://getmatterho 
rn.com/odr-solutions/traffic/accept-uploads-for-waivable-traffic-offenses-online/ (last visited Apr. 12, 
2020). If a docket search is unsuccessful, Matterhorn encourages litigants to provide contact information and 
to allow Matterhorn to continue to search for a ticket in the days ahead. 
251. Courts develop eligibility criteria in order to limit the platform’s availability to only those kinds of 
cases that they deem appropriate for resolution in an online setting. Eligibility criteria typically relate to the 
nature of the offense and the litigant’s criminal history or driving record. See supra note 238. 
252. Even after fully exhausting their options through Matterhorn, litigants retain the option of going 
to the courthouse in person. Prescott, supra note 15, at 2022 n.158. Using Matterhorn results in no prejudice; 
thus, there is no significant risk to litigants in accessing a court’s procedures using Matterhorn. 
253. “At the outset, Matterhorn requests contact information (e.g., e-mail address and mobile number) 
from litigants so the court or other parties can impart information, requests, and/or any decisions to them 
during the remainder of the process.” Id. at 2022 n.159 (citing How It Works, supra note 248). 
254. Id. at 2022 n.160 (explaining that citizens can tell the court about their case—if it is eligible—and 
answer questions from the court on the platform). 
255. The set of questions that courts ask litigants is adjusted to take account of case and litigant infor-
mation of which the court is already aware, and the ordering of questions is designed to take advantage of 
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court always entreats litigants (via a prompt presented by the platform) to ex-
plain and justify their requests, although in writing.  
Matterhorn directs the litigant’s submissions and all other information in 
the case (charge, etc.) to a prosecutor or a police officer for online review and 
a text-based recommendation, which is logged on the platform. The judge then 
reviews the case—the charges, the arguments, the evidence, and the prosecu-
tor’s input—and makes a determination about how to proceed,256 which almost 
always means resolving the case, but a judge may request additional infor-
mation. While the range of possible outcomes is the same in both mediums, the 
online platform presents the judge with a menu of preconfigured punishment 
options, combining fine amounts with final charges. A reduced charge counts 
as relief independent of a reduced fine because it translates into fewer driver’s 
license “points” relative to the original charge. When hearing a case online, 
judges select from a set of preconfigured choices; although they can deviate 
from these options in some cases, judges rarely do so.257 After a judge decides 
the case, the system informs the litigant of the outcome. 
The simultaneous availability of online proceedings and in-person informal 
hearings in the civil-infraction context presents a unique opportunity to con-
trast the outcomes of these two procedural approaches. Our empirical analysis 
amounts to a statistical comparison of group-based outcome disparities in cases 
resolved in a face-to-face court setting and those resolved via the online court 
platform.258 We focus on in-person “informal” hearings and alternative online 
hearings because, in both, litigants overwhelmingly seek a reduction in punish-
ment, rather than contest their responsibility.259 Judges act as the ultimate deci-
sion makers in both types of processes for equivalent types of cases, but the 
two processes differ in adjudication structure, in the level of decision-maker 
discretion, and in the visibility to the judge of a litigant’s group-defining physical 
 
“smart” online-survey technology (for example, questions that become irrelevant based on previous answers 
are not presented) to reduce the burden on litigants. 
256. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 243. Typical decision-relevant data include the type of 
infraction, the circumstances of the incident, the specific relief requested, the litigant’s criminal and traffic 
history, and the litigant’s communication with and submissions to the court. See id. 
257. See id. at 213–14; E-mail from M.J. Cartwright, supra note 237. 
258. The cases resolved through the different mediums should be substantively the same or similar 
(once we control for observables; we discuss potential omitted variable bias and selection concerns below), 
but as we make clear in Part I, supra, decision makers inevitably consider extraneous factors in their delibera-
tions. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences 
on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 119–30 (1994) (discussing the causes and implications 
of what the authors term “mental contamination”). Altering the means of communication affects the salience 
of these irrelevant factors and can change decision-making—in our terminology, a structural bias. See, e.g., 
Holly K. Orcutt et al., Detecting Deception in Children’s Testimony: Factfinders’ Abilities to Reach the Truth in Open 
Court and Closed-Circuit Trials, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 358 (2001) (finding, in a mock-trial experiment, 
that jurors are less likely to convict a defendant when intentionally deceptive accusers testify using closed-
circuit television as opposed to when they testify in person). 
259. E-mail from M.J. Cartwright, supra note 237; Telephone Interview with Manager, Mich. Dist. 
Court (June 21, 2019) [hereinafter June Telephone Interview]; Telephone Interview with Manager, Mich. 
Dist. Court (July 3, 2019) [hereinafter July Telephone Interview]. 
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traits.260 We turn now to describing our data and explaining the methods we 
employ for comparing online and offline proceedings. 
C. Data and Methodology 
Our analysis is based on comprehensive data of similar online and face-to-
face traffic violation cases that were resolved in multiple courthouses that make 
up two district courts in Michigan. These data come directly from each court’s 
case-management system and include descriptive details of the litigant,261 the 
 
260. We take measures to overcome the “baseline problem” that plagues analyses of dispute-resolution 
systems. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 117, at 4. The term refers to the difficulty of establishing valid com-
parisons between traditional court procedures and novel alternatives. Carrie Menkel-Meadow has elaborated 
on this issue in the ADR context, where attempts to derive evaluative conclusions about ADR procedures 
raise the question of “compared to what?” Id. ADR procedures are invoked by parties with distinctive inter-
ests in a unique pool of cases; random assignment is virtually impossible. Id. Likewise, in our work, it is 
important to identify the right set of face-to-face proceedings to contrast with online hearings.  
 In our traffic-case context, our sample courts provide multiple options for face-to-face dispute resolution: 
prehearing conferences, informal hearings, and formal hearings. June Telephone Interview, supra note 259. 
During prehearing conferences, litigants speak with police officers in a once-a-week, no-appointments setting 
and negotiate fines and charges (essentially, a plea deal) without magistrate or judge supervision. Id. By con-
trast, informal hearings are judge centered—although often presided over by magistrates—and usually do not 
involve legal representation. Id. Litigants in informal hearings are almost always found guilty—the rare ex-
ceptions include case dismissals if the ticketing police officer fails to appear or nonguilty dispositions if strong 
evidence contradicts the police officer’s claims. Id.; see also E-mail from M.J. Cartwright, supra note 237. The 
aim of informal hearings is often to determine appropriate punishment. June Telephone Interview, supra note 
259. During (rare) formal hearings, litigants experience a full-fledged trial, usually with legal representation 
and a district judge presiding. Id. In formal hearings, litigants typically contest the charges outright, and the 
government seldom alters the original charges along the way. Id. 
 Prehearing conferences and informal hearings are the most similar to online hearings in terms of their 
structure and likely outcomes. June Telephone Interview, supra note 259; July Telephone Interview, supra note 
259. The parties assume the litigant’s guilt in prehearing conferences, and guilty pleas and judgments are 
overwhelmingly common in informal hearings. June Telephone Interview, supra note 259. Litigants arrive at 
these hearings seeking to improve on the default outcome of simply accepting full responsibility, usually 
angling for less serious charges associated with fewer license penalty points, but fine amounts matter to liti-
gants as well. June Telephone interview, supra note 259; July Telephone Interview, supra note 259. 
 A key difference between prehearing conferences and informal hearings ultimately led us to eliminate the 
former from our control group of in-person cases: Cases disposed via prehearing conferences resolve through 
negotiated agreements between litigants and police officers; these agreements are ultimately approved later 
by a magistrate or judge but inevitably without alteration of the negotiated terms. June Telephone Interview, 
supra note 259; July Telephone Interview, supra note 259. Even if we were to treat police officers as “decision 
makers” in such cases, our data for these cases do not list the officer involved, leaving us unable to control 
for the identity of the presiding individual (which, in our primary analysis of judges in informal hearings, turns 
out to be important). More important is that police officers involved in preconference hearings are both 
parties and judges; it is unclear what we can learn about litigation disparities from such proceedings. In the 
end, we believe the baseline problem is less acute when comparing only informal hearings to online proceed-
ings. The two pools are of course not perfectly equivalent, so in unreported work we perform our main 
analysis on multiple combinations of in-person hearing types and conclude that our findings are qualitatively 
unaffected (robust). These results are available upon request. 
261. In particular, litigant data in our sample include gender, date of birth, and driver’s license state 
and zip code from driving records as well as race from the traffic ticket. The litigant’s race is entered as 
perceived by the ticketing police officer at the time the ticket is written; to our knowledge, the litigant is not 
asked to acknowledge, verify, or correct this race information at any stage in the legal process. Although it 
appears to be a standard practice for police to record the perceived race of a litigant at the time of ticketing, 
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traffic incident,262 and the court processes that led to the final disposition.263 
The court records are largely complete, though we limit our analysis to the sam-
ple of cases with no missing details.264 All of the cases in our data meet the 
requirements for online eligibility as established by the courts.265 To ensure that 
our comparisons of outcomes across groups in face-to-face and online hearings 
are informative, we take several measures in how we define our sample and in 
our modeling assumptions to maximize the chances that we are analyzing what 
are effectively similar cases.  
To begin with, because we focus on disparities in severity of punishment 
that result from a judge’s exercise of discretion in a procedurally structured en-
vironment, we restrict our analysis to cases that allow for this discretion—i.e., 
where a judge makes a decision. We exclude cases never subject to dispute res-
olution, either because the individual paid the ticket at the outset or because 
they never paid the ticket or responded to court inquiries, sending the case into 
 
officer identification is less than perfect. See Rhonda Fanning, Why Are Texas Officers Misidentifying Race During 
Traffic Stops?, TEX. STANDARD (Nov. 6, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/why-are-
texas-cops-misidentifying-race-during-traffic-stops (reporting that investigators found “lots and lots of ex-
amples” of “people that were clearly Hispanic” recorded as white on traffic citations). Such misreporting may 
be explained by officers attempting to avoid detection for engaging in racially biased traffic stops. Elizabeth 
Luh, Not So Black and White: Uncovering Racial Bias from Systematically Misreported Trooper Reports 31 (Mar. 20, 
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://elizluh.github.io/files/highwaybias.pdf (finding “evidence that mis-
reporting allows biased officers to evade punishment for bias”).  
262. In particular, traffic-incident data in our sample include the traffic-case type (i.e., state-statute 
violation or local-ordinance violation), the original charge code and description, and the incident date—all of 
which are found on the traffic ticket. 
263. The court-processing data in our sample include a unique case number for each incident, the name 
of the presiding judge or magistrate, the case-filing date, the hearing type, the final charge code and descrip-
tion, the final disposition, the case-closing date, and the dollar amount of court fines ordered at the conclusion 
of the final court hearing. 
264. Our analysis aims to understand the role of litigant age, gender, and race in outcome disparities 
across hearing mediums (face-to-face versus online), so we exclude cases that are missing any of the following: 
judge name, litigant date of birth, litigant gender, litigant race, and litigant zip code—since we use these data 
to create various control variables in our analysis. Because litigant date of birth and gender come from driving 
records, this information is only missing for a handful of cases. Unsurprisingly, the judge name, which relies 
on the court clerk’s diligence during the creation of the court record, and litigant race, which relies on the 
ticketing police officer’s perception and care during the traffic-ticketing process, are missing more frequently. 
In unreported analysis, we find that the qualitative conclusions of our empirical work are unaffected (robust) 
when we include the observations with missing judge and race information using a variety of assumptions. 
Notably, we arrive at similar results if we define all cases with missing race information (that are otherwise 
complete) as all black and as all nonblack—two configurations that serve as upper and lower bounds for the 
actual race distribution of this sample. 
265. In general, courts using Matterhorn’s ODR platform limit eligibility for the online hearing process 
to particular case types even within the traffic category of cases. But eligibility varies some from court to 
court and depends on the extent of the court’s experience with resolving cases online (as a court becomes 
more experienced, the scope of online eligibility tends to grow). The district courts in our sample determine 
online eligibility using original charges. Though all original charge types in our sample are eligible for the 
online platform, not all of them are equally populated. We test to see if this phenomenon biases our results 
in any way, in unreported analysis, by limiting the sample to only those cases with the most common original 
charges and find no substantive difference in our main results. 
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default.266 We then exclude any cases with not-guilty dispositions,267 cases with 
guilty dispositions that were not ordered to pay any fines,268 and cases in which 
charges were dismissed on technical grounds.269 These cases are rare and unu-
sual or the circumstances compelled the case’s outcome, leaving the judge with 
minimal discretion. Further, in order to compare cases across relatively similar 
circumstances, we also omit very old cases,270 and we exclude any cases with 
litigants younger than age eighteen.271 In terms of case types, we restrict our 
analysis to cases that were or would have been eligible for online resolution, 
again in hopes of comparing apples to apples. 
We use court data that begin a few years before online proceedings become 
available (pre-data), and we have at least two years of online hearing and con-
temporaneous in-person hearing data for each court (post-data).272 The final 
data set includes 5,232 cases, of which 2,713 are face-to-face and 2,519 are 
online.273 Of the cases in our sample that use face-to-face informal hearings in 
 
266. There is evidence that better access to the court through ODR leads relatively more litigants to 
invoke dispute resolution. Prescott, supra note 15, at 2047–48 (finding that litigants using ODR had an 18.6 
to 23 percentage-point reduction in their likelihood of defaulting). So there is an extensive margin-selection 
issue, which we believe our control variables address. We are also able to test for various forms of selection 
by studying the evolution of the face-to-face docket before and after ODR implementation. 
267. In a sense, a ruling of no responsibility in the traffic-court context is the ultimate display of po-
tential bias (toward leniency), given the generally very low probability of successfully challenging traffic 
charges. We exclude these cases because our main interest lies in punishment disparities among similarly 
situated guilty parties. However, in unreported work, we find that adding these cases into our analysis does 
not alter the essence of our results, although some relationships are less precisely estimated: we see the same 
patterns of disparity by litigant characteristics in the face-to-face setting and similar disparity alleviation in the 
online setting when we include these outlier cases in our analysis. 
268. According to conversations with court staff, any cases displaying guilty dispositions and no fines 
are likely erroneously entered because no zero-dollar court fines are ordered for cases with guilty dispositions. 
June Telephone Interview, supra note 259; July Telephone Interview, supra note 259. The total number of 
cases with these circumstances is very small (thirty-nine). In unreported analysis, we include these cases and 
find no substantive difference in our main conclusions. 
269. Our data include information on whether the court dismissed a case. We assume that all dismissed 
cases in our sample are dismissed on technical grounds. 
270. One district court only shared detailed case data from 2012 to 2019 with us. While the other 
court’s records we obtained go as far back as 2000, they are not consistent until 2012. In unreported analysis, 
we include the cases filed before 2012 and find no substantive changes to our main conclusions. 
271. According to conversations with court staff, judges and magistrates may openly display bias while 
dealing with teenage drivers, as they see traffic tickets as opportunities to shape future driving behavior. June 
Telephone Interview, supra note 259; July Telephone Interview, supra note 259. In unreported analysis, our 
main conclusions are robust to including the subsample of minor drivers. This is no surprise, as restricting 
our analysis to adult litigants excludes a population that is explicitly (and, in the court’s view, lawfully) treated 
more harshly, whereas differential treatment is more difficult in online proceedings. 
272. The exact number of years before and after the online platform implementation depends on the 
court. One district court launched the Matterhorn platform in 2014 and the other in 2016. 
273. A total of twenty-three judges preside over all cases in our sample, but only six preside over more 
than fifty cases in total. In unreported analysis, we limit the sample to only those six judges who preside over 
fifty or more cases and find no substantive difference in our results. Eight judges preside over cases in the 
online pool, but two judges handle the vast majority of these cases (97%), and three resolve almost all of 
them (99.7%). While we conjecture that the reduction of group-based disparities is a result of the online 
platform, it is possible that the effect might be the result of two especially fair-minded judges self-selecting 
into presiding over online cases. We test for this, in unreported results, by isolating the face-to-face and online 
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a physical courthouse, courts disposed of approximately 32% before and 68% 
after Matterhorn’s installation. This quasi-experiment in implementation timing 
allows us to assess differences in group-based outcome disparities across medi-
ums.274 Again, we assess group disparities along three identity markers: age, gen-
der, and race. We select these three traits because they are relevant to bias, 
discrimination, and disparities in other domains; they are observable in our data; 
and they are visible in face-to-face court proceedings but are significantly less 
salient on the Matterhorn platform.275 
Table 1—which we display in the Appendix, along with all other tables—
presents the details of the cases we examine in greater depth, including the de-
mographic characteristics of the litigants using each medium. Face-to-face and 
online cases look surprisingly similar in terms of litigant age, with a median age 
 
cases presided over by these same two judges and analyzing the differences in age-, gender-, and race-based 
disparities across the two hearing types. The results of this test mirror our main results, suggesting that judge 
self-selection does not drive our findings. 
274. Because we have data from cases that closed before the implementation of the online platform, 
we can explore whether our findings result from selection. See generally RONET BACHMAN & RUSSELL K. 
SCHUTT, THE PRACTICE OF RESEARCH IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 187 (3d ed. 2007) (dis-
cussing selection bias and differential attrition) (“Subjects who receive some advantageous program benefit 
are more likely to stay in the experiment . . . ; subjects who do no[t] receive program benefits are more likely 
to drop out.”). Specifically, our concern is that only or mostly litigants who would have received fair court 
fines or charge adjustments, regardless of their demographic characteristics, choose to use the online plat-
form—in that scenario, the online platform would not be the reason for their improved relative outcomes. 
Instead, the platform would have merely “skimmed” cases that, for whatever reason, are less disparity prone. 
This hypothesis has a testable implication, however: group-based disparities in face-to-face hearings should 
increase as less disparity-prone cases depart to online proceedings. In unreported results (available upon re-
quest), we test for such selection bias by checking for changes in group-based disparities in face-to-face hear-
ings before and after the launch of the online platform. A growth in group-based disparities in face-to-face 
hearings in the post-Matterhorn period would imply selection bias in our main results. In this scenario, dis-
parities across all modes of resolution would likely remain constant. We find no statistically significant in-
crease in group-based disparities post-Matterhorn for offline cases, suggesting selection plays at most a limited 
role in explaining our main results. 
275. Many empirical studies have found that exposure to a name is enough to produce biased outcomes 
from decision makers. Résumé audit studies, in which résumés that are substantively identical but vary in 
terms of identity markers are sent to employers, have found age-, gender-, and race-based discrimination. See 
Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 66, at 997–1003 (finding race-based labor-market discrimination based 
solely on an applicant’s name); Eva Derous & Jeroen Decoster, Implicit Age Cues in Resumes: Subtle Effects on 
Hiring Discrimination, 8 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 7–9 (2017) (demonstrating age-based discrimination in the 
labor market, where younger applicants are preferred); Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of Gender on the 
Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National Empirical Study, 41 SEX ROLES 
509, 516–22 (1999) (showing gender-based labor-market discrimination favoring male applicants in the higher 
education context). Relatedly, exposure to names alone has also been shown to affect educators’ decisions. 
See Meike Bonefeld & Oliver Dickhäuser, (Biased) Grading of Students’ Performance: Students’ Names, Performance 
Level, and Implicit Attitudes, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 5–8 (2018) (finding that educators give higher marks to 
those with stereotypically German names compared to those with names stereotypically associated with Turk-
ish migrants). See generally Rachel Baker et al., Bias in Online Classes: Evidence from a Field Experiment (Ctr. for 
Educ. Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. 18-03, 2018), https://cepa.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/wp 
18-03-201803.pdf (finding that educators in online courses are more likely to respond to questions and com-
ments from white and male students than their nonwhite and female peers). Identity salience in writing may 
be most clear in terms of gender. See, e.g., Rob Thomson & Tamar Murachver, Predicting Gender from Electronic 
Discourse, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 201 (2001) (finding, experimentally, that most informal communi-
cation reveals an author’s gender). Even so, the online court context is more formal and structured than the 
online-chat and e-mail contexts used in Thomson & Murachver’s study. 
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of thirty-three and thirty-five years, respectively. Interestingly, the online sample 
includes a larger share of women than the face-to-face sample does—in fact, 
62% of women opt for online hearings, compared to 57% of men, in cases filed 
after Matterhorn adoption.276 Racial demographics also differ across the two 
dispute-resolution mediums. The proportion of litigants who are white shifts 
from roughly 73% in face-to-face hearings to 83% in online proceedings, 
whereas the proportion of litigants who are black decreases from 25% in the 
face-to-face setting to 15% in the online setting.277 The socioeconomic status 
of litigants (based on mean household income for their driving-record zip 
code)278 is similar across the two dispute-resolution mediums, with the vast ma-
jority of litigants originating from middle-class zip codes.279 The share of liti-
gants from high-income zip codes increases by almost six percentage points in 
online hearings, but representation of litigants from low-income zip codes only 
decreases by one percentage point.280 
 
276. Women may be overall more comfortable using online applications for government paperwork. 
Lee Rainie & Elena Larsen, The Rise of the E-Citizen: How People Use Government Agencies’ Web Sites, PEW RES. 
CTR. (Apr. 3, 2002), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2002/04/03/the-rise-of-the-e-citizen-how-
people-use-government-agencies-web-sites (finding that a larger share of women (73%) than men (66%) use 
government websites to accomplish work-related tasks). 
277. We admit that these differences further emphasize the important concerns we describe above 
about within-group selection—perhaps the particular black litigants choosing to use the online platform are 
less likely to be subject to discrimination in any situation. As we note, supra note 274, one implication of this 
story is that disparities in the offline setting should increase if online dispute resolution is attracting black 
litigants who are systematically less likely to suffer disparate outcomes relative to others. In unreported work, 
we see no significant evidence of this selection dynamic. See id. 
278. In unreported analysis, we instead use median household income by zip code and find that our 
findings are robust to this change. 
279. Zip-code mean household incomes come from the 2013–2017 American Community Survey five-
year estimates by the U.S. Census Bureau. 2013-2017 ACS 5-year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/technical-documentation/table-and-geography-changes/2 
017/5-year.html#par_textimage (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). The zip-code socioeconomic-status thresholds are 
defined by the minimum wage in Michigan (in annual income terms, just under $20,000 per person, assuming 
a forty-hour workweek). Because our income measure by zip code is mean household income (including the 
income of all work-eligible residents), we doubled this minimum-income amount to create the low-income 
threshold. Thus, we consider any zip codes with mean household incomes below $40,000 to be low-income 
zip codes. In comparison, the high-income zip-code threshold is three times the low-income threshold: any 
zip codes with mean household incomes above $120,000 are high-income zip codes (notably, this household 
income is above the ninety-fifth percentile for the areas under the jurisdiction of these district courts). We 
consider all zip codes with mean household incomes above $40,000 but below $120,000 to be middle-class 
zip codes. For lack of any alternative, we assume zip codes are economically homogeneous. 
280. If we are to believe that mean household income by zip code is an accurate representation of 
inhabitants’ economic resources, the consistent representation across mediums may indicate that low-income 
litigants are not necessarily precluded from participating in online courts by the “digital divide.” Accord Bu-
linski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 236 (“In 2013, the U.S. Department of Commerce reported that 80 percent 
of Whites in the United States had home computers, but that for Blacks that number was only 62 percent. 
Individuals with disabilities owned home computers at even lower rates (53 percent), as did individuals with 
a lower income (52 percent of households with less than $25,000 annual income). These racial and economic 
disparities raise significant concerns. However, the main disparity seems to be in home computer ownership 
rates and not actually in Internet access.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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We assess group disparities in two distinct outcomes. First, we use the total 
dollar amount of the fine ordered by the judge at the conclusion of the hearing. 
Second, we analyze whether the judge reduced the charges at the conclusion of 
the hearing, which typically signifies a reduction in points allocated to the liti-
gant’s driving record.281 In our view, the latter helps us understand the likeli-
hood that the judge or the process favors certain groups over others in more 
high-stakes ways, whereas the former may help us assess whether certain groups 
disproportionately benefit in smaller, potentially more pervasive ways. These 
variables are linked, of course, as a judge must decide each outcome simultane-
ously.282 But they are conceptually and methodologically distinct, with distinct 
consequences for litigants in these cases, and so we analyze each outcome sep-
arately.283 Our empirical approach is straightforward. We use a standard OLS-
regression framework to study the relationship between litigant-group de-
mographics (i.e., age, gender, and race) and the dollar amount of court-ordered 
fines, and we use a dichotomous outcome logit analysis to examine the relation-
ship of these same litigant demographics to the likelihood that a judge reduced 
the litigant’s charges.284 
Our main hypothesis is that the shift from a face-to-face medium to an 
online approach will reduce outcome disparities that are correlated with liti-
gants’ identity characteristics. We reason that a traditional hearing with a judge 
increases the salience of the litigant’s identity-related features, such as age, gen-
der, and race, because a physical encounter necessarily takes place. Although 
proceedings conducted over an online platform do allow judges to see a liti-
gant’s name and date of birth fairly easily (and with a bit of work, whether the 
litigant is listed as male or female), we anticipate that this text-based, asynchro-
nous process reduces their salience; it makes ascertaining identity information 
more costly or at least not instantaneous. 
 
281. To be precise, the data only tell us whether the final charges are different—not that they were 
necessarily reduced—from the original charges. But conversations with court staff indicate that charges are 
never increased following either online or informal hearings. June Telephone Interview, supra note 259; July 
Telephone Interview, supra note 259. Accordingly, we assume “altered” translates as “reduced.” Police offic-
ers tend to begin by recommending the highest possible charges for each incident (in this context, the “highest 
possible” charges are those associated with the greatest fines or number of license points).  
282. They may be substitutes or complements from a judge’s perspective. Either way, focusing on just 
one outcome would ignore a potentially important facet of outcome disparities in civil-infraction cases and 
would result in either an underestimate or an overestimate of the overall extent of any disparities. In unre-
ported robustness work, we analyze these two outcomes together—specifically, in our analysis of fines, we 
control for the initial charge, the final charge, and whether the charge changes. The substance of our findings 
with respect to fines is largely unaffected by this different approach. 
283. In terms of methodology, these are two very different types of variables and, consequently, are 
subject to different types of analysis. The amount ordered is a continuous variable, and the reduction in 
charge is a binary variable. At a conceptual level, these variables represent different elements of the punish-
ment and may weigh differently in judges’ preferences. 
284. Scholars employ similar modeling techniques in other studies examining the explanatory role of 
demographics in traffic court. See generally, e.g., Richard G. Greenleaf et al., Race-Based Decisions: Traffic Citations 
and Municipal Court Dispositions, 8 JUST. POL’Y J., Spring 2001. 
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Beyond defining our sample as a set of similar cases, we control for various 
observable case-level characteristics in our analysis to better isolate the impact 
of online court hearings and, in particular, their effect on age-, gender-, and 
race-based disparities in litigation outcomes. Importantly, we control for the 
category of the initial charge in our models so that any differences we observe 
are not simply the consequence of differences in the kinds of cases being han-
dled in the face-to-face versus online hearing settings.285 We implicitly assume 
(soundly, in our view) that law-enforcement practices with respect to charging 
did not change with the arrival of online hearing options. Conversations with 
courts and law enforcement support this assumption, and we have seen no ev-
idence in this or other contexts to suggest changing police practices in ticketing 
or citation enforcement.286  
We also control for the identity of the specific judge in each case so that 
any differences in case outcomes derive from differences in the medium and 
not from the fixed practices or preferences of individual judges, some of whom 
are more likely to preside over some types of hearing than others.287 To this 
end, we only consider cases that contain information about the identity of the 
judge.288 Our data also contain zip codes corresponding to the driver’s license 
records of litigants in these cases, so we use this information to generate proxy 
measures for out-of-state drivers, local residents, and household incomes.289 
 
285. We control for the original charge when we analyze the effect of litigant-identity traits on the 
probability that a charge reduction occurs. We also control for the final charge when we analyze the effects 
of litigant characteristics on the fine ordered after a hearing. This latter step is important because different 
charges have drastically different average fines. In our data, for example, the difference in average court fines 
between charge code 2740—improper use of lights—and charge code 1810—careless driving—is more than 
$90. Because litigant-identity traits may be correlated with certain charges, we must include charge controls 
to isolate the effects of age, gender, and race identity traits on court-ordered punishments. In our analysis of 
court-ordered fines, we also control for whether the litigant’s charges were reduced in order to remove the influence 
of “package punishment deals.” See supra note 282 and surrounding text. Because more serious charges are asso-
ciated with more license penalty points (resulting in higher car-insurance premiums and perhaps putting the 
driver’s license at risk of revocation), litigants may ask to pay higher court fines in exchange for a charge 
reduction. Although certainly an interesting phenomenon, we seek to control for these dynamics in our anal-
ysis in case they are correlated in some way with certain social groups, which would affect the interpretation 
of our within-medium results. 
286. In fact, the use of online courts for traffic cases is not universal in neighboring districts, so it is 
especially unlikely that state, county, or city law enforcement would alter their charging behaviors. 
        287. For example, in one court, two magistrates preside over 99.6% of online proceedings; in the other 
court, the chief judge presides over 99.9% of online cases. See supra note 273. 
288. Of the 6,115 cases that are otherwise complete, 883 or 14% were missing judge information. The 
sets of cases including and excluding judge information are similar in terms of their distribution of litigant 
demographic characteristics, original charges, and use of the Matterhorn platform. In unreported results, we 
perform equivalent analyses on the two data sets (excepting the judge controls), and these lead to the same 
statistical conclusions. Our results are robust to including all 6,115 cases in our main analysis, but given that 
the cases with judge information appear to be representative of the whole sample, we restrict our main anal-
ysis to cases with judge information so that we are able to control for fixed judge differences across mediums. 
See also supra notes 264 and 273 (discussing judge data). 
289. The out-of-state control is a binary variable equal to one if the litigant’s zip code is not from Michigan 
and zero otherwise. The local-resident control is a binary variable equal to one if the litigant’s zip code is within close 
proximity to the district court’s jurisdiction and zero otherwise. For the suburban district court, this area includes 
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Speeding is the most common charge in this sample, so we anticipate that 
judges may be either more or less lenient in their treatment of local residents 
(and, to some extent, state residents generally) relative to outsiders. Though 
outsiders can reasonably claim to be ignorant of the exact speed limits on every 
road within the court’s jurisdiction, they have no political power and are “easy 
targets” in the sense that they are unlikely to challenge their citations—at least 
via in-person hearings in a courthouse.290 
For our analysis, we calculate household income as a continuous variable 
equal to the mean household income for each driver’s zip code.291 To be sure, 
this proxy is an exceedingly rough measure of income (and, arguably, educa-
tional attainment), but there is evidence of spatial segregation by wealth at the 
zip-code level.292 The lowest mean household income by zip code in our sample 
is $30,200, and the highest is $218,801, so variation in income may help explain 
case outcomes. If household income is correlated with certain identity groups, 
controlling for it can help us be more confident we are identifying group-based 
disparities and not, in truth, disparities related to income differences (although 
such disparities themselves would be interesting and worthy of study). It seems 
reasonable to assume that most litigants’ incomes fall within a standard devia-
tion of their residential area’s mean income, which would make our income 
proxy a useful, if rough, control in our analysis.293  
D. Findings 
Fundamentally, our analysis tests for differences in litigation outcomes 
(specifically, the court-ordered fine amount and any reduction in charges) be-
tween the face-to-face and online samples along the axes of age, gender, and 
race of litigants. Table 2 in the Appendix presents our results for fines—specif-
ically, it reports the relationship between litigant demographic characteristics 
and the dollar amount of court-ordered fines across face-to-face informal hear-
ings and online proceedings, controlling for case characteristics, litigant income, 
 
all zip codes within the county. For the urban district court, this area includes all zip codes that make up the 
city and directly adjacent zip codes. In two unreported analyses, we include only those cases with litigants 
who have Michigan zip codes and who have local-resident zip codes (as defined above), respectively. We find 
no substantive differences from our main analysis—that is, we detect no reliable evidence of bias in favor of 
locals over passersby. 
290. Out-of-state drivers account for 2.3% of the total sample, 1.8% of the face-to-face sample, and 
2.7% of the online sample. Excluding these litigants from our analysis—i.e., studying only in-state litigants—
does not materially change our results. 
291. See supra note 279. 
292. See, e.g., Douglas S. Massey et al., The Changing Bases of Segregation in the United States, 626 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 74, 81–85 (2009) (documenting the shift in spatial segregation from being pri-
marily racially or ethnically motivated at the macro level in the beginning of the twentieth century to being 
primarily socioeconomically motivated at the micro level (i.e., by county and census tract) at the end of the 
last century). 
293. We also take account of time effects and time trends, as we describe in greater detail below, that 
might otherwise correlate with the adoption of online proceedings. See, e.g., infra note 305. 
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and residency information. Table 3 in the Appendix shows the role of litigant 
age, gender, and race in the likelihood that a judge reduced a litigant’s original 
charges after a hearing.294 The estimates we report in Table 2 can be interpreted 
as dollars, while those in Table 3 are odds ratios.295 In this Part, we address both 
sets of results simultaneously, and we discuss the differences in disparities 
across mediums for all three group-identity traits. 
Before we elaborate on what we find, however, it is important to be very 
clear on how we are using the word “disparity” in this Article. We use the word 
disparity to mean only that, having controlled for observables, individuals from 
one group end up with different outcomes on average than individuals from 
another group.296 This difference in outcomes may be either due directly to the 
group-identity trait (e.g., differential treatment by a judge or law enforcement 
on the basis of that trait) or due to various unobservables that are correlated with 
that group-identity trait.297 In our context, for example, unobservables that may 
be correlated with age, gender, or race include group differences in driving be-
havior that are not fully taken into account by our charge controls as well as 
average group differences in income, education, or priorities that influence liti-
gation success.298 Therefore, when we report age-, gender-, or race-based dispar-
ities, we are only asserting that members of a particular group appear to wind 
up with systematically different outcomes on average. Such differences may 
have a fairly benign explanation,299 but, of course, they may not.300 
 
294. The number of observations for the logit analysis of charge reductions is smaller than the sample 
for the OLS analysis of court-ordered fines. We drop a total of seventy-seven observations—twelve because 
they were presided over by judges who never varied in whether they reduced charges and sixty-five because 
certain initial charge codes were either always reduced or never reduced by judges. 
295. Odds ratios can be interpreted as relative changes in likelihood. When a particular independent 
variable has an odds ratio coefficient estimated to be greater than one, it indicates that the relative likelihood 
of an event depicted by the dependent variable (in this Article, whether a charge reduction occurs) increases 
with an increase in the independent variable. Similarly, an estimated odds ratio coefficient of less than one 
indicates that an increase in the independent variable is associated with a decrease in the relative likelihood 
of the event—i.e., a charge reduction. These odds ratios can be used to calculate changes in the predicted 
probabilities of receiving a charge reduction; we depict these probabilities in Figures 1(b), 2(b), and 3(b). 
296. See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. et al., Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered Wages, 56 J.L. & ECON. 633, 
648–50 (2013) (proposing a similar model of disparity). 
297. Hence, disparities may be attributable to the judge’s consideration of inappropriate information 
(such as a litigant’s race or gender) or to the judge’s consideration of legitimate, but unobserved, variables 
that happen to correlate with litigant race or gender. See Aidan R. Vining, Developing Aggregate Measures of Dis-
parity, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 233, 240 (1983) (describing disparity as a function of inappropriate considerations 
and unobserved characteristics). 
298. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 538–42 
(2012) (exploring the possibility that judges have access to information that they weigh when making their 
decisions but that is not captured in the authors’ data or by their statistical model). 
299. For example, within any particular offense category, young people may tend to commit more 
serious infractions on average, which the police and judges may observe but which are not visible in the 
available data. See id. at 541 (finding that judges successfully take into account information—that researchers 
do not observe—in deciding whether to detain individuals). 
300. Many existing studies find similar patterns of differential treatment on the basis of age, gender, 
race, or some combination with strong identification strategies. See, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 
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Instead, what we care about for our purposes is whether there is a difference 
in any particular disparity between the two types of proceedings.301 If we assume 
that groups do not sort differently into face-to-face and online proceedings in 
a way that biases our results—that is, hearing type is effectively random, an as-
sumption we address in our work302—then we can expect unobservable differ-
ences between groups to be the same on average across the sample. 
Consequently, we ought to observe similar group-based outcome disparities in 
both face-to-face and online settings. In our analysis below, we emphasize differ-
ences in disparities because they demonstrate that procedural choices matter dif-
ferently for different groups, perhaps because they are more or less affected by 
judicial implicit bias.303 Put another way, we take the initial disparity in face-to-
face hearings to be a baseline, and we ask whether moving to an online hearing 
format changes this preexisting disparity, which we assume would not occur if 
civil procedure generally—and in particular, the use of asynchronous, remote 
hearings—were irrelevant to group-based disparities. 
1. Age-Based Disparities 
We begin by investigating whether, after controlling for observables, any 
age-based disparities in legal outcomes—i.e., the court-ordered fine amount and 
whether the judge reduced the original charge—differ between face-to-face and 
online proceedings. We treat litigant age as a binary variable, split by the median 
age (i.e., litigants thirty-five and younger versus those older than thirty-five), 
although our conclusions are not sensitive to this choice.304 We separately re-
gress our two litigation outcomes on our age variable, the type of proceeding 
 
66, at 994–97 (employing a résumé audit study to capture pernicious differential treatment on the basis of 
race); Fryer et al., supra note 296, at 648–50 (incorporating previous wage information to capture unobserved 
characteristics in a study concerning job-market discrimination); Darrell Steffensmeier et al., The Interaction of 
Race, Gender, and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 
763, 773–75 (1998) (accounting for differences in crime circumstances not captured by charge codes by using 
an offense-severity scale created by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and detailed criminal history 
data as controls). 
301. This difference-in-differences approach is often used in empirical studies to mimic a natural ex-
periment. See, e.g., Sarah Marx Quintanar, Man vs. Machine: An Investigation of Speeding Ticket Disparities Based on 
Gender and Race, 20 J. APPLIED ECON. 1, 2 (2017). 
302. See supra Part II.C and notes 266, 274, and 277 (discussing selection issues) 
303. Chloë FitzGerald et al., Interventions Designed to Reduce Implicit Prejudices and Implicit Stereotypes in Real 
World Contexts: A Systematic Review, 7 BMC PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (2019) (“[I]f intervention X reduces the bias in 
group Y, it is by no means certain that same intervention is efficient to reduce bias against group Z.”). 
304. The age variable is a binary variable equal to one if the litigant’s age is greater than thirty-five and 
zero otherwise. Our findings are robust to this particular characterization of age. Had we treated age as a 
continuous variable, we would have estimated instead the change associated with an additional year of age 
for our outcomes. We structure the age variable in this alternative way in unreported analysis and find the 
same substantive results. But we hypothesize that the impact of age is determined not by the number of years 
separating two particular litigants’ ages but rather by the perception that the two litigants are in separate age 
“categories” (i.e., young versus old). See Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Age Differences in Sentencing, 12 JUST. Q. 
583, 592 (1995) (finding that the effect of age on sentencing decisions is “curvilinear or U-shaped,” with 
defendants in the twenty to twenty-nine age group facing the most severe punishments compared to similarly 
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indicator (i.e., face-to-face versus online), and their interaction, in addition to a 
wide range of control variables.  
We find strong evidence that younger drivers pay higher fines than their 
older peers in face-to-face courts but that this disparity evaporates in cases re-
solved through online hearings.305 Column (1) of Table 2 depicts the average 
difference in the court-ordered fine amount for those over thirty-five years old 
across both types of hearings. Controlling for case details and hearing type, 
older litigants are ordered to pay lower fines than their younger counterparts—
a highly statistically significant difference on the order of $3 per case (or roughly 
2% of the average fine).306 In Column (2) of Table 2, we compare the relation-
ship of age to fine amount separately by hearing type: the estimated coefficient 
on the “Age Above 35 Years” indicator variable tells us that, on average and 
independent of case facts, older litigants receive lower court fines in face-to-
face proceedings—a difference on the order of more than $5 (or 3% of the 
average fine). Conversely, our interaction-coefficient estimate in Column (2) 
implies that this difference is absent in the online setting: younger litigants, on 
average, receive only slightly higher fines relative to their older counterparts—
 
situated younger and older defendants (emphasis omitted)); see also John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco, How 
Do House Prices Affect Consumption? Evidence from Micro Data, 54 J. MONETARY ECON. 591, 603 (2007) (con-
structing a dummy variable to represent whether a homeowner is above or below forty years old); David 
Neumark et al., Do State Laws Protecting Older Workers from Discrimination Reduce Age Discrimination in Hiring? 
Evidence from a Field Experiment, 62 J.L. & ECON. 373, 379 (2019) (constructing a dummy variable to represent 
how senior job seekers’ outcomes are dependent on state antidiscrimination laws). We use the median age to 
define the two age categories, but, in unreported results, we experiment with defining age using three catego-
ries instead of just two: ages eighteen to thirty-five, ages thirty-six to sixty-five, and ages greater than sixty-
five. With that coding scheme, we find that the benefits of increasing age in traffic courts diminish after 
retirement age but that the divide between those younger than thirty-five and those older persists. To further 
investigate the validity of these choices, in unreported analysis, we create eight age categories containing 
mostly ten-year age cohorts (e.g., ages eighteen to twenty-five, ages twenty-six to thirty-five, etc.). In this more 
complex age-category model, we learn that litigants appear to begin to benefit from their age in face-to-face 
hearings at age thirty-six; these effects seem to disappear in the online setting. Therefore, we believe our 
treatment of age as a binary variable split at age thirty-five appropriately captures the basic idea of “litigant 
age” for purposes of understanding court-outcome disparities in our context. 
305. The court-ordered fine amount (in dollars) serves as our outcome variable. We control for the 
identity of the judge, the offense type, and other factors that might add noise or otherwise confound our 
analysis (such as time trends in litigation outcomes). These additional controls include linear and squared time 
trends, indicator variables for the year and the month of the year in which a case is filed, and an indicator 
variable for whether the litigant has an out-of-state driver’s license. Because the courts we study increased 
fines across the board at the time of the online platform’s installation, we also include an indicator variable 
for cases that closed after the implementation of the Matterhorn online platform to separately capture this 
unrelated increase in fine amounts. Our results are robust to excluding these time-related controls. And since 
we examine the impact of online proceedings on age-, gender-, and race-based disparities in hearing outcomes 
(rather than the overall impact of online proceedings), we also include an indicator variable to capture the 
main effect of litigants’ use of the online platform beyond the disparate effects of age, gender, and race. We 
also control for litigant gender and race to isolate the differences attributable to age. When we study the role 
of gender, we likewise control for age and race, and so on. 
306. Darrell Steffensmeier, John Kramer, and Jeffery Ulmer show in their study that a relatively small 
but persistent difference in court outcomes by age group can manifest as additional incarceration time; rela-
tively small outcome differences can be insidious if they are systematic and repeated. Steffensmeier et al., 
supra note 304, at 591–99. 
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the remaining disparity is statistically insignificant. Figure 1(a) illustrates the 
presence of this disparity in face-to-face hearings as well as its apparent reduc-
tion when the dispute is resolved in an online proceeding.307 
 
Figure 1(a). Age, Hearing Type, and Court-Ordered Fines 
 
Notes: The figure displays predicted court-ordered fines by age group and hearing type with 
95% confidence intervals calculated using residuals from the regression reported in Column (2) 
of Table 2. 
 
By contrast, we find no age-based disparities in charge reductions in either 
face-to-face or online courts.308 Column (1) of Table 3 reports that, on average, 
independent of the type of hearing and controlling for other potential con-
founders, older litigants are more likely to receive a charge reduction than their 
younger counterparts—but this estimated difference is only marginally statisti-
cally significant. More important for our hypothesis, when our analysis takes 
into account the type of proceeding in Column (2), the coefficients we estimate 
on both age-related terms lack any statistical significance and are very close to 
one. These numbers imply that older litigants are neither more nor less likely to 
receive charge reductions online versus face-to-face proceedings.309 Figure 1(b) 
illustrates our charge-reduction findings graphically.  
 
307. Figure 1(a) depicts a prediction of the total average court-ordered fine, calculated using residuals 
from our regression analysis. The total fine amount appears to decrease for both young and old litigants using 
the online platform, but our study’s interest lies in the disparity between the two age categories. The disparity 
is notably lower in the online setting. 
308. Our dependent variable is whether the judge decided to reduce the charge (a binary outcome). 
For this reason, we estimate a logit regression and report odds ratios. In our analysis, the charge-reduction 
variable is equal to one if the judge reduced the original charges after the hearing and zero otherwise. (Charges 
never become more serious. See supra note 281.) 
309. We recognize that interpreting coefficients on interaction terms raises significant issues in nonlin-
ear models like logits. See generally Chunrong Ai & Edward C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, 
80 ECON. LETTERS 123 (2003). In part for this reason, along with reporting odds ratio-style results in Table 
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Figure 1(b). Age, Hearing Type, and Charge-Reduction Probability 
 
Notes: The figure displays the predicted probability of a charge reduction by age group and 
hearing type with 95% confidence intervals calculated using residuals from the regression de-
scribed by Column (2) of Table 3. 
 
All in all, we find no evidence to suggest that there are age-related dispari-
ties growing out of a judge’s decision whether to reduce charges in either the 
face-to-face or the online medium, but we do find evidence that litigant age 
operates in some fashion to influence the total fine amount, with older individ-
uals paying relatively less in face-to-face settings. An implicit-bias interpretation 
might conclude that any bias is somewhat modest, resulting in a nontrivial 
change in the fine amount but not one sufficiently potent to tip a judge toward 
a charge reduction.310 Other interpretations might point to invidious explicit 
bias or even purposes of punishment that incorporate age directly—i.e., judges 
who feel it is proper to teach “young people” a lesson by giving them higher 
fines but not upsetting their future insurance costs by withholding a charge re-
duction.311 At the same time, our difference-in-disparity result for court-ordered 
 
3, we also appropriately transform the coefficients to calculate predicted probabilities by group, which we 
present in Figures 1(b), 2(b), and 3(b). 
310. Judges may differ in whether they view reductions in charges and court fines as equivalent in 
punishment terms, making it important to analyze how both outcomes change in response to technological 
innovations. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and 
Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695 (2015) (arguing that judges can be influenced by the units of punishment in 
their sentencing deliberations). See also supra note 282. 
311. See supra note 271. It may be conventional wisdom that younger drivers are more likely than older 
drivers to engage in risky driving, but studies evaluating whether younger drivers actually present a greater 
risk of committing driving offenses or accidents return mixed results based on a variety of factors, including 
gender, length of licensure, and the seriousness of the offense. See generally Patricia F. Waller et al., Changes in 
Young Adult Offense and Crash Patterns Over Time, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 117 (2001); A. F. 
Williams, Young Driver Risk Factors: Successful and Unsuccessful Approaches for Dealing with Them and an Agenda for 
the Future, 12 INJURY PREVENTION i4 (2006). 
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fines may indicate that age groups vary in how procedural conventions affect 
them. Young people may be better able to communicate using text over an 
online platform than their older counterparts;312 or, put another way, young 
people may fare poorly in court, at least with respect to court-ordered fines, 
because they do not perform or communicate well in face-to-face proceedings 
with visibly older judges.313  
2. Gender-Based Disparities 
 Next, we analyze whether the differences in the two mediums (face-to-face 
versus online court proceedings) influence any outcome disparities associated 
with a party’s gender.314 First, we examine the role of gender, hearing type, and 
their interaction in explaining court-ordered fine amounts. Column (1) in Table 
2 tells us that, on average and independent of the kind of hearing and case facts, 
women tend to receive slightly lower fines than men.315 This difference, how-
ever, is not statistically significant. Column (3) in Table 2 displays the disparities 
between male and female litigants across both types of proceedings. When we 
analyze the data by hearing type, the relative outcomes are not necessarily iden-
tical: women who use face-to-face hearings receive slightly lower fine amounts 
than men, and women who use the online platform receive fines that are almost 
identical to men. However, none of these differences is statistically significant, 
so we cannot claim—at least with our sample and in our setting—that evidence 
of gender-based disparities exists with respect to fines ordered by judges either 
in general, or in face-to-face or online court settings separately. Likewise, we 
find little evidence that gender and medium are related to the probability of 
receiving reduced charges. As can be seen in Column (3) of Table 3, women are 
slightly more likely than their male counterparts to receive a charge reduction 
in the face-to-face setting, though not with statistical significance. There is no 
sign of a different tendency in an online court. Thus, we find no evidence of 
gender playing an explanatory role in outcome disparities in civil-infraction lit-
 
312. See Eszter Hargittai & Amanda  Hinnant, Digital Inequality: Differences in Young Adults’ Use of the 
Internet, 35 COMM. RES. 602, 603–04 (2008). 
313. See, e.g., Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and 
Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 343–56 (2003) (finding that young adults 
aged eighteen to twenty-four are similar to sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juvenile defendants across a vari-
ety of trial readiness and performance metrics, including compliance with authority). 
314. With the exception that, in our gender analysis, we control for litigant age rather than litigant 
gender, we pursue precisely the same approach as we do in Part II.D.1. See supra notes 305 and 308. When 
we turn to analyzing the role of race, we control correspondingly for litigant age and litigant gender. 
315. It is worth reiterating here that this very slight disparity is what remains after we control for those 
observables for which we have data; however, if women tend to commit infractions in different, slightly less 
serious ways, perhaps because of gender differences in driving patterns, the “disparity” we observe could 
simply be the result of some underlying (but unobserved) difference in case facts. See supra notes 296–303 
and accompanying text. 
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igation on average, but we cannot rule it out, either; a larger sample or a differ-
ent context might tell a very different story.316 Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show our 
results. 
 
Figure 2(a). Gender, Hearing Type, and Court-Ordered Fines 
 
Notes: The figure displays predicted court-ordered fines by gender and hearing type with 95% 
confidence intervals calculated using residuals from the regression reported in Column (3) of 
Table 2. 
 
Figure 2(b). Gender, Hearing Type, and Charge-Reduction Probability 
 
Notes: The figure displays the predicted probability of a charge reduction by gender and hearing 
type with 95% confidence intervals calculated using residuals from the regression described by 
Column (3) of Table 3. 
 
316. See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier et al., Gender and Imprisonment Decisions, 31 CRIMINOLOGY 411, 435 
(1993) (finding that gender has a small-to-moderate effect on the likelihood of incarceration—with women 
being less likely to be imprisoned—but has no noticeable effect on incarceration length). 
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3. Race-Based Disparities 
Finally, we investigate race-based disparities in litigation outcomes,317 ex-
amining whether any apparent outcome disparity in the face-to-face court set-
ting is reproduced in the online hearing setting or, alternatively, whether 
disparity levels shift with the change in medium. First, we find substantial evi-
dence that black litigants receive higher court fines and are less likely to receive 
charge reductions in face-to-face settings than similarly situated nonblack liti-
gants.318 Second, our analysis of the data indicates that these outcome disparities 
vanish or are at least significantly smaller in online proceedings, suggesting that 
online proceedings may have some ability to reduce the role of implicit bias or 
tweak the structural distortions of traditional procedure so that black litigants 
experience better litigation outcomes on average. 
Sticking with our empirical approach from above, we begin by examining 
the relationship of race, medium, and their interaction with the total amount of 
court-ordered fines.319 Column (1) of Table 2 shows that, on average and inde-
pendent of hearing type and case facts, black litigants receive higher fines than 
nonblack litigants—on the order of over $6 (or roughly 4% of the average fine). 
This estimated disparity is highly statistically significant. When we assess this 
disparity in court-ordered fine amounts separately by hearing type, the results 
of which we present in Column (4) of Table 2, we observe an important and 
sizable shift. Black litigants using the online platform see a much lower relative 
fine, all else equal, relative to black litigants engaging with the court in person; 
race-based disparities associated with traditional procedures disappear in the 
online setting, and in fact, we estimate that black litigants receive slightly lower 
fines than their nonblack counterparts. Figure 3(a) illustrates these relation-
ships. 
 
 
 
 
 
317. The race variable in our analyses is a binary variable equal to one if the litigant’s race is black and 
zero otherwise. We compare black to nonblack litigants instead of comparing black, Asian, Native-American, 
and white litigants. White and black litigants make up the vast majority of litigants in our sample; Asian and 
Native-American litigants are not sufficiently common in our data to make reliable inferences about their 
groups’ average litigation experience. In unreported results, we test the impact of including all individual races 
in our analysis and find the same relationships that we report in our main results between both white and 
black litigants and Asian and black litigants. Asian litigants in our sample fared significantly better than white 
litigants in the face-to-face setting, but our sample of Asian litigants is too small to make inferences about 
any population-level effects. 
318. Again, these disparities may exist because of omitted variable bias and so they should not be 
interpreted as the causal result of litigant race. See supra notes 296–303 and 315. For a thorough discussion of 
the effects and limitations of omitted variable bias in empirical work using (often incomplete) law-enforce-
ment and court data, see generally David B. Mustard, Reexamining Criminal Behavior: The Importance of Omitted 
Variable Bias, 85 REV. ECON. & STAT. 205 (2003). 
319. Except that we control for litigant age and gender in this case. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559773
1 PRESCOTT 893–979.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/20  10:08 AM 
954 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4:893 
Figure 3(a). Race, Hearing Type, and Court-Ordered Fines 
 
Notes: The figure displays predicted court-ordered fines by race and hearing type with 95% 
confidence intervals calculated using residuals from the regression reported in Column (4) of 
Table 2. 
 
A similar phenomenon emerges with respect to charge-reduction probabil-
ity: Column (1) of Table 3 shows strong statistical evidence that, on average and 
independent of hearing type and observable case facts, black litigants are signif-
icantly less likely to receive reduced charges from a judge than are their 
nonblack counterparts.320 As Column (4) of Table 3 shows, however, the dif-
ference between black and nonblack litigants evaporates in the online setting, 
according to our estimates.321 Figure 3(b) illustrates the difference in the likeli-
hood of a charge reduction between black and nonblack litigants across the two 
types of hearings. Even if the likelihood of a charge reduction for black litigants 
in online proceedings is at the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval, it 
would remain a marked improvement over their expected face-to-face out-
come. These effects are consistent across courts, as well.322 
 
320. The coefficient on the race variable in Column (1) of Table 3 is 0.729. This means that the odds 
a black litigant’s charges will be reduced are roughly 73% of the odds a nonblack litigant’s charges will be 
reduced, all other factors equal (and without taking into account the differences in hearing medium). This 
result is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
321. The coefficient on the race variable in Column (4) of Table 3 is 0.637, meaning that the average 
black litigant is even less likely to receive a charge reduction than their nonblack peers once we account for 
the hearing medium. However, the coefficient on the race-and-medium interaction variable is 1.646—a highly 
significant result. Since the effect in logit models is multiplicative, the difference between a black litigant and 
an otherwise equal nonblack litigant using the online platform is 1.05. Therefore, black litigants actually ap-
pear to be slightly more likely to receive a charge reduction when their cases are heard through the online 
platform relative to an otherwise equivalent nonblack litigant. 
322. Two distinct district courts constitute our complete analysis sample—one situated in a suburban 
area and the other in a population-dense city. While we believe the similarities between these courts outweigh 
the differences in any statistical sense, both courts define face-to-face hearings and process traffic cases in 
slightly different ways. Consequently, in unreported work, we repeat our analysis on the two district-court 
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Figure 3(b). Race, Hearing Type, and Charge-Reduction Probability 
 
Notes: The figure displays the predicted probability of a charge reduction by race and hearing type 
with 95% confidence intervals calculated using residuals from the regression described by Column 
(4) of Table 3. 
4. Intersectional Identity Biases 
By design, our three analyses control for “other” observable identity traits 
when we identify changes in disparities across mediums.323 However, the em-
pirical legal literature on intersectionality highlights the potential for additional 
variation in litigation outcome disparities along shared axes of age, gender, and 
 
samples separately. Tables are available from the authors upon request. The suburban-court results approxi-
mate the main results fairly closely. Older litigants receive significantly lower court-ordered fines than younger 
litigants in face-to-face hearings and equal fines online. Older litigants are also more likely to receive charge 
reductions than younger litigants in face-to-face settings—a disparity that decreases in magnitude online. The 
disparity in court-ordered fines across genders is not significant, though it gestures in the same direction as 
our aggregate analysis. However, unlike our main analysis, female litigants are significantly more likely to have 
their charges reduced than male litigants in face-to-face hearings—a disparity that fades online. Black litigants 
receive significantly higher court-ordered fines than nonblack litigants do in face-to-face hearings and near-
equal court fines online. Black litigants are also significantly less likely to receive reduced charges than their 
nonblack counterparts in face-to-face hearings; online courts nearly eliminate this disparity as well (though, 
notably, the change is not statistically significant). The urban-court results are also close to the main results, 
with one key distinction. In analyzing this court’s data alone, we note that women litigants are somewhat less 
likely to receive charge reductions in face-to-face hearings. This is in direct contradiction with our gender 
results from the suburban court. Since women are nearly evenly distributed across the courts, this may explain 
the lack of significant gender-based disparities for the entire sample. Age-based disparities are also much 
larger in the urban court: older litigants receive significantly lower court fines than younger litigants in face-
to-face hearings; the online platform greatly (and statistically significantly) reduces this difference, though 
disparities favoring older litigants are still present. 
323. Specifically, we control for gender and race when examining age, we control for age and race when 
examining gender, and we control for age and gender when examining race. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559773
1 PRESCOTT 893–979.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/20  10:08 AM 
956 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4:893 
race.324 Our data and setting provide an opportunity to extend the study of in-
tersectionality into the civil-infraction context and to draw conclusions about 
the role of procedural design and/or implicit bias—and of online hearings gen-
erally—in understanding intersectional disparities. We test for the intersectional 
group-identity disparities by comparing predicted outcomes on various identity 
subgroups using the estimates from our main analysis. Not surprisingly, certain 
groups experience larger disparities in court outcomes in the face-to-face traf-
fic-court context. In particular, our data show that younger black male litigants 
fare worse than younger litigants, black litigants, and male litigants as groups. 
Likewise, we find that younger black female litigants do poorly relative to 
younger litigants, black litigants, and female litigants as groups.325 As in our 
main analysis, in general, the apparent disparities that appear in our data in face-
to-face proceedings are much less pronounced online, although our estimates 
of these changes are often imprecise in these small-sample analyses. 326 
5. Limitations, Caveats, and Extensions 
Although the evidence we present provides encouraging support for our 
hypothesis regarding the potential of online proceedings to reduce group-based 
outcome disparities, our analysis is limited in several respects. Our single most 
important assumption is that the litigants using (and the cases being resolved 
 
324. A common focus of intersectionality analysis in the empirical legal literature is minority women 
as plaintiffs in civil lawsuits or as judges. See, e.g., Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical 
Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991 (2011) (discussing the relatively low 
success rate for black women making intersectional employment discrimination claims); Todd Collins & 
Laura Moyer, Gender, Race, and Intersectionality on the Federal Appellate Bench, 61 POL. RES. Q. 219, 225 (2008) 
(finding that minority women judges are more likely than their minority male and nonminority female peers 
to support claims of criminal defendants). Fewer studies focus on intersectionality in the criminal context, in 
which minority men suffer severe disparities. See, e.g., Steffensmeier et al., supra note 300. 
325. Younger black male litigants fare worse than any other intersectional identity group in our data. This 
finding is consistent with intersectionality research in the law-enforcement and criminal-adjudication con-
texts. See Steffensmeier et al., supra note 300. See generally Andrea L. Dottolo & Abigail J. Stewart, “Don’t Ever 
Forget Now, You’re a Black Man in America”: Intersections of Race, Class and Gender in Encounters with the Police, 59 
SEX ROLES 350 (2008). For women, race-based disparities are larger in magnitude than they are in our full sample: 
black women receive significantly higher court fines than nonblack women in person but slightly lower court fines 
online. This finding aligns with empirical intersectionality research generally. See Stephanie A. Shields, Gender: 
An Intersectionality Perspective, 59 SEX ROLES 301, 302–04 (2008). 
326.  We forgo an extended discussion of the details of our intersectionality findings, but our results 
are available upon request. To summarize other patterns we observe in the data: older nonblack male litigants 
do relatively well in face-to-face hearings, meaning that older nonblack male litigants receive lower fines and 
exhibit higher charge-reduction probabilities than older litigants, nonblack litigants, and male litigants as 
groups, and older nonblack female litigants receive lower fines and higher charge-reduction probabilities than 
older litigants, nonblack litigants, and female litigants as groups. In both cases, these intersectional disparities 
are much smaller in online proceedings. Older black litigants experience better outcomes than black litigants 
overall in face-to-face hearings but do significantly worse than older litigants overall and male/female litigants 
as groups. These disparities also dissolve online. Younger nonblack litigants suffer worse outcomes in face-
to-face hearings than nonblack litigants overall but do significantly better than all younger litigants. These 
disparities also exist in the online setting. 
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through) traditional proceedings are comparable to the litigants opting for 
online hearings.327 Litigants and cases are not allocated randomly; rather, liti-
gants actively choose whether to pursue a traditional face-to-face proceeding, 
an online hearing, or nothing at all.328 It is possible that the patterns we docu-
ment are not attributable to the change in medium but rather to the character-
istics of the parties who choose to access courts online versus offline. For 
example, online users may have greater access to the Internet, may be more 
technologically savvy, and could be busier, so age- and race-based disparities 
may be less likely to manifest within this narrower group. Unfortunately, we 
cannot eliminate the possibility that selection explains our results to some ex-
tent. Mindful of the confounding effect of selection bias, we took measures to 
test for its presence and correct for it whenever possible.329  
Also, in a similar vein, it is worth reiterating that our within-medium dis-
parity findings should not be interpreted causally.330 Our results show statisti-
cally significant disparities in litigation outcomes between younger and older 
and between black and nonblack litigants in face-to-face proceedings after we 
control for observable case and demographic information. Unfortunately, we 
do not observe—and therefore cannot control for—many details of these dis-
putes that might matter to explaining outcomes. One important example is an 
individual’s infraction history, which most view as a legitimate consideration for 
a judge deciding whether to grant a litigant relief,331 and yet infraction history 
may be correlated with race or age.332 We were not able to obtain these data for 
 
327. See supra notes 240, 274 and accompanying text. 
328. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 99–114 (2002) (explaining 
the importance of random sample selection to avoid selection bias in empirical studies). 
329. Although selection bias may affect our difference-in-disparities findings, we know it cannot ex-
plain our results entirely. In unreported analysis, we compare the group of face-to-face cases litigated prior 
to the implementation of the online platform with the face-to-face cases litigated after implementation and 
find no statistically significant differences in the group-based disparities of the two face-to-face samples. See 
supra note 274. After accounting for all quantifiable variables available, we find no statistical difference be-
tween older, female, or black litigants who chose to litigate their alleged traffic offense in a courtroom across 
the two time periods. Had we found that the post-implementation face-to-face cases exhibited significantly 
higher disparities than the pre-implementation sample, a selection story would have been very plausible. But 
our unreported robustness analysis shows that it is unlikely that litigants who would have received favorable 
outcomes regardless of the hearing medium (for whatever reason not strictly and causally related to age, gender, 
or race—including legal awareness, social connections, wealth, or education) are the main driving force be-
hind the reduction in group-based disparities we document in online hearing outcomes. Moreover, because 
we care about disparities between younger and older litigants, male and female litigants, and black and 
nonblack litigants and not the average level of court outcomes across hearing types, we also know that our 
results are not driven by above-average online platform use by older litigants, female litigants, or nonblack 
litigants, respectively, who happen to receive more lenient court outcomes in face-to-face proceedings. 
330. See supra notes 296–303 and accompanying text. 
331. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.907(2) (West 2015) (“[F]or a violation of section 602b, the 
person shall be ordered to pay . . . a civil fine of $100.00 for a first offense and $200.00 for a second or 
subsequent offense.”); June Telephone Interview, supra note 259; July Telephone Interview, supra note 259. 
332.  See Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552, 
581 (1983) (“Age is everywhere correlated with crime. Its effects on crime do not depend on other demo-
graphic correlates of crime. . . . Although correlated with crime, age is not useful in predicting involvement 
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litigants in our analysis; however, our cases were selected by eligibility criteria 
that ensure that litigants in our sample are similar in terms of their driving his-
tory. Future research on civil infractions and misdemeanor decision-making 
ought, whenever possible, to include a measure to control for litigant driving 
histories—or perhaps a measure to control for whether judges consider driving 
histories in their deliberations.333 
Although we do not discuss it above, we also uncover a provocative rela-
tionship between average neighborhood income and litigation outcomes in our 
data. Our analysis suggests that more work is necessary to understand group-
based disparities and how they arise in our justice system.334 We find that liti-
gants from zip codes with higher mean household incomes receive lower fines 
and are more likely to receive a charge reduction in face-to-face hearings. The 
sizes of these effects are not large, and the interpretation of disparities based on 
zip-code household income is unclear,335 but both relationships are statistically 
significant. The roles of income and wealth in explaining litigation outcomes 
have obvious policy implications. Future work may also involve an in-depth 
analysis of the actual interactions between parties and judges in both face-to-
face hearings and online courts.336 Our results indicate that online courts affect 
the extent of group-based outcome disparities, but we know far too little about 
the reasons for this shift. One conjecture, of course, is that reduced identity 
salience plays an outsized role in the benefits of online proceedings, but the 
many procedural tweaks that accompany online proceedings may also coalesce 
in a way that benefits some groups more than others. 
 
 
 
 
in crime over the life cycle of offenders.”); Alex R. Piquero & Robert W. Brame, Assessing the Race-Crime and 
Ethnicity-Crime Relationship in a Sample of Serious Adolescent Delinquents, 54 CRIME & DELINQ. 390, 395–96 (2008) 
(“Generally speaking, both police records and self-report surveys show disproportionate involvement in se-
rious violence among Blacks with somewhat less Hispanic involvement. This is significant, because research 
also indicates that crimes involving serious violence are more likely to be reported to the police, more likely 
to result in apprehension of the offender, and more likely to trigger more severe criminal justice sanctions. 
In addition, researchers have also examined racial disproportionality in prisons. This research generally sug-
gests that much of the minority overrepresentation in prisons can be attributed to race group differences in 
arrests for crimes that are most likely to lead to imprisonment. But this research also indicates that it is unlikely 
that behavioral differences can account for all minority overrepresentation.” (citations and footnotes omit-
ted)). See generally Gary Sweeten et al., Age and the Explanation of Crime, Revisited, 42 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 
921 (2013) (examining developmental reasons for why crime varies with age). 
333. Incorporating criminal-history data into analyses can dramatically change statistical inferences. See, 
e.g., Steffensmeier et al., supra note 300. 
334. Tables containing these results are available from the authors upon request. 
335. This is especially true for data from the suburban court. Zip codes in this relatively low-density 
area are larger than those surrounding the urban court; any zip-code-level income data from the suburban-
court zip codes describes the average income of each neighborhood less accurately due to the relative size 
difference of the zip codes across district courts. 
336. Court interactions and other unquantifiable factors are especially important to review, given their 
frequent presence in judicial deliberations. See, e.g., Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 298, at 541. 
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E. Discussion on Disparities 
Taken together, our findings carry several implications for scholarship on 
disparities both in general and in the legal arena specifically. First, our analysis 
highlights the importance of age-based disparities in legal outcomes. Age, as an 
identity trait, receives much less attention than race and gender do in the study 
of legal institutions.337 This relative neglect is surprising given that ageism is an 
extensively studied topic in the social-science literature on implicit bias.338 In-
deed, research that uses the IAT typically finds that age-based implicit bias is 
among the strongest categories of bias,339 overshadowing both gender-based 
and race-based biases.340 Research on age-based implicit bias and procedure-
based structural biases in the justice system may be limited because age is as-
sumed either to be a formal legal factor properly affecting outcomes341 (e.g., 
eligibility for juvenile delinquency proceedings)342 or substantively unim-
portant.343 But age as a factor can be relevant within the adult population, in 
particular in the traffic context where deterring young drivers may be seen as 
an appropriate consideration in judicial decisions.344 Thus, when it comes to 
age-based disparities in litigation outcomes, we do not know whether explicit, 
implicit, or structural biases—or all of the above—explain the disparities we 
observe. 
We confirm that age may indeed shape legal outcomes. Older litigants ap-
pear to receive lower court-ordered fines compared with their younger coun-
terparts in face-to-face proceedings but pay similar fines to those imposed on 
younger drivers in online proceedings. There are various explanations for the 
difference across mediums in the disparities we observe.  
 
337. See Becca R. Levy & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Ageism, in AGEISM: STEREOTYPING AND 
PREJUDICE AGAINST OLDER PERSONS 49, 52 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2002). 
338. See, e.g., id. at 49–53. 
339. Id. at 53–56. The IAT is the most popular test to assess implicit biases, taken by millions of re-
spondents across the globe. See supra Part I.B. 
340. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 
GROUP DYNAMICS 101, 107 (2002) (“Negative implicit attitudes toward old relative to young were, on aver-
age, the strongest of any obtained at the [IAT] demonstration Web site.”). 
341. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271–75 (2011) (finding age is a relevant factor in 
determining whether a person is in custody). 
342. Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NCSL (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-
court-laws.aspx (breaking down by state the age at which juveniles are transferred to adult court); Legal Ages 
Laws, LAW LIBR. – AM. L. & LEGAL INFO., https://law.jrank.org/pages/11848/Legal-Ages.html (last visited 
May 3, 2020) (charting various “legal ages” by state). 
343. See William J. Chopik & Hannah L. Giasson, Age Differences in Explicit and Implicit Age Attitudes 
Across the Life Span, 57 GERONTOLOGIST S169, S169–70 (2017) (noting that “little attention has been paid to 
how implicit and explicit attitudes differ across [one’s] life span” and finding various implicit preferences 
based on age). 
344. See Roger C. Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions: A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
421, 426 (1969); Barry M. Sweedler, Strategies to Reduce Youth Drinking and Driving, 14 ALCOHOL HEALTH & 
RES. WORLD 76 (1990). 
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One possibility is that the age-based implicit stereotypes in this setting serve 
to improve the condition of older litigants who enjoy lower fines for similar 
offenses. This dynamic can be a manifestation of “benevolent ageism”: older 
people may appear to benefit from ageist stereotypes when, in fact, these “ben-
efits” simply reinforce these biases.345 Under this interpretation, online proceed-
ings disrupt the stereotyping process by making it more difficult for judges to 
discern a litigant’s age. Another possibility is that the disparate outcomes in 
face-to-face proceedings reflect a conscious attempt (explicit bias) to deter 
young drivers. Yet even in that context, our finding that disparate treatment 
persists with statistical significance between ages twenty-six and thirty-five—a 
point in a typical driver’s life when they have between one and two decades of 
driving experience—blunts any “shaping young minds” argument for conscious 
bias. According to this view, online proceedings as currently deployed simply 
make it harder for judges to punish younger litigants. Finally, our traditional 
processes may work to the benefit—at least with respect to fines—of older 
litigants, perhaps because they are experienced and less intimidated by judges; 
by contrast, online proceedings may empower younger people. 
With respect to gender, we do not observe outcome disparities under tra-
ditional proceedings—nor in online proceedings. While much attention has 
been dedicated to examining the impact of judge gender on legal outcomes, 
there is less research studying the role, if any, of party gender.346 Existing re-
search provides inconclusive findings, possibly because it is very difficult to find 
a pool of cases that are equivalent in the type of legal matter, the size of the 
stakes, and the surrounding context across genders,347 particularly in the crimi-
nal domain.348 Here, we locate a class of disputes—civil traffic violations—in 
which we can more easily assemble equivalent pools.  
Although our research does not find gender-based disparities in legal out-
comes in face-to-face proceedings, we cannot claim that there are no implicit 
or structural biases in traditional hearings.349 But the fact that a shift in medium 
and with it the change from oral to written communication does not seem to 
produce a change of some sort suggests that 1) little or no implicit bias exists, 
2) implicit bias continues apace online because it is—currently—somewhat easy 
 
345. Cf. Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism as Complemen-
tary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 109, 110 (2001) (stating that “[b]enevolent sexism 
is a subtle form of prejudice, yet the ideology it represents may be far from trivial in promoting gender 
inequality”). 
346. With respect to the impact of judge gender on outcomes, evidence is also inconsistent. See Boyd 
et al., supra note 56, at 392. 
347. The difficulty of creating equivalent or comparable case pools is due in part to the fact that women 
and men have different criminological landscapes, both in terms of the crimes they commit as well as the 
circumstances surrounding those crimes. See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan, Gender and Crime: 
Toward a Gendered Theory of Female Offending, 22 ANN. REV. SOC. 459, 460–64 (1996). 
348. See Sonja B. Starr, Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases, 17 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
127, 128–29 (2015). 
349. See supra notes 296–303 and accompanying text. 
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to discover a person’s gender in online proceedings (through a litigant’s name), 
or 3) there is no gender-group comparative advantage to using online hearings 
versus traditional hearings. This last possibility seems at odds with research in-
dicating that differences between women’s and men’s writing styles lead to out-
come disparities in other contexts,350 but it may still make sense in light of the 
brief and straightforward nature of written statements in the traffic violation 
context, a question that is the subject of our future research. 
Finally, our study also contributes to the research on race-based disparities 
in the justice system by showing that black litigants experience worse outcomes 
than (observably) similarly situated nonblack litigants in terms of both court-
ordered fine amounts and the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction. In line 
with the large literature showing that racial identity is a common source of bias 
and disparity in the criminal justice system,351 we calculate large disparities for 
black traffic-court litigants in face-to-face courts, but these race-based outcome 
disparities appear to evaporate in online proceedings. Barring a selection story, 
the dramatic disappearance of these disparities seems very likely to result from 
a reduction of implicit bias and/or the influence of the online medium’s dis-
tinctive procedural attributes—for example, the shift to written form, the re-
moval of potentially stressful face-to-face encounters, and the additional 
procedural structure, which may put groups on more equal footing. Unlike with 
gender, ascertaining the race of a litigant is difficult in the online proceedings 
we study unless the litigant has a name that makes drawing an accurate inference 
about race easy for a judge.352 We hope to better understand the exact reason 
for this reduction in outcome disparities through future research. 
III. IMPARTIALITY IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL COURTS 
A. Toward a New Impartiality Equilibrium? 
Online courts have been gaining traction in recent years.353 This advance is 
due to two principal developments. The first is the growth of ODR—in partic-
ular, its evolution from resolving consumer controversies to addressing a 
 
350. Kolev et al., supra note 188. 
351. See generally Radley Balko, 21 More Studies Showing Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/04/09/more-studies-show 
ing-racial-disparities-criminal-justice-system/ (summarizing results from multiple studies showing racial bias 
in the criminal justice system). 
352.  See, e.g., Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 66, at 992 (finding that résumés with African-Amer-
ican-sounding names are 50% less likely to receive callbacks than résumés of similar quality with white-
sounding names). 
353. See Part II.B; supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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broader class of legal disputes.354 The second development is the maturing of 
court technology, especially record-keeping software. Pressure to enhance court 
efficiency and accessibility prompted this change, and improvements include 
allowing judges and lawyers remote access to court information, digitized case 
management, automatization of workflow functions, online filing of claims, and 
online publication of judicial rulings.355 The next natural step was to move be-
yond mere digitization and piecemeal communication to carrying out entire ju-
dicial processes online—a metamorphosis we are now observing with the 
expansion of ODR into public courts.356  
Alongside enhanced efficiency and access, the diffusion of technology in 
courts over the last decade has, inadvertently, opened the door to other poten-
tial advantages. As we argue in this Article, the shift from in-person to online 
proceedings changes the nature of litigation. These “technical” improvements 
may seem minor, but they have important implications for group-based dispari-
ties in litigation outcomes. The introduction of remote, text-based, asynchro-
nous judicial proceedings has, at a minimum, the potential to allay unwarranted 
disparities due to implicit biases by limiting a judge’s exposure to a party’s iden-
tity information. In our work, we find that despite judges having some identity-
relevant information available to them in text format, the elimination of physi-
cal encounters appears to reduce or eliminate disparate outcomes correlated 
with certain identity characteristics.357  
Addressing litigation disparities through the use of online court technology 
does not involve the tools and approaches that underlie more traditional inter-
ventions to reduce bias (i.e., developing awareness and motivation to counter 
the automatic tendencies toward and triggers of implicit bias).358 These conven-
tional efforts demand substantial resources as well as a strong and consistent 
commitment from individual judges, court personnel, and courts as institutions. 
But such resources are often difficult to collect and maintain because the legal 
system is under constant pressure to cut costs and improve efficiency. Plus, 
judges and court administrators may find it psychologically difficult to commit 
those resources when reducing implicit bias seems elusive—despite judges be-
ing fiercely devoted to impartial decision-making in the abstract.359  
Online proceedings can make ex post debiasing unnecessary, obviating the 
need for an enduring and systemic commitment by courts to costly debiasing 
 
354. The spread of smartphones and social media induced dramatic changes in Internet-use patterns, 
blurring pure online and offline activities and transforming what individuals view as an appropriate domain 
for online solutions. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
355. See supra notes 205–07 and accompanying text. 
356. See supra notes 209–14 and accompanying text. For a list of courts throughout the United States 
and worldwide using ODR, see Courts Using ODR, NAT’L CTR. FOR TECH. & DISP. RESOL., 
http://odr.info/courts-using-odr/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2020). 
357. See supra Part II.D. 
358. See, e.g., supra notes 138–61 and accompanying text. 
359. See supra Part I.A. 
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efforts. Eliminating—or at least reducing—implicit bias becomes an ex ante de-
sign choice rather than an ever-repeating Sisyphean stage of judicial decision-
making.360 This may be both good and bad, precisely because online proceed-
ings can reinforce impartiality without an explicit commitment to eliminating 
implicit or structural biases. Courts should adopt measures to reduce judicial 
exposure to group-identity-related traits and add structure to judicial delibera-
tions as fairly simple prescriptions from this study. If courts take these steps, 
however, judges may feel relieved of their responsibility to become aware of 
such biases and the relationships of these biases to structure, process, and de-
cision-making.361 Further, courts may lose focus on the need to uncover new 
sources of bias that may be associated with online engagement.362 
At the same time, online “blinding” techniques appear to have real potential 
to succeed where other approaches to address bias have struggled, and we may 
be just fine with behind-the-scenes bias reduction, even if it comes at a cost of 
clouding our awareness of biases and openly discussing them less often. The 
time and effort required of judges—from undergoing bias training, to imple-
menting its lessons in their deliberations, to preventing the automatic triggering 
of biases—are significant. Moreover, judicial decision-making occurs under cir-
cumstances that are quite susceptible to implicit biases—especially when it 
comes to civil infractions. Judges operate under extreme time pressure, handle 
a heavy caseload, and are often evaluated according to their ability to “close 
cases” rather than deliver justice.363 Indeed, these common conditions might 
account for the limited success of some measures to counter biases.364 Shifting 
to online proceedings avoids the trade-off between impartiality and efficiency. 
It could advance both objectives simultaneously.365  
 
360. Obviously, one could design the platform to highlight relevant group-identity features, thereby 
ensuring their salience, much as in the face-to-face setting. But it is not certain that, even where salient, these 
features would have the same effect online. 
361. See Mahoney, The Myth of Judicial Neutrality, supra note 12, at 811–19 (describing threats when courts 
do not focus on the sources of bias and its impact ). We do not suggest that the solution lies in race (or gender 
or age) blindness generally, an approach that has been found problematic. See Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in 
the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 
77, 84 (2000). Rather, we suggest that online proceedings may be more successful than face-to-face settings 
in avoiding the effects of implicit bias despite the fact that some identity-related information is available to 
decision makers in court records. See, e.g., supra notes 184–88. 
362.  Research regarding discrimination in online settings ranges from online education to participation 
in the sharing economy. See, e.g., Rachel Baker et al., supra note 275; Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, 
Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014). 
363. See Guthrie et al., supra note 166, at 35 (characterizing judges’ time pressures as an “enormous 
challenge, often inducing less-than-optimal decision making”); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CTR. FOR 
FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, HANDLING CASES INVOLVING SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS 10-
1 (2019), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/benchguide_self_rep_litigants.pdf (“Under time pressure 
and stress of heavy and intense calendars, judges must determine how they can best perform their fact-finding 
and decision-making functions when the parties involved are not legally trained . . . .”). 
364. Geyh, supra note 1, at 514. 
365. For a discussion of the possibility of overcoming the efficiency-fairness trade-off in dispute reso-
lution when conducted online, see KATSH & RABINOVICH-EINY, supra note 198, at 179. 
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It is important to acknowledge that diminishing implicit biases is not a nec-
essary consequence of using technology to resolve disputes; it is a product of 
specific design choices as they are implemented in a particular online platform 
in a particular dispute-resolution environment.366 Technology is not bias neu-
tral; we recognize that there are “values in the design” of digital technology367—
and accept the central role of design choices in developing and implementing 
technology.368 While all legal proceedings—online and offline—are based on 
design at some level, the introduction of online proceedings has transformed 
this reality, situating design-related concerns at the forefront. 
Matterhorn’s design choices appear likely to dampen the impact of visible 
markers of group identity on judicial decision-making. Matterhorn’s dashboard 
and workflow reduce the salience of parties’ group identities, but they do not 
(and, practically, perhaps cannot) eliminate this information altogether. And yet 
judges’ exposure to written on-screen information relevant to party identity on 
Matterhorn (e.g., date of birth) does not seem, in our data, to have the same 
effect as face-to-face exposure to the parties in open court.369 Under different 
design options, identity could be either more (video-based communication) or 
less (communication without any identity markers) pronounced. Such design 
 
366.  For example, race is conspicuous in videoconferencing proceedings, which are becoming more 
common in U.S. courts—particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. See Aaron Haas, Videoconferencing 
in Immigration Proceedings, 5 PIERCE L. REV. 59, 62–64 (2006); Ryan Autullo, Texas Moving to Virtual Courts to 
Avoid Coronavirus Spread, STATESMAN (Mar. 20, 2020, 12:23 PM), https://www.statesman.com/news/20200 
320/texas-moving-to-virtual-courts-to-avoid-coronavirus-spread; Hannah Brock, Michigan Courts Improve Vir-
tual Services Due to COVID-19, ST. NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://statenews.com/article/2020/03/michigan-
courts-improve-virtual-services-due-to-covid-19?ct=content_open&cv=cbox_latest; Christina Vazquez, Mi-
ami-Dade Courts Readying ‘Virtual’ Hearings Due to COVID-19 Crisis, LOCAL10 (Apr. 2, 2020, 6:40 PM), 
https://www.local10.com/news/local/2020/04/02/miami-dade-courts-readying-virtual-hearings-due-to-
covid-19-crisis/. 
367. Helen Nissenbaum, Values in Technical Design, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, 
AND ETHICS lxvi, lxvi (Carl Mitcham ed., 2005); see also Ayelet Sela, e-Nudging Justice: The Role of Digital Choice 
Architecture in Online Courts, J. DISP. RESOL., 2019, at 127, 137 (noting that the setup of online courts—the 
intentional choices of the designers—influences how litigants and others will act). 
368. See, e.g., Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute Systems Design, 
17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 151, 197–98 (2012); Lisa Toohey et al., Meeting the Access to Civil Justice Challenge: 
Digital Inclusion, Algorithmic Justice, and Human-Centered Design, 19 MACQUARIE L.J. 133, 152–54 (2019). For 
analyses of the values in design of dispute-resolution systems in general, see generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons from 
International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195 (2009), and Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, 
An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009). 
369. A different explanation may lie in the nature of identity online. As we note above, judges are 
exposed to parties’ names as well as their gender and date of birth (in written form)—yet another design 
choice in Matterhorn’s ODR process. Parties also have the opportunity to write their own statement to the 
court at the outset of the process. Perhaps judges are aware of substantial elements of parties’ group identities, 
but the way in which identity operates in online communication is different than in physical settings. This 
could explain why judicial exposure to group-identity-related features in this format and medium does not 
appear to generate biased outcomes. Most of the writing on the changing notion of identity online has focused 
on the ways in which users perceive their own identity. See, e.g., DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE 
SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 29–53 (2014). Here, we suggest that the change in medium may 
change the ways in which people react to the identity of others. This is, as far as we know, uncharted territory 
that we hope to explore in future projects. 
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choices could fine-tune the degree to which online platform technology reduces 
the threat of implicit bias in judicial decision-making.370 This is especially im-
portant when the advantages of reducing implicit biases must be balanced 
against losing relevant identity information.  
Matterhorn’s online proceedings may also curb unwarranted outcome dis-
parities through their implicit translation of procedural rules into code and 
structured punishment options. Judicial discretion can be channeled in ways 
that may limit both implicit bias and structural bias.371 Online proceedings, just 
as with face-to-face hearings, can be designed to reduce the unintentional and 
wasteful randomness that can lead to group-based outcome disparities. Ex ante 
decisions can be made to ask the same questions in the same order, use identical 
language, and include proposed predetermined options for outcomes, for ex-
ample, imposing structure and encouraging consistency.372 As was once fa-
mously stated in the early days of the Internet, “code is law.”373  
While law is rich with procedural rules on the books, the reality of face-to-
face judicial proceedings today is quite different from what the dense corpus of 
procedural law might imply.374 Some have termed this variety of informal judi-
cial practices—employed in an attempt to close cases in a speedy and inexpen-
sive manner—“judicial dispute resolution.”375 In some contexts, judges operate 
with very limited direction, often in the early phases of the process and often 
 
370. Notwithstanding the significance of the design choices made in the Matterhorn platform, merely 
removing proceedings from the physical setting may lessen the degree of implicit bias, even if identity-related 
features are not concealed. Removal creates psychological distance between a judge and the parties in a case, 
which is more conducive to rule-based, as opposed to identity-based, decision-making. Avital Mentovich et 
al., Justice Without Borders: The Influence of Psychological Distance and Construal Level on Moral Exclusion, 42 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1349, 1360 (2016). 
371. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 8, at 3, 17; see, e.g., supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
372. Indeed, this characteristic of coded solutions has also given rise to critiques against ODR that 
warn against its uniform approach as well as the “translation issues” associated with substituting complex 
legal rules with code. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mediation 3.0: Merging the Old and the New, 2018 ASIAN J. ON 
MEDIATION 1, 14, 17. Similarly, Jean Sternlight recently questioned the ability of ODR to address the “mal-
leability and unpredictability of human wants” through “box creation” and “box checking.” Jean R. Sternlight, 
Pouring a Little Psychological Cold Water on Online Dispute Resolution, 2020 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 14–17. 
373. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); see also Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 
553–54 (1998). 
374. The “vanishing trial” phenomenon has made trials a scarce occurrence and has given rise to “man-
agerial judging” and other informal practices. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials 
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 519–20 (2004); Marc Galanter 
& Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without a Cat: The Continuing Decline & Displacement of Trials in American Courts, 
143 DAEDALUS 115, 126 (2014); Resnik, supra note 165, at 376–77. 
375. Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, Introduction to THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE 
JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1, 2 (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013); Michal Alberstein, Judicial 
Conflict Resolution (JCR): A New Jurisprudence for an Emerging Judicial Practice, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 
879, 898–905 (2015) (discussing various forms of judicial conflict resolution). 
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by intervening “off the record,” making any appeals doubtful.376 This phenom-
enon weakens structured judicial decision-making, a principal means for ensur-
ing the positive aspect of impartiality, both ex ante and ex post.377 Absent such 
structure, biases become more likely to shape judicial decision-making.378 Mat-
terhorn substitutes for informal hearings of civil-infraction cases, which sit at 
the center of judicial dispute resolution.379 The employment of this technology 
has introduced structure through preconfigured exchanges and options into 
what was, beforehand, a loose environment with few rules to guide judicial de-
cision-making. While any particular rule or process configuration that a court 
selects may be subject to critique, guided discretion generally weakens the threat 
of outcome disparities in judicial decision-making.  
Reducing outcome disparities was not a principal motivating factor in Mat-
terhorn’s original design, and particular design choices (such as whether to dis-
play certain party-related identity information on a particular screen or not) had 
more to do with how best to replicate and improve the judge’s in-person expe-
rience and the preferences of the court in question.380 The primary considera-
tions driving design choices were making available legally material information, 
system accessibility and ease of use, and efficient communication between 
judges and parties.381 In designing new systems, priorities and trade-offs ought 
to be explicitly identified and debated—who should have a voice in the design 
phase (which professions, types of users, etc.), what values and goals should be 
promoted (efficiency, fairness, legitimacy), and so on. Early design conversa-
tions should also anticipate the ongoing improvement of the system as we learn 
by studying the consequences of initial design choices.382  
The potential of online hearing technology to reduce biases and counteract 
structural sources of disparities is exciting, but achieving such goals using online 
proceedings may put other legal values and goals at risk, some of which may 
 
376. See Resnik, supra note 165, at 376–78 (examining the costs in terms of impartiality and other as-
pects of traditional judging as federal judges adopt a managerial role); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial 
Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261, 1287–1315 (2010) (demonstrating that managerial judging has 
expanded beyond the preliminary stages of trials and can affect outcomes). 
377. See supra Part I.C. 
378. See supra Part I.C. 
379. See supra Part II.A. As we note here and above, explicit design choices can reduce implicit bias, 
which may render the justice system better able to realize both positive and negative aspects of impartiality 
than the traditional legal and ethical framework. 
380. See Persky, supra note 210; E-mail from M.J. Cartwright, supra note 237. 
381. See Persky, supra note 210; E-mail from M.J. Cartwright, supra note 237. 
382. Because all communication in online proceedings is exchanged and recorded digitally, these court 
processes create unique opportunities for learning about the connections between party characteristics, dis-
pute contexts, procedural choices, and substantive outcomes. See, e.g., Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 
213–14 (“[T]he systems can offer evolving guidance in the ongoing decision-rule creation and amendment 
process, thus fine-tuning the interactions between litigants and the court.”); O’Neil & Prescott, supra note 
182, at 223–24; Prescott, supra note 15, at 1999–2001. Our findings enrich the set of considerations designers 
of court processes can employ when choosing to move various proceedings online and illuminate some of 
the axes along which such processes should be evaluated and reformed over time. 
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carry significant weight to policymakers. In the next Subpart, we touch on some 
of the possible costs of shifting judicial proceedings online, and we reflect on 
the ways in which they could be mitigated or addressed. We also identify a few 
potential unexpected benefits of the growth of online procedures. 
B. Beyond Impartiality: Costs Associated with Online Court Proceedings 
1. Substantive Justice 
Online proceedings may reduce the impact of implicit and structural biases 
on litigation outcomes by reducing exposure to party-identity information, im-
posing structure, and replacing disparity-producing features. But, in doing so, 
remote interaction may veil the contextual and individual characteristics of the 
parties. One might argue that such traits appropriately influence judicial deci-
sions in certain cases, and their removal reinforces formal rather than substan-
tive equality. In fact, scholars have leveled similar objections against the “veil 
of ignorance” notion in philosophy.383 This approach has been criticized for 
preferring an abstract principle, inevitably overinclusive and underinclusive, to 
the particular circumstances of individuals and their social context.384 Conse-
quently, the failure of decision-making to take into account these details may 
run counter to the well-recognized principles of equity and mercy.  
Unlike formal equality, equity recognizes the legal system’s need to leave 
room for judicial discretion within the confines of the law to ensure that the 
consistent application of general principles across cases does not frustrate the 
realization of justice at the individual level.385 Indeed, “equitable discretion is 
not understood by moral philosophers as a flouting of the law, but as a neces-
sary part of making it whole.”386 Mercy complements the role of equity by 
broadening further the scope of judicial discretion, pushing it beyond the letter 
of the law.387 In appropriate cases, merciful judges deviate from the confines of 
 
383. Seyla Benhabib, The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg–Gilligan Controversy and Feminist 
Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 77, 88–91 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla 
Cornell eds., 1987); see also Iris Marion Young, Impartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Cri-
tiques of Moral and Political Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 57, 66 (Seyla 
Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987). These approaches object to the identity-blind justice ideal, claiming 
that such an endeavor is infeasible and undesirable. Instead, they advance an agenda premised on the need 
to connect judging with identity, both with respect to judicial identity (translating into calls for diversifying 
the bench) and party identity (calling for judicial decision-making that is responsive to party group identity). 
Benhabib, supra, at 91–95; Young, supra, at 66–67. 
384. See Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1285 (2016). 
385. Equity, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (“The mitigating principles, by the appli-
cation of which substantial justice may be attained in particular cases wherein the prescribed or customary 
forms of ordinary law seem to be inadequate.”) 
386.  Roth, supra note 384, at 1285. 
387.  See Richard H. S. Tur, Defeasibilism, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 366–67 (2001) (tracing the 
concept of mercy as fairness outside of the letter of the law to Roman times). 
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rigid legal rules and principles in order to reach a just outcome. To many, ab-
stract legal principles that do not allow for adequate levels of equity and mercy 
present a hollow and incomplete understanding of justice.388 
More broadly, scholars have argued that the quest for abstract formal jus-
tice fails to consider the unique history, perspectives, and experiences of non-
dominant group members.389 Here, the critique shifts from a focus on the 
individual to the collective, particularly those historically disadvantaged or mar-
ginalized.390 Critics make the claim that the Rawlsian principles undergirding a 
traditional understanding of impartiality—autonomy, rationality, and equality—
are themselves not impartial.391 One version of this claim is that these principles 
are necessarily steeped with Western culture’s biases about historically disad-
vantaged groups, a belief that engenders deep skepticism toward the idea that 
such concepts can remedy the unfairness and injustice experienced by members 
of such groups in concrete cases.392 A second and related argument is that the 
Rawlsian understanding of impartiality as color- and gender-blindness fails to 
take into account the unique circumstances and experiences that shape the lives 
and choices of members of such groups.393 For example, feminists and com-
munitarians have questioned the supremacy that Rawls attached to reason over 
feelings, empathy, connection, and community.394  
Under this view, the pursuit of formal equality may ultimately serve to shore 
up existing inequalities under the guise of impartial decision-making.395 This 
critique seems particularly relevant in our context, where some of the biases we 
document in face-to-face settings appear to operate in ways that favor members 
of a sometimes powerless and marginalized group—the elderly. One could as-
sert that by stripping cases of identity-related features, online procedures limit 
our legal system’s ability to include relevant group-based perspectives. How-
ever, in today’s courts, which are both highly overworked and operating in an 
 
388.  Roth, supra note 384, at 1285 (“Unlike equity, which is a necessary part of rendering overinclusive 
laws just, mercy is leniency granted by the grace of private persons beyond what justice alone demands or 
even allows.”). This view seems to explain jury nullification—an acquittal based on the jury’s view that ap-
plying formal law would violate its moral conscience. See Keith E. Niedermeier et al., Exceptions to the Rule: 
The Effects of Remorse, Status, and Gender on Decision Making, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 604, 606–07 (2001); 
Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168, 181–83 (1972). 
389. See Sheila Foster, Rawls, Race, and Reason, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–17 (2004); Susan 
Moller Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1540 (2004). 
390. E.g., Okin, supra note 389, at 550–51. 
391. Foster, supra note 389, at 1717. 
392. Id. 
393. See Christopher Wolsko et al., Framing Interethnic Ideology: Effects of Multicultural and Color-Blind Per-
spectives on Judgments of Groups and Individuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 635, 648–49 (2000); see also 
Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 
40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417, 418 (2004) (confirming that a race-conscious rather than a race-
blind approach would more effectively address racial problems). 
394. See Young, supra note 383, at 61–63. 
395. Foster, supra note 389, at 1717–18; see Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 135, 
at 49–50. 
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increasingly informal manner to speed case closure, identity information seems 
more likely to become a source of implicit bias rather than the wellspring of a 
richer understanding of the unique experiences of dispossessed and vulnerable 
parties. More important, such theoretical claims are in tension with the empiri-
cal findings that demonstrate that biases favoring certain group members can 
be no less detrimental than negative biases since both positive and negative 
biases stem from, and reinforce, the same stereotypes.396 
Appropriately structured online proceedings may offer an avenue for bridg-
ing the tension between the need to be sensitive to context and identity and the 
need to ensure judicial impartiality. Technology typically adds flexibility and op-
tions (since traditional avenues can be retained), and court ODR processes can 
be designed in myriad ways. For example, the design of online court technology 
could attempt to illuminate parties’ idiosyncratic circumstances while also ren-
dering implicit identity-based biases less influential.397 Moreover, when it is es-
sential to incorporate group-identity information into judicial decision-making 
to achieve a just outcome, online systems could permit or encourage disclosure, 
either as a design feature or via complementary procedures. More broadly, con-
figurable online systems allow for a much more tailored calibration of judicial 
exposure to party-identity details (e.g., by case type, underlying facts, or identity 
characteristics) than is possible with traditional one-size-fits-all face-to-face 
hearings. Online proceedings (and technology more generally) thus offer at least 
some hope of reducing biases while still achieving justice.  
2. Procedural Justice 
The qualities of legal proceedings and the way parties perceive them have 
been found to be key factors in how people experience and evaluate the legal 
system generally and judicial decision-making in particular.398 In fact, according 
to procedural-justice theory, the perceived fairness of legal proceedings, more 
than the favorability of their outcomes, are tightly linked to belief in the legiti-
macy of the legal system and to long-term commitment to the rule of the law.399 
Perceptions of procedural fairness are anchored in a number of key factors, 
several of which are relevant to how members of the public are likely to appraise 
online proceedings as they become more common. The first has to do with the 
nature of the proceedings themselves—whether they are impartial, transparent, 
 
396. See note 345 and accompanying text. 
397. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 232–35 (discussing the ways in which ODR may provide a 
degree of anonymization while also providing relevant information, such as ability to pay). 
398. Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Proce-
dures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 (1988). 
399. See id.; see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 375, 378–80 (2006). 
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and principled.400 The second has to do with the qualities of any interpersonal 
treatment—whether the decision-making authority (in our context, judges) gave 
respectful and dignifying treatment to the involved parties.401 A third and last 
element, cutting across both concerns for fair decision-making procedures and 
interpersonal, respectful treatment, is the opportunity for voice—the ability of 
parties to present their story before a decision maker.402  
Online proceedings and courts raise at least a few procedural justice-related 
challenges. To begin with, the shift online may generate tension between com-
ponents of procedural fairness: online proceedings may promote impartiality, 
structure, and transparency, but they will also significantly reduce the interper-
sonal content of judicial decision-making.403 This is consequential, as research 
shows that people place higher value on the interpersonal element of procedural 
justice than the quality of decision-making.404 In addition, procedural-justice 
perceptions are necessarily subjective, and while the limited nature of interper-
sonal interactions online is evident, the potential impartiality benefits may be 
less obvious to parties; in fact, online court users may not be aware of them at 
all and, therefore, may attach little significance to such benefits.405 Finally, alt-
hough there are reasons to believe that proceedings held in an online arena can 
 
400. See Jonathan Jackson et al., Compliance and Legal Authority, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 456, 457–58 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). 
401. Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning 
of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 748 (2003). 
402. Jackson et al., supra note 400, at 458 (“A key element of procedural justice is the implementation 
of voice practices. Voice means providing opportunities for individuals to participate in decision-making 
processes. In situations of everyday disagreements and conflicts it is important to provide opportunities for 
individuals to state their case before decisions concerning them are made. Informal dispute resolution mech-
anisms are popular in part because participating in decision making allows people to voice their own personal 
concerns, stating what they think the issues involved are, making suggestions for how they should be handled. 
Such opportunities for voice need not involve a formal or elaborate mechanism. Studies of police street stops, 
for example, indicate that when officers provide people an opportunity to tell their side of the story before 
they take action, people are much more likely to feel fairly treated.”). 
403. See Sternlight, supra note 372, at 21 (discussing some of the limitations of online dispute resolution 
in terms of richness of communication). 
404. See generally Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social 
Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349, 357 (2003) (“[W]ithin the study 
of procedural justice, research has shifted from exclusively defining procedural fairness by the quality of 
decision-making procedures to broader definitions of procedural fairness that also consider the quality of 
people’s interpersonal treatment when they are interacting with others. This is consistent with the prominent 
role that treatment criteria of procedural justice play in the group engagement model . . . .”). 
405. Early survey research on the determinants of procedural-justice perceptions of online systems 
indicates that “ease of use” matters and may also substitute in some way for interpersonal interactions, given 
that ease of use is related to feelings toward court officials. See Youyang Hou et al., Factors in Fairness and 
Emotion in Online Case Resolution Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2017 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2511, 2519 (2017) (“Ease of use is important in all online systems, but 
one important and novel finding here is that ease of use and perceptions of procedural justice interacted 
strongly in their relationship with emotion toward court officials. For online judicial systems, priority should 
be placed on ease of use that promotes a strong sense of procedural justice.”). For another analysis of the 
potential impact of ODR on procedural-justice perceptions, see Elayne E. Greenberg & Noam Ebner, 
Strengthening Online Dispute Resolution Justice 29–30 (St. John’s Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 19-0032, 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3434058 (stating that participants in ODR felt they 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559773
1 PRESCOTT 893–979.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/20  10:08 AM 
2020] Are Litigation Outcome Disparities Inevitable? 971 
fulfill a litigant’s need to be heard,406 we know too little about how voice works 
in an online court setting. Together, these challenges may undermine the legit-
imacy of online proceedings in the public’s eyes. 
At the same time, the vast majority of procedural-justice research has been 
conducted in traditional face-to-face settings. The question of how individuals 
experience online proceedings remains very much open. Components of pro-
cedural fairness may change as interactions move online, perhaps reducing the 
significance of interpersonal interaction.407 It is also possible that online oppor-
tunities will prove to be more conducive to voice, allowing litigants to tell their 
stories from the comfort of their homes and at their own pace.408 Here also, the 
particular design choices made in online platforms could enhance—or dimin-
ish—opportunities for voice. In this context, it is important to remember that 
the ideal of the full adversarial proceeding is far removed from the reality of 
“mass justice” and speedy informal hearings in which voice is rigidly circum-
scribed. Furthermore, the expansion of procedural options to resolve disputes 
(including online hearings) can be seen as yet another layer of “process plural-
ism,” offering parties a broad range of processes for various types of disputes, 
contexts, and preferences, which can ultimately enhance the public’s percep-
tions of the fairness and effectiveness of the judicial system.409  
3. Access to Justice, the Digital Divide, and Structural Disparities 
The access-to-justice movement emerged in the 1960s, dedicated to making 
it easier for the poor to make use of the judicial system.410 The initial focus was, 
understandably, on reducing the direct and indirect financial costs associated 
 
were “treated in a dignified manner” if the platform “clarified each process” and resolved conflicts “in a 
timely manner” and that they felt they “ha[d] an opportunity to express themselves” by “enter[ing] their 
information into the ODR platform, even though they did not engage with a human”). 
406. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 229–31 (written-communication benefits); O’Neil & Pres-
cott, supra note 182, at 221–22 (convenience benefits). 
407. See supra note 405. 
408. See Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 229–31. Interestingly, enhanced procedural fairness could 
reduce both perceptions and the actual existence of judicial bias. Further research into procedural justice and 
outcome disparities in online proceedings could deepen our understanding of the connection between the 
elements of procedural justice, bias, and online court proceedings. See generally Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, 
Procedural Fairness, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 229 (Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017). 
409. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 107, at 577 (“[P]eople judge their satisfaction with legal processes by 
their participation in and perceptions of fairness of those processes, irrespective of the outcomes.”). A recent 
experiment conducted by Ayelet Sela provides support for such a hypothesis; she finds that online asynchro-
nous communication—in both written and video formats—results in robust perceptions of procedural jus-
tice. Sela, supra note 133, at 363–84. Stanford University students participated in what they believed to be a 
test for a new online system for handling student violations of the university’s honor code. Id. at 363–64. The 
highest levels of procedural justice were experienced by participants who communicated with the judge via 
text messages and received, in return, video messages from the judge. Id. at 377. These findings suggest that 
not all online mediums may equally address procedural-justice needs. 
410. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to 
Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181, 197–98 (1978). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559773
1 PRESCOTT 893–979.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/9/20  10:08 AM 
972 ALABAMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:4:893 
with court processes, which presented a heavy burden for those who were eco-
nomically disadvantaged.411 The access-to-justice agenda eventually came to en-
compass the design of legal proceedings, generating momentum for ideas 
related to small-claims courts, class actions, and ADR processes.412 Today, the 
potential of technology to improve access to justice is center stage,413 with tech-
nology both touted as an opportunity and criticized an obstacle.414  
 Technology, of course, can lower the costs, time, and travel necessary for 
participating in face-to-face legal proceedings.415 Yet, in its early stages at least, 
access to and familiarity with online technology were unequally distributed in 
society.416 Incorporating digital technology often proved more of a barrier than 
a boost for the population most in need of access.417 In recent years, as advances 
in mobile technology have made Internet access broadly available and improve-
ments in the interface and language of digital platforms have made using them 
simpler and more engaging,418 handling one’s claim online has become a realis-
tic option for virtually everyone. And yet the digital divide remains. Technology 
and Internet access are broadly available,419 but patterns of use vary across so-
cioeconomic strata.420 These patterns mirror existing social, cultural, and eco-
nomic divisions, with some evidence indicating that marginalized groups—such 
as low-income racial minorities—use the Internet mostly for entertainment and 
 
411. Id. at 196–97. 
412. Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Framework of the World-Wide Ac-
cess-to-Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L. REV. 282, 285, 288 (1993). 
413. See Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 184–86. 
414. Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 410, at 196–227 (discussing the successive “waves” of approaches 
to access-to-justice problems). 
415. Bulinski & Prescott, supra note 11, at 222–28; Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 213. 
416. James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 241, 258–
264 (2012); Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 110, at 180–81. 
417. For a discussion of concerns over ODR and the digital divide, see, for example, Menkel-Meadow, 
Is ODR ADR?, supra note 135, and supra note 280. See also Toohey et al., supra note 368, at 145 (2019) (finding 
it “insufficient” in a digitally inclusive society for a person merely to have “access to a device or internet 
connection,” but rather that “technological advancements must . . . take into consideration the sociological 
challenges faced by end users”). 
418. See Charles Arthur, How the Smartphone Is Killing the PC, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2011, 3:30 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/jun/05/smartphones-killing-pc. But see Amy J. Schmitz, 
Expanding Access to Remedies Through E-Court Initiatives, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 89, 159 (2019) (discussing the limits 
of cell-phone use for dispute resolution). 
419. For some people and under certain circumstances, technology may encumber or limit access, ra-
ther than facilitate it. Although the digital divide has diminished in most respects in recent years, Internet 
access for members of disadvantaged groups remains at least somewhat lower than for white people. See 
Prescott, supra note 15, at 2011 & n.86; Robert W. Fairlie, Have We Finally Bridged the Digital Divide? Smart Phone 
and Internet Use Patterns by Race and Ethnicity, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 14, 2017), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/in 
dex.php/fm/article/view/7919/6523. 
420.  Hyunwoo Yoon et al., Older Adults’ Internet Use for Health Information: Digital Divide by Race/Ethnicity 
and Socioeconomic Status, 39 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY 105, 107–08 (2020); Fairlie, supra note 419. 
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shopping.421 If true, those who might benefit most from making online pro-
ceedings available may be the least predisposed to take advantage of such op-
portunities and the least prepared to succeed if they do.  
 Furthermore, as we acknowledge above, social and economic cleavages may 
reappear within online proceedings—just as they do in face-to-face settings but 
in entirely different ways, possibly exacerbating (or mitigating) group-based out-
come disparities.422 For instance, the relative ability of someone to make a con-
vincing argument in a traditional face-to-face setting may track the litigant’s 
socioeconomic position. How moving litigation online will affect the status quo 
is an empirical question. Current online court proceedings rely on asynchronous 
written communication, some of it unstructured and one-directional. Relative 
to open-court back-and-forth, this mode of communication better allows for 
receiving advice and assistance from friends and family members, might ease 
performance anxiety, and may highlight differences in narrative-writing abilities 
(instead of differences in oral-advocacy skills).423 To the extent these changes 
differentially affect different groups (e.g., white versus black, young versus old), 
then shifting online could upset existing, but perhaps unrecognized, disparities 
that may arise out of the traditional structure of legal hearings.  
 Indeed, as we stress, this dynamic—rather than eliminating implicit bias—
could explain why young people, who are more experienced in conveying brief 
messages online, appear to do relatively better in online proceedings.424 Like-
wise, our finding that the relative outcomes of black litigants improve online 
could be the result of online proceedings just being different—and different in 
a way that happens to benefit black litigants relative to others on average. But, 
at least in theory, improvements with respect to outcome disparities may come 
at the cost of access-to-justice goals. In our study, for example, we find that 
 
421. See Fairlie, supra note 419; Jesse Washington, New Digital Divide Seen for Minorites on Internet, SF 
GATE (Feb. 13, 2011, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/New-digital-divide-seen-for-mi 
norities-on-Internet-2459621.php. But see Andrew Perrin & Erica Turner, Smartphones Help Blacks, Hispanics 
Bridge Some – but Not All – Digital Gaps with Whites, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.pewresearch. 
org/fact-tank/2019/08/20/smartphones-help-blacks-hispanics-bridge-some-but-not-all-digital-gaps-with-
whites/. 
422. See Part II.D (finding that seemingly neutral structure can lead to group-based disparities). 
423. See supra notes 123–24. But see supra note 351 and accompanying text. During the COVID-19 
pandemic that began in March 2020, many courts across the U.S. and worldwide simply shut down their 
physical courtrooms. Many courts held virtual hearings (typically employing videoconferencing technology) 
to allow real-time court proceedings to take place despite shelter-in-place orders and social-distancing re-
quirements. See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Coronavirus & The Courts, TABLEAU PUB., https://public.tableau. 
com/profile/ncscviz#!/vizhome/StateCourtResponsestoCOVID-19/CovidTheCourts (last updated May 
14, 2020). Clearly, under these procedural conditions, party demographics remain salient, proceedings are no 
more (and perhaps even less) structured than in-court proceedings, and the pressure to communicate effec-
tively in the moment remains pronounced. Indeed, the COVID-19 experience demonstrates the importance 
of designing court processes carefully and the need to reflect on both the nature of available mediums and 
the role of party characteristics. While such careful calibration may not be possible in the midst of a pandemic, 
it is highly desirable during times of routine operation. 
424. See supra notes 312–13 and accompanying text. 
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black court users are underrepresented in online proceedings,425 and yet the 
platform appears to work substantially in their favor. These findings may indi-
cate that the mere implementation of online proceedings alone is insufficient to 
improve access to courts for marginalized populations.  
 Research shows that specific, targeted outreach can improve online court 
use for especially disadvantaged communities.426 Implementation of online pro-
ceedings may need to be coupled with a tailored outreach strategy, at least if 
policymakers view the disparity reductions we identify as associated with online 
proceedings as attractive. An alternative, more exhaustive (and more radical) 
approach could be adopted to guarantee higher uptake: making online proceed-
ings the default arrangement for all users. The online tribunal in British Colum-
bia uses such an approach, mandating the use of online proceedings in small 
claims and certain neighbor disputes.427 In the short run, mandatory online tri-
bunals seem unlikely to take root in the United States, but a strategy built on 
introducing online court proceedings and actively encouraging their use by com-
munities that experience outcome disparities in traditional proceedings may 
achieve the right balance in the face of a lingering digital divide.428  
 
 
425. Black litigants account for 29% of all hearings prior to the implementation of online courts but 
only 15% of online proceedings in our sample. This is true at the individual court level, too. In the suburban 
court, black litigants account for 19% of all hearings before Matterhorn was implemented but only 8% of 
online hearings. In the urban court, black litigants account for 51% of all pre-Matterhorn hearings but only 
26% of online proceedings. 
426. Prescott, supra note 119, at 55–56, 60. Indeed, Toohey et al., supra note 368, advance this solution 
under the rubric of “legal design.” Id. at 154 (arguing that legal design “encourage[s] an iterative and user-
focused process of law reform and innovation that allows for miscalculations and mistaken assumptions to 
be made and corrected before a purported solution is released to an end user” and helps laypersons better 
understand “their rights and obligations in contexts such as an employment contract”). On legal design in 
traffic cases, see also Margaret Hagan, The Justice Is in the Details: Evaluating Different Self-Help Designs for Legal 
Capability in Traffic Court, 7 J. OPEN ACCESS L. (2019). 
427.  Shannon Salter, Chair, Civil Resolution Tribunal, Inaugural SCL Sir Brian Neill Lecture: Can 
Online Dispute Resolution Humanize the Justice System? (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.scl.org/podcasts/ 
10363-webinar-the-inaugural-scl-sir-brian-neill-lecture-can-online-dispute-resolution-humanize-the-justice-
system-by-shannon-salter. Besides its mandatory nature, the British Columbia tribunal works closely with 
litigants and groups representing the interests of various parties to help improve access to its online proceed-
ings. See id. (describing the close work tribunal officials carry out with all parties, their commitment to having 
all information online at a sixth-grade reading level, and their promise to provide effective over-the-telephone 
assistance for inexperienced users). 
428. In some contexts, research shows that online procedures increase access to justice—and not only 
for online users but also for parties using traditional processes in courthouses. See Prescott & Sanchez, supra 
note 203, at 53. The added efficiency afforded by online courts permeates the entire courthouse and results 
in greater access across mediums and cases. Id. Prescott and Sanchez analyzed the effect of online proceedings 
in a small-claims court and found that litigants for all online-proceeding-eligible case types—including those 
who did not use the online platform—experienced longer case durations and lower probabilities of receiving 
default dispositions. Id. at 33 n.2. Both of those results may indicate greater interaction with the court and, 
therefore, an improvement in access to justice. Notably, prior to the implementation of online courts, litigants 
had to compete with one another to access court resources during specific hours, id. at 36–37; online options 
seemingly lessened demand for in-person court resources, and the redistribution of newly available services 
benefited litigants who did not use the online platform. 
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CONCLUSION 
We have come to accept a world in which our system strives to be “impar-
tial enough.” In this system, judges follow legal and ethical prescriptions regard-
ing judicial decision-making, and courts adopt structures that limit discretion 
and ensure equal application of the law. But our judicial system often fails to 
attain impartiality. Despite efforts to debias judges through training and aware-
ness techniques, disparities in judicial decision-making persist, and traditional 
face-to-face procedures may also generate group-based structural disparities, 
potentially adding further to any systematic disparities across groups.  
 Online court processes may offer a new way to address these disparities. 
The adoption of online proceedings to date has been about efficiency and ac-
cess: courts, judges, and parties trying to cope with an ever-growing caseload 
and complex rules and procedures. But the use of digital technology can trans-
form legal processes. In particular, it has allowed remote online proceedings in 
which judges need not be exposed to parties’ group-based identity traits, parties 
and judges can interact and make decisions in a more structured environment, 
and exchanges may be entirely written and occur asynchronously. Research sug-
gests that such features may reduce group-based outcome disparities. 
 To explore the relationship between these online proceedings and group-
based outcome disparities, we studied over 5,000 traffic cases in multiple Mich-
igan state courthouses, comparing outcomes from informal in-court hearings 
with those of an ostensibly equivalent online process. The online proceedings 
rely on asynchronous text communication, add structure to the process, and 
reduce the salience of social identity. We found that online proceedings reduce 
or eliminate the apparent age- and race-based disparities that we detect in tra-
ditional face-to-face hearings. Our results are consistent with the idea that 
online proceedings—at least the format we study—mitigate the implicit and 
structural biases inherent in traditional in-person court hearings. The exposure 
to identity information that inevitably triggers implicit biases in the physical-
court environment becomes, in the online setting, a malleable function of de-
sign choices. Likewise, traditional features of court-based dispute resolution 
rooted in the fact that courts are a place where people meet and interact in 
person (e.g., oral advocacy)—but which may generate structural disparities—
are no longer necessary but merely optional.  
 Online proceedings entail their own weaknesses, however. Face-to-face ju-
dicial decision-making can better promote justice under certain circumstances. 
Nevertheless, under the varied procedural options available with online tech-
nology, courts can calibrate more carefully and easily when and where more 
traditional approaches would contribute to an equitable resolution and a just 
judicial system, breaking the all-or-nothing nature of face-to-face court settings, 
especially a judge’s inevitable awareness of a litigant’s identity traits. In addition, 
online proceedings support more structured procedures, which curb implicit 
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and structural biases by limiting discretion and carefully controlling the ways in 
which parties interact. The wide range of design choices is vital to the potential 
of online proceedings; the right ones, in the right contexts, will make it possible 
to make our legal system impartial in a way it has never been. 
In designing court proceedings, simply looking at efficiency is insufficient; 
we must also weigh the importance of access, equality, and legitimacy. Perhaps 
“the answer is not to forego mechanical proxies entirely. Machines can be allies 
in tackling complex problems not because they make things simpler, but be-
cause they enhance our own unique human experience with powers of percep-
tion, speed, and precision that humans could not dream of attaining 
unaided.”429 Moreover, “[w]e should reject both a romanticized view of the vir-
tues of unaided human justice and a fetishistic or statist view of the virtues of 
mechanical justice.”430 But progress begins with recognizing that human deci-
sion-making and court proceedings are subject to implicit and structural biases. 
Technology may be able to protect us and our institutions from unwarranted 
disparities, but to do that, it needs to be developed, tested, and refined. 
 
 
  
 
429. Roth, supra note 384, at 1300. 
430. Id. at 1305. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
      Note: Percentages in parentheses are column percentages of the total sample.  
Number of Cases
Closed Pre-Matterhorn Launch 870 0
Closed Post-Matterhorn Launch 1,843 2,519
Total 2,713 2,519
Litigant Age
Median 33 35
Mean (Std. Dev.) 36.9 (14.9) 37.8 (14.3)
Minimum 18 18
Maximum 95 86
Litigant Gender
Male 1,662 (61.26%) 1,423 (56.49%)
Female 1,051 (38.74%) 1,096 (43.51%)
Litigant Race
White 1,988 (73.28%) 2,095 (83.17%)
Black 680 (25.06%) 384 (15.24%)
Asian 43 (1.58%) 38 (1.51%)
Native-American 2 (0.07%) 2 (0.08%)
Zip-Code Socioeconomic Status
Low-Income 354 (13.05%) 305 (12.11%)
Middle-Income 2,139 (78.84%) 1,866 (74.08%)
High-Income 220 (8.11%) 348 (13.82%)
In-Person Hearings Online Hearings
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Table 2. Litigant Demographics and Court-Ordered Fines 
 
Notes: The table reports results from OLS regressions in which the outcome variable is the total fine 
(in dollars) that a litigant is ordered to pay the court after an online hearing or a face-to-face informal 
hearing. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, 
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Online Hearing (0 = No, 1 = Yes) -5.104*** -7.125*** -5.635*** -3.916***
(1.197) (1.498) (1.495) (1.253)
Age Above 35 Years (0 = No, 1 = Yes) -3.391*** -5.363*** -3.382*** -3.382***
(0.912) (1.659) (0.913) (0.911)
Gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) -1.095 -1.049 -1.738 -1.085
(0.848) (0.850) (1.583) (0.847)
Race (0 = Nonblack, 1 = Black) 3.659*** 3.590*** 3.683*** 6.416***
(1.351) (1.353) (1.352) (2.054)
Age Above 35 × Online Hearing 4.056**
(1.785)
Gender × Online Hearing 1.292
(1.744)
Race × Online Hearing -6.999***
(2.330)
Constant 161.856*** 163.325*** 162.058*** 161.193***
(10.079) (10.098) (10.111) (10.128)
Controls
Judge-ID Indicator ü ü ü ü
Final-Charge Indicator ü ü ü ü
Linear and Squared Time Trends ü ü ü ü
Case Filed Month and Year Indicators ü ü ü ü
Out-of-State Driver’s License Indicator ü ü ü ü
Case Closed Post-Matterhorn Indicator ü ü ü ü
Charges-Reduced Indicator ü ü ü ü
Local-Resident Indicator ü ü ü ü
Mean Household Income by Zip Code ü ü ü ü
No. of Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232
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Table 3. Litigant Demographics and Likelihood of Charge Reduction 
 
Notes: The table reports results from logit regressions in which the dichotomous outcome variable is 
equal to one if the litigant’s original charges are amended to lower charges after an online hearing or 
a face-to-face informal hearing and equal to zero otherwise. Estimates are shown as odds ratios (i.e., 
exponentiated coefficients of the logistic regression) for all but the interaction term, which is a ratio 
of odds ratios. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols 
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Online Hearing (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 7.613*** 7.679*** 7.372*** 6.963***
(0.817) (1.044) (0.940) (0.791)
Age Above 35 Years (0 = No, 1 = Yes) 1.158* 1.165 1.159* 1.160*
(0.093) (0.116) (0.094) (0.094)
Gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 1.113 1.112 1.084 1.113
(0.092) (0.092) (0.111) (0.092)
Race (0 = Nonblack, 1 = Black) 0.729*** 0.729*** 0.729*** 0.637***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.080)
Age Above 35 × Online Hearing 0.982
(0.164)
Gender × Online Hearing 1.082
(0.184)
Race × Online Hearing 1.646**
(0.376)
Baseline Odds 0.389* 0.388* 0.391* 0.403*
(0.205) (0.205) (0.206) (0.213)
Controls
Judge-ID Indicator ü ü ü ü
Original-Charge Indicator ü ü ü ü
Linear and Squared Time Trends ü ü ü ü
Case Filed Month and Year Indicators ü ü ü ü
Out-of-State Driver’s License Indicator ü ü ü ü
Case Closed Post-Matterhorn Indicator ü ü ü ü
Local-Resident Indicator ü ü ü ü
Mean Household Income by Zip Code ü ü ü ü
No. of Observations 5,155 5,155 5,155 5,155
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